

### UPDATE 2014

## **EXPORT COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT:**MISSION AND PRIORITIES

MISSION: Protect national security, foreign policy, and economic interests by inhibiting the unauthorized export/reexport of items subject to export control.

### **PRIORITIES**:

- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile)
- > Terrorism (including designated terrorist organizations and state sponsors of terrorism)
- Sanctions/embargoes (e.g., Iran, N. Korea)
- > Unauthorized military end-use
- > Foreign policy/human rights



### COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

### **COMPLIANCE:**

- Create culture of informed compliance
- Evaluate transactions

### **ENFORCEMENT:**

- Detect and investigate
- Interdict shipments
- Penalize violators

"Those who comply with the rules benefit from strong enforcement because lax enforcement permits violators to flourish."

Eric L. Hirschhorn, **Under Secretary for Industry and Security** 



### **Compliance: Complementary** Mission of Industry and Government

- 1) Ensure educated export and reexport (foreign business) communities
- 2) Be alert of suspicious inquiries
- 3) Evaluate bona fides of transaction parties
  - Conduct end-use monitoring abroad
- 4) Coordinate with partner governments/ customers to enforce/comply with complementary export controls
- 5) Identify export control violations



### **End-Use Monitoring Programs**



### **Department of Commerce**

- ☐ BIS End-Use Monitoring Program managed by the Office of Enforcement Analysis (OEA)
- ☐ Exports of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), including Commerce Control List (CCL) items

### **Department of State**

- ☐ Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Blue Lantern Program managed by DTC-Compliance (DTCC)
- ☐ Exports of U.S. Munitions List (USML) defense articles under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)

### **Department of Defense**

- ☐ Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Golden Sentry Program managed by DSCA's Directorate for Programs
- ☐ Exports of USML defense articles and services under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY

What is an End-Use Check





- An End-Use Check (EUC) is a physical verification on location with a party of the transaction to determine if the party is a reliable recipient of U.S. goods and that items are or will be used according to the EAR.
- As part of its licensing process and preventive enforcement efforts, BIS selectively conducts end-use checks on certain dual-use and munitions exports.
  - Monitor license condition compliance.
  - Monitor compliance of non licensed transactions.
  - Confirm the end-use.
  - Determine if the company is a reliable end-user.
  - Discover more information about the parties.



Triggered Spark Gap (Controlled for Nuclear Proliferation-3A228)







### **Consequences of Unfavorables**



- ➤ Watch List: Scrutiny of license applications and export transactions, including rejection, strict conditions, and pre-shipment inspection.
- ➤ **Unverified List**: Alerts exporters to exercise increased due diligence in transactions with foreign persons whose *bona fides* could not be verified. License Exceptions are not available.
- ➤ Entity List: Imposes restrictions on exports, absent license approval, on foreign persons involved in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
- ➤ Referral for Further Investigation: May result in criminal or administrative penalties.



### **Internal Compliance Program**



Elements of an Effective Compliance Program:

- Management Commitment
- Continuous Risk Assessment
- Formal Written Program: Ongoing Compliance Training
- Pre/Post Export Compliance Security and Screening
- Adherence to Recordkeeping Requirements
- Internal and External Compliance Monitoring and Periodic Audits
- Program for Handling Compliance Problems, including Reporting Violations
- Completing Appropriate Corrective Actions

- ➤ Trade benefits
- ➤ Safeguard your company's reputation
- ➤ Enforcement mitigation




Best Practices for UPDATE Evaluating Bona Fides	E 2014
☐ Screen customers (e.g., <u>www.export.gov</u> )	
☐ Request an end-user certificate	
☐ Visit the public website	
Review other social media sources (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, Linkedin)	
☐ Request business registration	
☐ Understand foreign export control practices	
Provide license/regulatory conditions in writing an obtain written confirmation	d
☐ Conduct a visit	
☐ Any other <i>red flags</i> ?	
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# Export Controls: Joint Responsibility and Joint Benefits Protecting national security is in the interests of the business community and BIS Culture of compliance: Protects company reputation Creates a level playing field Creates trade benefits Mitigates enforcement activities Government needs industry support... ...including facilitating successful end-use checks!









