Regional stability (RS) controls ensure that exports and reexports of controlled items do not contribute directly or indirectly to a country’s military capabilities in a manner that would alter or destabilize a region’s military balance contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States. These controls traditionally cover items specially designed or modified for military purposes and certain dual-use commodities that can be used to manufacture military equipment.
On March 30, 2004, the Department of Commerce published an amendment to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) that removed national security (NS) controls and imposed regional stability (RS) controls on certain searchlights, bayonets, and marine boilers, and the technology to produce them (69 FR 16478). The Wassenaar Arrangement no longer imposed multilateral controls on such items, and the Export Administration Act limits the duration of unilateral NS controls, if no active negotiations are underway to restrict foreign availability. These RS controls were substituted for NS controls.
On June 28, 2004, the Department of Commerce published an amendment to the EAR that removed the license requirements for certain regional stability items and for certain crime control items destined to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. We made this change to reflect the accession of those countries to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on March 29, 2004 (69 FR 36009).
Section 742.6 of the EAR requires a license for RS reasons to export certain image-intensifier tubes, infrared focal plane arrays, as well as certain software and technology for inertial navigation systems, gyroscopes, and accelerometers, to all destinations except Canada. The U.S. Government reviews all license applications for these items on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export could contribute, directly or indirectly, to a country’s military capabilities in a manner that would destabilize or alter a region’s military balance contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests.
Section 742.6 of the EAR also requires a license for RS reasons to export explosive detection equipment and related software and technology, military-related items (e.g., certain vehicles and trainer aircraft), and certain commodities used to manufacture military equipment to all destinations except member nations of NATO, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. The U.S. Government will generally consider applications for such licenses favorably, on a case-by-case basis, unless the export would significantly affect regional stability.
These controls provide a mechanism for the U.S. Government to monitor the export of these items, to restrict their use in instances that would adversely affect regional stability or the military balance within a region, and to protect the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
1. Probability of Achieving the Intended Foreign Policy Purpose. The Secretary has determined that these controls are likely to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, in light of other factors, including the availability of these RS-controlled items from other countries; and that most of the items subject to these controls are also controlled, as a result of international negotiations, by the United States’ partners in the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Regional stability controls contribute to U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives by enabling the United States to restrict the use or availability of certain sensitive U.S.-origin goods and technologies that would adversely affect regional stability or the military balance in certain areas.
2. Compatibility with Foreign Policy Objectives. The Secretary has determined that these controls are compatible with U.S. foreign policy objectives; and that the extension of these controls will not have any significant adverse foreign policy consequences. Regional stability controls are consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals to promote peace and stability and prevent U.S. exports that might contribute to weapons production, destabilizing military capabilities, or terrorist acts.
3. Reaction of Other Countries. The Secretary has determined that any adverse reaction to these controls is not likely to render the controls ineffective, nor will any adverse reaction by other countries be counter-productive to U.S. foreign policy interests. A number of other countries limit exports of items and technologies with military applications to areas of concern, recognizing that such items and technologies could adversely affect regional stability and military balances. For example, the United States and other member countries of the Wassenaar Arrangement each have their own national controls on the export of certain night vision devices. All members of the MTCR maintain controls on software and technology related to missile guidance and control devices. Although other countries may object to new unilateral RS controls, allies and partners of the United States support U.S. efforts against regional conflict and terrorism and appreciate the need to keep certain equipment and technologies from those who could misuse the items to destabilize countries or regions.
4. Economic Impact on United States Industry. The Secretary has determined that any adverse effect of these controls on the economy of the United States, including on the competitive position of the United States in the international economy, does not exceed the benefit to U.S. foreign policy objectives. Items controlled for regional stability reasons generally require licenses for export to all destinations except NATO countries, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. Certain RS-controlled items, including those controlled concurrently for missile technology reasons and cameras controlled under ECCN 6A003, however, require licenses for export to all destinations except Canada. Cameras account for a large percentage of regional stability-controlled exports.
In FY 2004, the Department of Commerce approved 3,383 license applications for items controlled for RS reasons, with a total value of $813 million. Ten applications for these items (one optical sensor under ECCN 6A002 and nine cameras under ECCN 6A003) were denied, with a total value of $1.4 million. In addition, the Department of Commerce returned without action (RWA) 310 applications, valued at $35.3 million. The majority of RWA cases, 265 of the 310, were for imaging cameras classified under ECCN 6A003. Many of the RWA’s were due to insufficient end-user or end-use information. The Department returned without action 66 cases, with total value of $9 million, because the export transaction fell through due to delays in the licensing system. The total value of the 76 cases denied or RWA’d was $10.4 million, which is approximately 1.25 percent of the total dollar value of licenses issued. The 76 cases also represent approximately 2.25 percent of the total of 3703 cases.
The licensing volume for items controlled for regional stability was significantly larger than in FY 2003, in which the Department of Commerce approved 2,883 license applications for items controlled for RS reasons. The increase in volume was due to an increase in the number of license applications for thermal imaging cameras (from 2,588 to 2,767), and due to the increased number of license applications for the first full year of the new regional stability controls on explosive detection equipment and related technology (ECCN 2A983, 2D983, and 2E983). However, the value of these RS-related licenses actually fell from $1.010 billion in FY 2003 to $813 million in FY 2004, due to declines in the value of thermal imaging camera exports (6A003) and exports of military trainer aircraft/vehicles for military use (9A018).
