• FAQs

    FAQs for the Commerce Categories I-III (final rule) posted

  • Publication

    Publication of a 232 Report on the Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security.

  • Publication

    Publication of a 232 Report on the Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the National Security.

  • Xinjiang

    Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory

  • Suspension

    Suspension of License Exceptions for Hong Kong

  • Military

    Military End Use and End User FAQs

  • Revisions

    Revisions to EEI Filing Requirements Pursuant to Revisions to Section 744.21 (China/Russia/Venezuela military end use/end user rule)

  • Release

    Release of ‘‘Technology’’ to Certain Entities on the Entity List in the Context of Standards Organizations

  • Implementation

    Implementation of the February 2020 Australia Group Intersessional Decisions: Addition of Certain Rigid-Walled, Single-Use Cultivation Chambers and Precursor Chemicals to the Commerce Control List

  • BIS

    BIS Extends Comment Period for Electrical Steel Investigation

  • Air

    Air Force Supply Chain Survey Deployment Press Release

  • Entity

    Entity List final rule (0694-AI02) published 6/5/20 (85 FR 34503)

  • Entity

    Entity List final rule (0694-AI07) published 6/5/20 (85 FR 34495)

  • Expansion

    Expansion of Export, Reexport, and Transfer (in-Country) Controls for Military End Use or Military End Users in the People’s Republic of China, Russia, or Venezuela

  • Notice

    Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Vanadium. Published 6/3/20.

  • Notice

    Notice of Inquiry Regarding the Exclusion Process for Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Import Tariffs and Quotas. Published 5/26/20.

  • Notice

    Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Mobile Cranes. Published 5/26/20.

  • Bureau

    Bureau of Industry and Security 2020 Annual Conference on Export Controls: Acting Under Secretary Hull Announces Postponement

  • Notice

    Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Laminations for Stacked Cores for Incorporation into Transformers, Stacked Cores for Incorporation Into Transformers, Wound Cores for Incorporation Into Tra

  • Amendments

    Amendments to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule) and the Entity List interim final rule on public display and effective 5/15/20

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Events

September 9-10, 2020 Louisville, KY

louisville kySeptember 9-10, 2020 Complying with U.S. Export Controls

This two-day program is led by BIS's professional counseling staff and provides an in-depth examination of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The program will cover the information exporters need to know to comply with U.S. export control requirements on commercial goods. We will focus on what items and activities are subject to the EAR; how to determine your export control classification number (ECCN); steps to take to determine the export licensing requirements for your item; when you can export or reexport without applying for a license; export clearance procedures; and record keeping requirements.
View Event Details

   
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITYTu
Tuesday, October 25, 2011 Office of Public Affairs
www.bis.doc.gov 202-482-2721

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) today announced that it will add fifteen parties located in China, Hong Kong, Iran and Singapore to the Entity List. The parties who are added to the Entity List have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. In a related action, the Department of Justice announced today the indictment of five people and four companies for fraud conspiracy involving exports to Iran of U.S. - origin components later found in bombs in Iraq.

“Today’s action targets egregious conduct by these foreign companies and individuals who have endangered the lives of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq,” said Under Secretary of Commerce Eric L. Hirschhorn. “Keeping U.S. technology from falling into the wrong hands and from being used against our troops overseas is a top priority for the Bureau of Industry and Security and its law enforcement partners.”

Eight parties are being added based on evidence that they have engaged in actions that could enhance the military capability of Iran, a country designated by the U.S. Secretary of State as having repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism and for enhancing the capabilities of militant insurgents operating in Iraq against the U.S. military. These parties are also added because their overall conduct and deceptive practices pose a risk of ongoing violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). These parties include the following: Corezing International, Hia Soo Gan Benson, Hossein Ahmad Larijani, Lim Kow Seng, Lim Yong Nam, NEL Electronics Pte Ltd, Paya Electronic Complex, and Wong Yuh Lan.

These parties participated in a complex and layered network that engaged in complicated and long-term schemes to divert U.S.-origin items through deceptive actions, including shifting/circuitous routes and false or omitted information on shipping documentation in an attempt to conceal their activities. The parties, while not all under the same ownership and management, are interrelated and work toward the same objective: obtaining items that are subject to the EAR for shipment to Iran and/or to China without the required Department of Commerce licenses and obtaining military items subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) without the required Department of State licenses. Among other activities, this procurement network arranged for the transshipment of EAR-controlled radio frequency modules from the United States through Singapore to Iran for use in Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) found in Iraq. The procurement network also obtained ITAR-controlled antennas designed for use in military radars and aircraft, and exported them to Singapore and Hong Kong. Additionally, the procurement network transshipped a range of U.S.-origin goods, including acrylic polymers and fiberglass tape, through Hong Kong to Iran. In the case of many of the eight individuals, they knowingly engaged in the described activities in violation of U.S. export control laws.

The remaining seven parties (Action Global, Amaze International, Luo Jie, OEM Hub Co Ltd., Parto System Tehran, Surftech Electronics, and Zhou Zhenyong) are being added based on evidence that they aided and/or facilitated the activities of the procurement network.

Action Global, Amaze International and OEM Hub Co., Ltd., all Hong Kong entities, are being added based on specific information indicating that they serve as front companies and are otherwise related to the other entities named in this rule, including Corezing International, and therefore pose an imminent risk of violating the EAR.

Luo Jie, director of Corezing International, Action Global and Amaze International, is being added on the basis of information indicating that she was specifically involved in the procurement and attempted procurement of U.S. power amplifiers intended for end-users in China, as well as in the diversion of various U.S.-origin goods through Hong Kong to Iran. Luo’s involvement in these activities raises significant concerns based on her demonstrated knowledge of U.S. export control laws and regulations.

Parto Systems Tehran, an Iranian freight forwarder, is being added based on information indicating that it was involved in the diversion of U.S.-origin items to Iran. BIS also has information indicating that Parto Systems Tehran is closely associated with Hossein Ahmad Larijani.

Surftech Electronics, a Singapore corporation established by Hia Soo Gan Benson, is co-located with Corezing International. BIS has information indicating that Surftech Electronics sought to purchase certain U.S.-origin items for shipment to Iran.

Zhou Zhenyong, director of Corezing International, is being added based on information that he was specifically involved in the procurement and attempted procurement of U.S.-origin items, including U.S.-origin munitions items destined for end-users in China and/or Iran. BIS’s information indicates that Zhou engaged in these activities despite having knowledge of U.S. export control laws and regulations.

BIS controls exports and reexports of dual-use commodities, technology, and software for reasons of national security, missile technology, nuclear non-proliferation, chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation, crime control, regional stability, foreign policy and anti-terrorism. Criminal penalties and administrative sanctions can be imposed for violations of the Export Administration Regulations. For more information, please visit www.bis.doc.gov.


   
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