# Our Working Partners U.S. State Department, Economic and Political sections Office of the United States Trade Representative U.S. Department of Energy U.S. Department of Defense U.S. Department of Homeland Security (ICE/CBP) Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) American Chamber of Commerce; U.S. Information


**Technology Organization** 

■ EU Export Control Officers

☐ University of Georgia; Consultants/law firms

### **Types of Items and ECCN Categories** ☐ Category 1: Chemical/Biological ☐ Category 2: Machine Tools: 5-Axis Horizontal **Machining Systems** ☐ Category 3: **Optoelectronics Industry** ☐ Category 4: Semiconductor Industry ☐ Category 6: Fiber Lasers (Fine cutting) Specialized cameras ☐ Category 7: Navigational systems Aviation/Manufacturing





# Bureau of Industry, Security, Import 2014 and Export Control - MOFCOM

- ☐ In April, 2014, MOFCOM reorganized their departments, and established the Bureau of Industry, Security, Import and Export Control
- ☐ Main Stated Responsibilities and Goals:
  - To formulate and implement national policies and rules on import and export control
  - To issue import and export licenses for dual-use goods and technologies
  - To conduct investigations and evaluate industry security



## New Agency Consisting of Six Divisions

- ☐ Safety Review Division
- ☐ Policy and Regulation Division
- ☐ License Division
- ☐ Enforcement Division
- ☐ Industrial Competitiveness Division
- Administration Office



### **Distinguishing Civil vs. Military**



- What actually separates manufacturing lines?
- Did the company build a separate building or even a compound specifically for civilian use, or is there a temporary fence or rope separating the machines from the materials?
- Can the company clearly articulate and track how the materials are used, and are they willing to share that information in EUC?



### **Red Flag Indicators for China**



- ✓ Company has production agreements or close affiliation with military
- ✓ Company address is different than proposed export destination
- ✓ End-user fails to obtain an End-User Statement from the Chinese Government when required
- ✓ Company has a history of conducting business with North Korean or Iranian entities (map)



## EUC Case Study - A PSV and a PLC

BIS China conducted an EUC (PSV) in 2013 for a company that uses U.S.-origin titanium to produce parts and components for civil aviation.

We conducted an EUC (PLC) in 2014 for the same company.


What were the differences?











### **Best Practices for China**



☐ The United States fully supports high tech trade to civil end users for civil end uses. Do you know what the ultimate enduse is for your commodity? Have you seen the facility first hand? How often?

The U.S. Commercial Service provides an International Company Profile (ICP) service to assist you in evaluating potential business partners' reliability and capabilities as marketers for your products and services. The turn around time is about 20 days, and the reports are created in conjunction with reputable investigation/risk analysis firms in China.

www.export.gov/china/services



# Best Practices for China I bought it (for a lot of money), so why can't I use it for whatever I want? Educating Chinese companies on the concept of export controls is the first step. U.S.-origin equals quality. The bottom line is that companies want the better tools, the more sophisticated equipment, the servicing, etc. It's worth the effort to educate. Ask for an End-Use Statement, especially for items that are or may be intended, entirely or in part, for a military end-use (EAR)

Part 744.21).

### The Unverified List (UVL) ☐ Foreign parties to transactions subject to the EAR whose bona fides could not be verified (e.g., could not be located or contacted, could not demonstrate disposition of EAR items, etc.) ☐ Imposes 3 conditions on transactions involving listed persons: Mandatory electronic export information filing for all shipments Suspension of all license exceptions Prior consignee statement for items not subject to a license requirement ☐ Separate from the Entity List, which establishes a license requirement for entities acting contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy. Generally establishes a license review policy of a presumption of denial. On June 16, 2014, BIS added the following China party to the UVL (79) Federal Register 34217): China National Plant Import/Export Co. Room 2135, Jingxin Building A, No Dong San Huan North Road, Beijing, China

### **Useful Resources**



- ☐U.S. Commerce Department
  - U.S. Commercial Service
    - » Doing Business in China: Country Commercial Guide
  - Bureau of Industry and Security
    - » Export Administration Regulations
  - Patent and Trademark Office
    - » Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in China
- ☐ American Chamber of Commerce
  - Export Compliance Working Group (ECWG)
  - www.amchamchina.org
  - www.amchamkorea.org
- ☐ Independent Consultants and Law Firms
- ☐Ministry of Commerce, China
  - www.mofcom.gov.cn



