Common High Priority List

(February 23, 2024)

Since February 24, 2022, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has implemented a series of stringent export controls that restrict Russia’s access to the technologies and other items that it needs to sustain its brutal attack on Ukraine. These restrictions also apply to Belarus in response to its substantial enabling of Russia’s destabilizing conduct.

While BIS’s controls cover a vast array of items necessary to fuel Russia’s war machine, certain items are more significant to Russian weaponry than others. Working with the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom, BIS has developed the Common High Priority List (CHPL), which includes 50 items identified by six-digit Harmonized System (HS) Codes that Russia seeks to procure for its weapons programs. In this notice, BIS is publicizing these 50 common high priority items to highlight for industry that these items pose a heightened risk of being diverted illegally to Russia because of their importance to Russia’s war efforts. The list may be updated periodically as new information becomes available.

Common High Priority Items List

The CHPL is divided into four tiers.

·         Tier 1: Items of the highest concern due to their critical role in the production of advanced Russian precision-guided weapons systems, Russia’s lack of domestic production, and limited global manufacturers.

·         Tier 2: Additional electronics items for which Russia may have some domestic production capability but a preference to source from the United States and its partners and allies.

·         Tier 3.A: Further electronic components used in Russian weapons systems, with a broader range of suppliers.

·         Tier 3.B: Mechanical and other components utilized in Russian weapons systems.

·         Tier 4.A: Manufacturing, production and quality testing equipment for electric components, circuit boards and modules.

·         Tier 4.B: Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) machine tools and components.

Within the CHPL, BIS has prioritized the nine HS codes in Tier 1 and Tier 2—covering items such as integrated circuits and radio frequency (RF) transceiver modules—that have extensive commercial applications but have also been found in Russian missiles and drones on the battlefield in Ukraine. Taken together, items in Tiers 1 and 2 are subject to the most comprehensive controls under the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Parts 730 – 774) (EAR) (see, e.g., the controls on foreign produced items described in § 734.9 of the EAR ). Items in Tiers 1 and 2 have been described in previous notices issued by the U.S. government (see below).

The items in these 50 HS codes include both lower technology items designated EAR99, as well as more sensitive items on the Commerce Control List (supp. no. 1 to part 774 of the EAR ) (CCL), including items designated under Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs), 2A001, 2A101, 2A991, 2B001, 2B002, 2B003, 2B201, 2B991, 2B992, 2B993, 2B998, 3A001, 3A002, 3A090, 3A991, 3A992, 3B001, 3B991, 3B992, 5A001, 5A991, 6A002, 6A003, 6A993, 7A003, 7A994, and 9A991.

TIER 1

TIER 2

TIER 3.A

TIER 3.B

TIER 4.A

TIER 4.B

Russia’s efforts to procure high priority items create significant risks  that persons both inside the United States and globally may become (even inadvertently) entangled in violations of U.S. export controls and sanctions laws, resulting in potentially significant civil or criminal liability. Foreign parties engaged in activity contrary to U.S. foreign policy and national security interests may also be added to BIS’s Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the EAR ) or OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List . Russia routinely relies on evasive or deceptive tactics, such as the use of third-party intermediaries or transshipment points, to disguise the involvement of parties on the Entity List or SDN List in transactions and obscure the true identities of Russian end users, thereby circumventing restrictions. It is critical that exporters and reexporters (such as manufacturers, distributors, and resellers) as well as their service providers (such as financial institutions, logistics companies, transportation providers, and freight forwarders) are aware of the export control risks posed by Russia’s procurement efforts and adopt appropriate measures to counteract such risks.

Relation to Other Guidance Published by BIS and other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies

This list complements prior guidance issued by BIS and other U.S. Government departments and agencies on items sought by Russia, Belarus, and Iran, including guidance tailored to exporters and reexporters as well as guidance tailored to financial institutions. To date, this guidance has included:

·    FinCEN & BIS Joint Notice : FinCEN and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security Announce New Reporting Key Term and Highlight Red Flags Relating to Global Evasion of U.S. Export Controls (November 6, 2023)

·    Alert : FinCEN and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security Urge Increased Vigilance for Potential Russian and Belarusian Export Control Evasion Attempts (June 28, 2022).

·    BIS frequently asked questions   for exporters on the commodities and red flags identified in the June 28, 2022 FinCEN alert (August 16, 2022).

·    Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, and Department of Justice Tri-Seal Compliance Note : Cracking Down on Third-Party Intermediaries Used to Evade Russia-Related Sanctions and Export Controls (March 2, 2023).

·    Supplemental Alert : FinCEN and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security Urge Continued Vigilance for Potential Russian Export Control Evasion Attempts on the highest priority nine HS codes (May 19, 2023).

·    BIS guidance   on these same nine highest-priority HS codes for exporters and reexporters, including manufacturers, distributors, resellers, and freight forwarders (May 19, 2023).

·    Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, Department of State, and Department of the Treasury guidance   on items sought by Iran for the production of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), including to enable Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine (June 9, 2023).

The guidance listed above provides information on evasion trends and fact patterns and identifies transactional and behavioral red flags to assist financial institutions and exporters in identifying suspicious transactions relating to possible export control evasion or violations.