The table that follows lists the total number and value by ECCN of export licenses that the Department of Commerce issued for regional stability items during FY 2004:
|ECCN||Description||Number of Applications||Dollar Value|
|1B018.a||Equipment for the production of military explosives and solid propellants||1||$202,876|
|2A983||Explosives detection equipment||202||$73,128,376|
|2B018||Equipment on the International Munitions List||0||$0|
|2D983||Software for equipment in 2A983||25||$3,020,024|
|2E983||Technology for equipment in 2A983||29||$5,000,035|
|6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, c, e||Optical detectors and direct view imaging equipment incorporating image intensifier tubes or focal plane arrays||18||$471,838|
|6A003.b.3,b.4||Imaging cameras incorporating image intensifiers or focal plane arrays||2,767||$574,590,857|
|6A008.j.1||Space qualified LIDAR equipment||0||$0|
|6A998.b||Space-qualified LIDAR equipment for meteorological observation||0||$0|
|6D001||Software for development/production of 6A002, 6A003, or 6A008||0||$0|
|6D991||Software for development/production/use of 6A998.b||0||$0|
|6E001||Technology for the development of equipment, materials, or software controlled by 6A, 6B, 6C, or 6D||9||$908|
|6E002||Technology for the production of equipment or materials controlled by 6A, 6B, or 6C||4||$1,202|
|6E991||Technology for production, development or use of items in 6A998.b||0||$0|
|7D001||Software for the development or production of equipment in 7A or 7B||7||$3,006|
|7E001||Technology for the development of items in 7A, 7B, or 7D||22||$687,362|
|7E002||Technology for the production of items in 7A or 7B||5||$2,506|
|7E101||Technology for the use of items in 7A, 7B, or 7D||51||$322,650|
|9A018.a, b||Military trainer aircraft and vehicles designed or modified for military use||230||$148,273,179|
|9E018||Technology for the development of items in 9A018.a, b||13||$818,606|
NOTE: The number of sub-categories under certain ECCNs that are not controlled for regional stability reasons is insignificant and is not reflected in this data.
5. Effective Enforcement of Controls. The Secretary has determined that the United States has the ability to effectively enforce these controls. Image intensifier tubes, infrared focal plane arrays, certain software and technology for inertial navigation systems, gyroscopes, and accelerometers, and other items controlled for regional stability purposes, are almost all subject to multilateral controls for either national security or missile technology reasons. The multilateral nature of these controls aids in enforcement. The Department of Commerce can effectively enforce these controls by focusing on preventive enforcement, using regular outreach efforts to keep businesses informed of its concerns, and gathering leads on activities of concern. Given the enhanced anti-terrorism efforts of the U.S. Government, it is expected that industry will continue to support enforcement efforts.
The Department of Commerce consults regularly with industry and its Technical Advisory Committees (TACs) on RS controls. For example, the Department has continued to consult the Sensors and Instrumentation Technical Advisory Committee (SITAC) as the U.S. Government considers possible revisions to the U.S. Munition List’s (USML) night vision thermal imaging entry. (Issues regarding licensing jurisdiction of night vision equipment are being addressed in the interagency review of the USML.)
The Department of Commerce informed the Regulations and Procedures Technical Advisory Committee (RPTAC) of the U.S. Government’s intention to impose regional stability controls on certain power controlled searchlights, bayonets, and marine boilers to replace unilateral national security controls on these items. The U.S. Government took the RPTAC comments into consideration when drafting the revision to the EAR for this purpose.
In a September 28, 2004, Federal Register notice, the Department of Commerce solicited comments from industry on the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy-based export controls. Comments were solicited from all six of the Department’s TACs, as well as from the President’s Export Council Subcommittee on Export Administration. Comments also were solicited from the public via the BIS Web page. The comment period closed on November 19, and 12 comments were received. A detailed review of all comments received can be found in Appendix I.
The Wassenaar Arrangement controls most items that the United States controls for RS purposes. The Wassenaar Arrangement member countries hold extensive consultations and certain member countries hold bilateral discussions regarding Wassenaar issues. During FY 2004, the U.S. Government engaged in extensive consultations with its Wassenaar partners. Wassenaar participating states have agreed to incorporate the Wassenaar Dual-Use Control List into their own national export controls to prevent exports that could contribute to destabilizing buildups of conventional arms.
The United States has undertaken a wide range of actions to support and encourage regional stability and has specifically encouraged efforts to limit the flow of arms and militarily useful goods and other special equipment to regions of conflict and tension. U.S. regional stability export controls remain an important element in U.S. efforts to enhance regional stability. Because most of the items that the United States controls for RS purposes are also controlled by its Wassenaar and MTCR partners, the controls are largely based on international agreement, so no other alternative means were necessary.
Some military vehicles and other military-type equipment that are controlled for regional stability (RS) purposes may be obtained from foreign sources, but there are also multilateral national security (NS) controls on many items which support the U.S. controls by limiting foreign availability. In fact, nearly all of the commodities and related software and technology controlled for regional stability purposes are also subject to multilateral controls for either national security or missile technology reasons under multilateral regimes. Manufacturers of imaging cameras controlled in ECCN 6A003 have voiced complaints to the Department of Commerce that there is considerable foreign availability of these items in Europe and Japan. The U.S. Government has maintained its controls as it has determined that the national security and foreign policy objectives override the impact of foreign availability.