## **UPDATE 2014**

### **Thank You!**


**Embassy of the United States of America Beijing, China** 

Office.Beijing@trade.gov www.export.gov/china


www.bis.doc.gov







# Region Overview India Population 1,210,193,444 Total exports to India were \$21.9 billion in 2013. Of the \$21.9 billion in U.S. exports to India in 2013, only 0.3% required a BIS license India working towards future membership in four multilateral export control regimes. The largest categories of U.S. advanced technology exports (controlled and not controlled) to India in 2013 were comprised of Aerospace at \$2.9 billion.



### Who I Work With ☐ Department of State – Economic and Political sections for Policy issues. ☐ U.S. Commercial Service for Trade issues. ☐ Department of Homeland Security (CBP/ICE) for coordination on enforcement Issues. ☐ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India for End-Use Checks and Policy Issues. ☐ Trade Associations for Export Control Seminars Federation of Indian Chambers of www.ficci.com Commerce and Industry Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) www.cii.in U.S.-India Business Council www.usibc.com AMCHAM India www.amchamindia.com Associated Chambers of Commerce and www.assocham.org Industry of India

# Types of Items and ECCNs Category 1 Chemical, biological and radiation protection and detection equipment – 1A004 Category 2 Vertical Machining Tools – 2B001 Pressure Transducers – 2B230 Centrifugal Pumps – 2B350 Category 3 F Spectrophotometer (ICP-MS) – 3A233 Oscilloscopes – 3A292 Category 6 Wideband Mini Transponders – 6A001 Doppler Velocity Log Navigator – 6A001 Thermal Imaging Camera – 6A003

### **Types of Locations for EUCs**



- ☐ Majority of EUCs in India are at the end-user location instead of the consignee or intermediary's site.
  - Manufacturing Plants
  - Government Facilities
  - Research Institutions (private and government)
  - Testing facilities



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### **Red Flag Indicators for India**



- ✓ Vendors fulfilling a public or private tender can make you vulnerable to catch all controls and listed parties. "If they ask for the end-use(r) I'll provide, if not...."
- ✓ Most controlled transactions placed <u>from</u> the region are for local consumption. Be extra vigilant with orders placed to drop/deliver in third countries.
- ✓ Third parties are common in most transactions. They
  provide credit to small/mid-size clients and facilitate local
  clearance. However, be critical of the end-user statement
  signature which may have been completed by the
  intermediary/consignee on behalf of the end-user

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY

# EUC Case Study - A Reliable End-user Why would a graphics/printing company need an advanced machine tool? □ PLC on a two-axis rotary table controlled under Export Control Classification Number 2B008. □ Company designs and print decorative decals and plastic logos for the Indian and overseas automotive market. □ 100% of their products are decorative in nature.


# ■ New low-tech product, high-tech process for quality and precision. □ Company was subcontracting time on the same machine tool they wanted to purchase. □ Provided sample and documentation for review □ Open tour of current operations. □ The needs for a low-tech operation can be transformed overnight; our industry and control regime are ready to respond. □ Customer's prior experience with the equipment's performance combined with exporter education on the licensing process enhanced the visit and supported the favorable outcome.

Best Practices for India  UPDATE 201	4
Know where your industry is concentrated. Most key industries are concentrated in particular regions/cities.	
Check your customers' basic compliance with Indian import requirements. Do they have an Importer Exporter Code? (exceptions apply)	
☐ Is your customer exporting or re-exporting? Ask them about SCOMET.	
☐ Some imports of high technology equipment are meant to comply with U.S. standards on finished products to be re-exported back to the States.  Understanding those requirements may help you	
identify possible red flags.  Lus. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BLAGAL OF PAGLISTRY AND ISCLUSIVE ADDRESS:	

# Useful Online Resources Country Commercial Guide (CCG) www.export.gov/india United States India Business Council (USIBC) www.usibc.com United States India Importers Council (USIIC) www.usiic.in Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry (FICCI) www.ficci.com Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) www.cii.in








