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UPDATE 2014

COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

COMPLIANCE:

- Create culture of informed compliance
- Evaluate transactions

ENFORCEMENT:


- Detect and investigate
- Interdict shipments
- Penalize violators


"Those who comply with the rules benefit from strong enforcement because lax enforcement permits violators to flourish."


Eric L. Hirschhorn, Under Secretary for Industry and Security





































GDP	US\$273.2 billion in 2013	
GDP growth	nominal 4.6% (2013) – real GDP 2.9% (202	13)
Per Capita GDP	US\$38,000 (2013)	
Trade	US\$976.9 billion (2013) (358% of GDP)	
Economic freedom	#1 in world in 2013	
Major industries— Services (about 58% of GDP in 2012)	Logistics & trade (24.6%) Finance (15.9%) Professional service (e.g. law & accounting Tourism (4.7%)	g) (12.8%)
Hong Kong Manufacturing	about 10,897 business unit (2012) Account 1.6% GDP (2011)	























EUC Case Study An Unfavorable Pre-License Check


- Company address is accounting firm/company secretary
- Owners were not from HK
- Company established one year ago
- A little questioning on company's planned security measures showed they were not prepared to implement them
- Vague responses to questions about their other companies














Welcome to ICRIS! - Goo		
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J. Contraction	総上査冊中心 にRIS Cyber Search Centre	NCC ON EXPORT CONT
Search -	Product • Shopping • Aboute-Search • Logout	
Welcome!	System Clock: 11-JUN-2014 11-54.48 GMT +0800 🚙 🖬 😨	
Company Name Search		
Your Search: LEFT PARTIA	L match with 'Centre Bright', CR No.: = 0639550	
CR No.:	0639550	
Company Name:	CENTRE BRIGHT ELECTRONICS COMPANY LIMITED 中輝行電子有限公司	
Company Type:	Private company limited by shares	
Date of Incorporation:	18-MAR-1998	
Active Status:	Live	
Remarks:		
Winding Up Mode:		
Date of Dissolution:		
Register of Charges:	Unavailable	
Important Note:	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
Name History		
Effective Date	Name Used	
18-MAR-1998	CENTRE BRIGHT ELECTRONICS COMPANY LIMITED 中輝行電子有限公司	al 9 5
		(Y)












Impact of Export Controls on U.S.-Singapore Trade

In 2013, U.S. exports to Singapore increased 0.7% from \$30.5 billion to \$30.7 billion, while imports decreased 11.9% from \$20.2 billion to \$17.9 billion and the trade surplus increased 25.3% from \$10.3 billion to \$12.9 billion.





Whoo I work with Implement of the provided in the pr







Red Flag Indicators for Region

- ✓ Willing to pay top dollar.
- Will not provide an address for the ultimate end-user.
- Changes delivery address at the last minute.
- Utilizes a freight forwarder as the ultimate end-user address.
- Payment by wire from a third country, often by a company not associated with the transaction.






EUC Case Study A Favorable Post-Shipment Verification

Supply Chain check

- Six specialty valves exported with license authorization, classified under ECCN 2B350 for petrochemical refinery
- Freight forwarder located in Singapore
- Ultimate consignee was a trading company located in Indonesia
- Scheduled check at forwarder
 - Singapore Customs attended check
 - Freight was still in warehouse awaiting re-export
 - No Strategic Export Permit applied for slated to move within the week
 - Singapore Customs personnel were able to walk the company through the procedure prior to delivery of the goods, preventing a violation of Singapore law



















Regional Overview					
Cour	ntry Group	Cc	ountry Group		
 Bahrain 	B, D:3-4	Lebanon	B, D:3-5		
 Jordan 	B, D:3-4	 Malta 	A:3,6, B		
Kuwait	B, D:3-4	 Oman 	B, D:3-4		
Turkey	A:1-5, B	 Qatar 	B, D:3-4		
 Cyprus 	A:3-4, B, D:5	 Saudi Arabia 	B, D:3-4		
 Egypt 	В, D:3-4	 Syria 	D:3-5, E:1		
■ Iraq	D:1-5	Yemen	D:3-4		
 Israel 	A:6, B, D:2-4		۱		
55			U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF NOUSTRY AND BECURITY		


































Directorate of Defense Trade Controls Defense Trade and Blue Lantern End-Use Monitoring Program

End-Use Monitoring Session II

Regional Affairs & Analysis Office of Defense Trade Controls Policy Bureau of Political-Military Affairs



Legal Authorities for Defense Trade Controls

Reference	Subject
AECA (Arms Export Control Act), Sections 3(g), 38(g)(7), and 40A	Establishes DDTC and legal authority for defense trade controls; requires end-use monitoring of defense articles and services
ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations)	Implementing regulations for AECA, specifies the United States Munitions List (USML)





- Section 126.1 of the ITAR: Prohibited Exports, Imports, and Sales to or From Certain Countries
- Belarus
- Burma
- Cuba
- Eritrea
- Iran
- North Korea
- Syria
- The People's Republic of China
- The Republic of Sudan
- Venezuela

- Afghanistan
- Central African Republic
- Cote d'Ivoire
- Cyprus
- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Fiji
- Haiti
- Iraq

- Lebanon
- Liberia
- Libya
- Somalia
- Sri Lanka
- Vietnam
- Zimbabwe



Three End-Use Monitoring Programs



Blue Lantern - U.S. Defense Articles, Defense Services and Brokering via Commercial Channels (USML)



