## Russian Procurement Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

**Decreased ability to acquire U.S. items has led Russia to circumvent U.S. export controls**

### Red Flags
- Using consolidators or reshippers which are owned/directed by Russians.
- Layering procurements through third party countries to obfuscate the end user, an example of which is the use of numerous 3rd country freight forwarders and shippers on a single transaction.
- Freight forwarding firm is listed as the product’s final destination.
- Making payments from entities located in third countries not otherwise involved with the transactions.
- Removing government/military affiliation from website.
- Consolidating shipments/shippers in the United States may be more likely to provide applicable cover for the exports of luxury goods.
- Procuring items below control thresholds while claiming civil end use.

### Commodities of Concern
- Aircraft Parts and Equipment
- Antennas
- Cameras
- GPS Systems
- Inertial Measurement Units
- Integrated Circuits
- Sonar Systems
- Spectrophotometers
- Test Equipment
- Thrusters
- Underwater Communications
- Vacuum Pumps
- Wafer Fabrication Equipment/Substrates
- Oil Field Equipment

### Transshipment Countries of Concern
- Armenia, Brazil, China, Georgia, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan.

### Naming Nomenclature
- **RAO** (Rossiyskaya Aktsionernaya Kompaniya), which designates a Russian joint stock company
- **FGUP/FSUE** (Federal’noye Gosudarstvennoye Unitarnoye Predpriyatiye), which designates a Russian Federal State Unitary Enterprise
- **GK** (Gorsudarstvennaya Korporatsiya), which designates a Russian State Corporation
- **SPRE/NIPP** (Nauchno-Issledovatel’skoye Proizvodstvennoye Predpriyatiye), which designates a Russian Scientific Research Production Enterprise
- **NPO/GNPO** (Gosudarstvennyy Nauchno-Proizvodstvennyy Tsentr), which designates a Russian State Research and Production Center