Region Overview  UPDATE 2014 CONTINUE OF PAPER OF PAPER AND POLICY					
Country Group			Country Group		
	Azerbaijan	D:1,3	<ul><li>Lithuania</li></ul>	A:3,5, B	
	Belarus	A:4,	<ul><li>Moldova</li></ul>	D:1,3	
		D:1,3,5	<ul><li>Poland</li></ul>	A:2-5, B	
•	Estonia	A:3,5, B	<ul><li>Serbia</li></ul>	В	
٠	Finland	A:2-5, B	<ul><li>Tajikistan</li></ul>	D:1,3	
•	Georgia	D:1,3	<ul><li>Turkmenistan</li></ul>	D:1,3	
•	Kazakhstan	A:4, D:1,3	<ul><li>Ukraine</li></ul>	A:2-4, D:1	
•	Kyrgyzstan	D:1,3	<ul><li>Uzbekistan</li></ul>	D:1,3	
-	Latvia	A:3-5, B			
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## **Trade Statistics**




- □ U.S. exports to Russia in 2013 were \$11.2 billion, a new record and an increase of almost 30% from 2011. This is six times more than the growth rate for overall U.S. exports worldwide, which rose by 5%.
- ☐ Russian exports to the United States in 2013 were \$27 billion, a decrease of 15% from 2011.
- ☐ Russia's leading trade partners were recently Netherlands, China, Germany, Italy, Ukraine, and Turkey.











# Red Flag Indicators for Russia The company refuses to meet with the ECO. Not answering questions during the meeting. The company hides important facts about its business activity. Refusal to provide requested transaction documentation. Newly formed company with same address as a company on the Entity List, Unverified List, or Denied Persons List. Diverting shipments from one freight forwarder to another. Using freight forwarders as final destinations. No website, no contact phone numbers, no address. Incorrect addresses on shipping labels. Attempts to hide complete written addresses.

EUC Case Study  An Unfavorable Pre-License Check
<ul> <li>□ PLC requested on license application for item under ECCN 3A982</li> <li>□ \$86,700 transaction for export of one transistor for a pulse amplifier to be incorporated into a radar transmitter. Stated enduse was for civilian purposes.</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Initial order was later modified to a more powerful transistor by the Intermediate Consignee.</li> <li>PLC interview revealed no one actually knew the final destination of</li> </ul>
the commodity.  Hesitant to answer questions about to whom the company exports
(exports to over 50 countries – four of five embargoed countries).  ☐ End-user actively supports military programs. ☐ It is a first of the countries of the co
☐ Intermediate Consignee is a large supplier of electronics to the Russian military.
и в, регимпичест от сорметске выяван от исценту ало весшету 57

### **Results of Crisis in Ukraine**



□BIS implements restrictions on trade with Russia:

- New BIS restrictions on approvals of new export licenses and of re-export licenses to Russia.
  - The Department of Commerce (DoC) has added 24 companies to the Entity List.
  - BIS will deny pending applications for licenses to export or reexport any military item subject to the EAR to Russia or occupied Crimea and any dual-use item for military end use or end users.
  - The United States will continue to adjust its export licensing policies toward Russia as warranted by Russia's actions in Ukraine.



# Effects of Crisis in Ukraine □ PLCs have been canceled by Russian companies seeking U.S. commodities, because the U.S. exporter cannot obtain license authorizations. □ Possible attempts to transship greater amount of commodities through third party countries listing the ultimate consignee in the third party country; item then transshipped to Russia. □ Companies asking to send items to a branch office in Ukraine instead of Russia, which also has a Russia branch office.

### **Best Practices for Russia** ☐ Inform all freight forwarders as to whether an item is controlled. The forwarder cannot legally open packages, according to foreign laws, to ascertain whether or not an item(s) is/are controlled. ☐ Mark packages correctly. Third-party country customs services will not otherwise know whether or not they need to enforce a law. ☐ Don't fall for "this item is for civilian use." Sometimes this is stated up front in order to be able to receive an item using NLR or via a license, when in fact the item is not for civilian use. Practice due diligence and act on the side of caution. ☐ Ask for an end-user statement ☐ Russians extensively use freight forwarders or one or more intermediaries in order to circumvent U.S. export controls. ☐ If you know an item is going to Russia, because it is stated in the purchase order or in email correspondence, complete paperwork accurately. Do not ship to thirdparty country as ultimate consignee or end-user. Items may then be transshipped to Russia. Know and properly report and document the end-user.