Golden Sentry - U.S. Defense Articles and Defense Services via Government-to-Government Channels (Foreign Military Sales Program)



Extrancheck - Dual-Use Items (CCL)



Blue Lantern Basics

- Verifies end-users, consignees, and end-uses of U.S. exports of defense articles and services
 - Pre-license and post-shipment checks (50/50)
- Performed worldwide by U.S. Embassy personnel in cooperation with host governments since 1990
 93 countries in FY 2013
- Required by U.S. law: High interest by Congress, media, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
- U.S. and foreign industry aware of program



Objective 1 Build Confidence in Trade Relationship

- Monitor transfer of sensitive hardware, technology, and services
- · Verify bona fides of parties, especially intermediaries
- Foster cooperation/confidence among U.S. government, host government, and industry
- Enhance understanding of U.S. export controls (e.g., USG approval required to re-export)
- NOT a law enforcement action or "investigation"



• Support and facilitate transfer of greater volume and more advanced hardware or technology

OR

Result in increased scrutiny and/or restrictions on future exports



Objective 3 Impede Gray Arms Trade

- Use of legitimate means for illicit ends
- Tools & Techniques
 - \circ False end-use documentation
 - Front companies
 - \circ Brokers
 - \circ Hidden intermediaries/end-users
- Impeding gray arms trade improves international security and stability

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Vetting Licenses

Entities on every license are run against the Watch List

- 100,000+ entities from various USG sources
- Compiled from various USG sources, classified & unclassified
- · Hit on Watch List may lead to a Blue Lantern
 - 918 Blue Lanterns out of ~83K export authorization requests in FY 2013



- Unfamiliar, limited, or any derogatory background information. Possible front companies
- · Payment in cash or at above-market rates



- · Incomplete or suspect supporting documentation
- · End-user unfamiliar with hardware/technology or its use
- End-user declines follow-on repair or maintenance service or other warranty options

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Warning Flags Commodity Indicators



- Hardware in excessive quantity inconsistent with inventory of end-user
- Hardware or technology in demand by proscribed countries. See http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ embargoed_countries/index.html







Warning Flags Commodity Indicators

· Sensitive hardware or technology



Stealth Fighter



Night Vision Devices



Unmanned Aerial Vehicles



Missiles or Rockets



- Unusual or circuitous routing or trans-shipment through multiple countries or foreign parties
- End-user or consignee in a foreign free trade zone
- Unknown or unfamiliar intermediate party
- Vague or suspicious delivery dates, locations (e.g., P.O. box), shipping instructions, packaging requirements
- Designation of freight forwarders as foreign consignees or foreign end-users





- Licensing Officers
- Department of Defense (e.g. Defense Technology Security Agency)
- Department of Homeland Security/Homeland Security Investigations
- · Federal Bureau of Investigations
- Intelligence Community
- Open Source Reporting



Types of Blue Lanterns

- Pre-License (50-60%)
 - o Confirms order
 - o Verifies bona fides of parties
 - o Determines foreign import authorization
 - $_{\odot}$ Verifies end-use
 - o Ensures foreign parties understand ITAR requirements
- **Post-Shipment** (40-50%)
 - \circ Confirms receipt by end-user
 - \circ Confirms end-use per license and provisos
- Post-License/Pre-Shipment (<5%)



Life-Cycle of a Blue Lantern

Washington


- Generate case
- · Research companies and technologies
- · Draft, clear, and send action request cable to Post

Post

- · Conduct check, including research and site visit, if appropriate
- · Draft, clear, and send response cable back to Washington

Washington

- If favorable, recommend issuance of license; record results for future reference
- If unfavorable, recommend application be either returned without action (RWA), denied, or revoked; if appropriate, add entities to Watch List, refer to Enforcement Division for possible civil and/or criminal action





Reasons for "Unfavorable" Responses FY 2013

Derogatory information/ foreign party deemed unreliable recipient of USML	70	
Indications of diversion or unauthorized retransfer or re-export	47	
Refusal to cooperate	38	
Unable to confirm order or receipt of goods by end-user	25	
Foreign party involved in transaction but not listed on license/ application	21	87



Blue Lanterns

Blue Lanterns Initiated Jan. 2013-July 2014

	Favorable	Unfavorable	Pending	Total
Hong Kong	1	4	2	7
Singapore	12	2	2	16
UAE	9	2	5	16



Case Studies Shell Company

Export License

Commodity:

Aircraft

End-user: P
 Foreign Consignee/Broker: E

Police, East Asian Country East Asian Private Company

- Reason for Check
 Transshipment concerns
- Significant Military Equipment

Findings

• Foreign consignee/broker had no physical presence in the East Asian country: merely a shell company and could not comment on the licenses

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Case Studies Unauthorized Party

Export License

- Commodity:
- Aircraft Components
- End-user:
- MOD, East Asian Country
- Foreign Consignee:

East Asian Private Company

Reason for Check

- Transshipment concerns
- Significant Military Equipment

Findings

• Refused to cooperate. Unauthorized entity involved in the transaction.



Case Studies Unable to confirm receipt

Export License

- Commodity: Artillery and aircraft components
- End-user:
- Foreign Consignee:

- MOD, Middle Eastern Country
- Middle Eastern Private Company

Reason for Check

Transshipment concerns

Findings

· Unable to confirm order or receipt of goods by the foreign consignee and enduser

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QUESTIONS?

Jae Shin

Senior Compliance Officer **Regional Affairs and Analysis** Office of Defense Trade Controls Policy ShinJE@state.gov 202-632-2107 pmddtc.state.gov