U.S. Department of Commerce
Bureau of Industry and Security

Update 2012 Conference

Remarks of
Vann H. Van Diepen
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)
July 18, 2011

Interagency Panel – State/ISN

The International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) bureau plays a key supporting role in the administration of U.S. export controls, and a leading role in interactions with foreign countries and international organizations concerning export controls.

In the U.S. export control system, we are part of the interagency process that reviews license applications for CCL and USML items.  In particular, we review items for nonproliferation reasons and for consistency with U.S. international obligations and commitments – particularly those under the Australia Group chemical/biological nonproliferation regime, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement conventional nonproliferation regime.

Because the bulk of CCL controls exist due to U.S. commitments under these four regimes, I wanted to highlight some of the key developments in regime export controls over the past year:

Australia Group (AG) Highlights:

  • At the annual AG Plenary in Paris this June 2012, members added spray dryers to control and made a variety of adjustments stemming from a comprehensive review of the plant pathogen control list.
  • The AG is currently performing a comprehensive review of its controls for dual-use chemical equipment that should be completed by the next plenary in June 2013.
  • AG members also agreed to share experiences on catch-all control implementation, with a view to identifying best practices.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Highlights:

  • MTCR celebrated its 25th Anniversary in April.
  • The MTCR agreed in December 2011 to add controls on (1) maraging steel in the pre-heat-treated stage and in tubular forms, and (2) “technology” for development, production, and use of liquid propellant tanks.
  • The MTCR will hold its next plenary in Berlin in October 2012.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Highlights:

  • The NSG has had a Dedicated Meeting of Technical Experts (DMTE) engaged in a fundamental review of its control lists that began in 2009 and is expected to be completed in 2013.
  • The latest results of this ongoing review are 25 amendments to the Reactor and Isotopic Separation sections of the NSG Trigger and Dual-Use Lists agreed at the June 2012 Seattle Plenary.  We hope another amendment, on frequency changers important to isotopic separation, will be agreed at the end of the summer.

Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Highlights:

  • 2011 was a very productive year, with the December Plenary adopting:
    • Best practice guidelines for Internal Compliance Programs (ICP) and re-exports of conventional arms;
    • New elements on controlling transport of arms between third countries
    • Amendments to the 1998 Elements for Objective Analysis concerning Destabilizing Accumulations of Arms.
  • In 2011, the WA also approved changes to 56 entries on its control lists.  Among the most significant were:
    • Clarification of controls on probe technology for Coordinate Measuring Machines
    • Relaxation of controls on high-performance rechargeable batteries
    • Tightened controls on certain integrated circuits
    • New controls on devices used to intercept mobile telecommunications
    • Restructuring and relaxation of certain controls on gas turbine engine technology
  • The WA is in the process identifying entries on its list that have never been reviewed as a preliminary phase for conducting a Comprehensive and Systematic List Review. 
  • On January 25, 2012 Mexico was admitted as the 41st Participating State. 

In addition to leading U.S. participation in these four regimes, ISN plays a leading role in:

  • Assisting other countries in putting in place, implementing, and enforcing export control systems consistent with regime standards;
  • Working with other countries to interdict proliferation-related shipments, including via the Proliferation Security Initiative; and
  • Implementing U.S. nonproliferation sanctions authorities and promoting the implementation by other countries of similar national sanctions, as well as UN Security Council sanctions.

We undertake all of these activities on a thoroughly interagency basis, and in particular I want to thank all my colleagues on the panel here today for their support in these important activities that contribute so much to U.S. national security.

© BIS 2020