# Addition of Russia Parties to the UVL UPDATE 20



- ☐ On June 16, 2014, BIS added the following Russian parties to the UVL (79 Federal Register 34217):
  - JSC Voentelecom Bolshaya Olenya Str. 15A, Moscow, Russia
  - Nasosy Ampika 3-ya institutskaya St. Bld. 15, Moscow, Russia
  - Nuclin LLC Serebryakova Proezd 14, Moscow, Russia
  - SDB IRE RAS 1 Vvedenskogo Square, Fryazino, Russia
  - Security 2 Business Academy, a.k.a. S2BA, a.k.a. Academy of Business Security Deguninskaya Street 10, Moscow, Russia; and Novoslobodskaya Str. 14/19, Moscow, Russia



### **Useful Online Resources**



- ☐ Country Commercial Guide Russia
  - http://export.gov/russia/marketresearchonrussia/index.asp
- ☐ American Chamber of Commerce Moscow
  - www.amcham.ru
- ☐ U.S. Russian Business Council
  - www.usrbc.org
- ☐ The Russian Organization for Small and Medium Entrepreneurship (OPORA)
  - http://en.opora.ru
- ☐ Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP)
  - http://eng.rspp.ru





### **Thank You!**

U.S. Embassy - Moscow Bolshoy Devyatinsky Pereulok, 8 Moscow, Russia office.moscow@trade.gov www.export.gov/russia

www.bis.doc.gov





Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
Defense Trade and Blue Lantern
End-Use Monitoring Program

**End-Use Monitoring Session I** 

Regional Affairs & Analysis
Office of Defense Trade Controls Policy
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs



# **Legal Authorities for Defense Trade Controls**

Reference	Subject	
AECA (Arms Export Control Act), Sections 3(g), 38(g)(7), and 40A	Establishes DDTC and legal authority for defense trade controls; requires end-use monitoring of defense articles and services	
ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations)	Implementing regulations for AECA, specifies the United States Munitions List (USML)	

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### **COUNTRY POLICES & EMBARGOES**

- Section 126.1 of the ITAR: Prohibited Exports, Imports, and Sales to or From Certain Countries
- Belarus
- Burma
- Cuba
- Eritrea
- Iran
- North Korea
- Syria
- The People's Republic of China
- The Republic of Sudan
- Venezuela

- Afghanistan
- Central African Republic
- Cote d'Ivoire
- Cyprus
- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Fiji
- Haiti
- Iraq

- Lebanon
- Liberia
- Libya
- Somalia
- Sri Lanka
- Vietnam
- Zimbabwe



### **Three End-Use Monitoring Programs**



**Blue Lantern** - U.S. Defense Articles, Defense Services and Brokering via Commercial Channels (USML)



Golden Sentry - U.S. Defense Articles and Defense Services via Government-to-Government Channels (Foreign Military Sales Program)



Extrancheck - Dual-Use Items (CCL)

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### **Blue Lantern Basics**

- Verifies end-users, consignees, and end-uses of U.S. exports of defense articles and services
  - Pre-license and post-shipment checks (50/50)
- Performed worldwide by U.S. Embassy personnel in cooperation with host governments since 1990
  - 93 countries in FY 2013
- Required by U.S. law: High interest by Congress, media, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
- U.S. and foreign industry aware of program



## Objective 1 Build Confidence in Trade Relationship

- Monitor transfer of sensitive hardware, technology, and services
- Verify bona fides of parties, especially intermediaries
- Foster cooperation/confidence among U.S. government, host government, and industry
- Enhance understanding of U.S. export controls (e.g., USG approval required to re-export)
- NOT a law enforcement action or "investigation"

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### Objective 2 Regulate Hardware & Technology Transfer

 Support and facilitate transfer of greater volume and more advanced hardware or technology

OR

Result in increased scrutiny and/or restrictions on future exports



## **Objective 3 Impede Gray Arms Trade**

- Use of legitimate means for illicit ends
- Tools & Techniques
  - o False end-use documentation
  - o Front companies
  - o Brokers
  - o Hidden intermediaries/end-users
- Impeding gray arms trade improves international security and stability

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### **Vetting Licenses**



Entities on every license are run against the Watch List

- 100,000+ entities from various USG sources
- Compiled from various USG sources, classified & unclassified
- Hit on Watch List may lead to a Blue Lantern
  - 918 Blue Lanterns out of ~83K export authorization requests in FY 2013



# Warning Flags End-User & End-Use Indicators



 Unfamiliar, limited, or any derogatory background information. Possible front companies



- Payment in cash or at above-market rates
- Incomplete or suspect supporting documentation
- End-user unfamiliar with hardware/technology or its use
- End-user declines follow-on repair or maintenance service or other warranty options

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# Warning Flags Commodity Indicators



- Hardware in excessive quantity inconsistent with inventory of end-user
- Hardware or technology in demand by proscribed countries. See http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ embargoed\_countries/index.html







# **Warning Flags Commodity Indicators**



Sensitive hardware or technology



Stealth Fighter



Night Vision Devices



Unmanned Aerial Vehicles



Missiles or Rockets

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# Warning Flags Country or Shipping Indicators



- Unusual or circuitous routing or trans-shipment through multiple countries or foreign parties
- End-user or consignee in a foreign free trade zone
- Unknown or unfamiliar intermediate party
- Vague or suspicious delivery dates, locations (e.g., P.O. box), shipping instructions, packaging requirements
- Designation of freight forwarders as foreign consignees or foreign end-users



### **Blue Lantern Referrals**



- Licensing Officers
- Department of Defense (e.g. Defense Technology Security Agency)
- Department of Homeland Security/Homeland Security Investigations
- Federal Bureau of Investigations
- Intelligence Community
- Open Source Reporting

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### **Types of Blue Lanterns**

- **Pre-License** (50-60%)
  - o Confirms order
  - o Verifies bona fides of parties
  - o Determines foreign import authorization
  - o Verifies end-use
  - o Ensures foreign parties understand ITAR requirements
- **Post-Shipment** (40-50%)
  - o Confirms receipt by end-user
  - o Confirms end-use per license and provisos
- Post-License/Pre-Shipment (<5%)



### Life-Cycle of a Blue Lantern

### Washington


- Generate case
- · Research companies and technologies
- Draft, clear, and send action request cable to Post

### **Post**

- · Conduct check, including research and site visit, if appropriate
- Draft, clear, and send response cable back to Washington

### Washington

- If favorable, recommend issuance of license; record results for future reference
- If unfavorable, recommend application be either returned without action (RWA), denied, or revoked; if appropriate, add entities to Watch List, refer to Enforcement Division for possible civil and/or criminal action





# Reasons for "Unfavorable" Responses FY 2013

Derogatory information/ foreign party deemed unreliable recipient of USML	70
Indications of diversion or unauthorized retransfer or re-export	47
Refusal to cooperate	38
Unable to confirm order or receipt of goods by end-user	25
Foreign party involved in transaction but not listed on license/application	21

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### **Blue Lanterns**

### Blue Lanterns Initiated Jan. 2013-July 2014

	Favorable	Unfavorable	Pending	Total
India	6	4	3	14
Russia	3	3	2	8



# Case Studies Diversion

### **Export License**

• Commodity: Night Vision Devices

End-user: South Asian Municipal Police Department

• Foreign Consignee/Broker: South Asian Private Company

### **Reason for Check**

· Diversion concerns

· Sensitive "Significant Military Equipment"

### **Findings**

- FC confirmed delivery of NVDs to end-user and provided serial numbers.
- · End-user denied ordering/receiving any NVDs.
- · Serial numbers provided by FC did not match those provided by U.S. exporter

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# Case Studies Refusal to Cooperate

### **Export License**

• Commodity: Electronics

End-user: East European Research Institute
 Foreign Consignee: East European Private Company

### **Reason for Check**

- · Diversion concerns
- · Unusually high number of bandpass filters

### **Findings**

· Refused to cooperate.



### **QUESTIONS?**

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