WPC  \T<.A3ܝ 'v33@tJ-k!V,2)%RDQ rܢ7pIu Yp+3 0v 4 0`4 0`4 0`A5 0`5 0`6 0(a6 086 067 028 08A9"; 0:A> B{> 0Y> 0_> 0 P? 0jZ@ 0A D/HC D+wC 1C 0)D D/E 0E 06F iHF 0(G 0:0H 0^jH D3H B *H 0<%I 1eaI 0<I D5JN7J C9JnSJZVL i.N 0~N 0D\ONOOdQIRfPTaRT CfT CT 1Tf!URX 1Y`Z&[ 15\f\a\\f^a^f^ 1^a1_ 1E__ 1`2aNKb 1Mb 1bf[ca]cfqcasccMd!ef4ga6g`Jgfjajfjajfjaj*jl 72l imU6+mU>amU*m&mnroeq1TrstQu8wOyizN}-AX9,U N9ffauf*a,USN@faU5@ 1 72U@ɐHP LaserJet 4 Plus,,,,0(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX($USUS.,3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)lI0s yC0:i+003|xhU(9 Z 6Times New Roman Regular>$$"Small Circle0  "0` (#(#i)(.3$ !USUS.,  (O;$0  2#  a  .3  0` (#(#(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#2#(   )3  0h(#h(#i)($$  0  *+ (_2623  ..(;3$2#  0  .3  0  (.3Ly$ !USUS.,    0  . "hDCEIMQUY]aAutoList4i)1)a)(b$0  0` (#(#2#   .3  0 ` (#` (#(xir$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#2#(  0  )3  0 (# (#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#2#(  a  )3  0h(#(#*G+M (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  ($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#2#  0  )3  0(#(#({$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#2#  a  )3  0p(#(#(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#2#     )3  0p(#p(#  "xIGaeimquy}Bullet ListBullets List "pTCEIMQUY]aAutoList5!i)1)a)  d*D+M (_24   ," hp x ,23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5   'USUS.,  __XX  Chapter1Introduction  AY ) xdtEsxA*A+M (_23  ` ) hp x )23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *>+M (_22   &hhp x &23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *;+M (_21   #p x #23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *8+M (_20  h  p x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  * (_1723  Ԁ*GM (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *DM (_15   ," hp x ,23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *AM (_14  ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *>M (_13   &hhp x &23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *;M (_12   #p x #23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *8M (_11  h  p x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *5M (_10   pp x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  (CEKQW]cioAutoList1A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A. "hgCEIMQUY]aAutoList2i)1)a) "hwCEIMQUY]aAutoList3i)1)a) d*5+M (_19   pp x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *2+M (_18    x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  (2M &_9    x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  ( &_823  (GM &_7   /%` ` hp x /23   5+ ` hp x 5  (DM &_6   ," hp x ,23   5+ ` hp x 5  (AM &_5  ` ) hp x )23   5+ ` hp x 5  (>M &_4   &hhp x &23   5+ ` hp x 5  (;M &_3   #p x #23   5+ ` hp x 5  (8M &_2  h  p x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  (5M &_1   pp x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  &2M $_    x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  0.Normal<:Definition T6) 4Heading 2XXX    <AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition(''&H1      (&H2  (&H3  (&H4 XXX (&H5  (&H6  ($20Address8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5  P)  __AY ) xdExA  XX   `    2004ReportonForeignPolicyBasedExportControls,*CITE,dl*CODEK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS 7 u($USUS.,    5    _ԀCitationsfollowingeachoftheforeignpolicycontrolprogramsrefertosectionsofthe  EAR,15_CFR_ԀParts730774,thatdescribethecontrolprogram.  u($USUS.,    6    _ԀProvisionspertainingtoforeignavailabilitydonotapplytoexportcontrolsineffect  beforeJuly12,1985,underSections6(_i_)(InternationalObligations),6(j)(CountriesSupporting  InternationalTerrorism),and6(n)(CrimeControlInstruments).SeetheExportAdministration  AmendmentsActof1985,PublicLawNo.9964,Section108(g)(2),99Stat.120,13435. t Moreover,Sections6(_i_),6(j),and6(n)requirethatcontrolsbeimplementedundercertain ` conditionswithoutconsiderationofforeignavailability.42Emphasis d64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard K<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted/%  ,Kk %#/K<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/<:zBottom of 7_(X7  ?%2A`Arial?  S\  `&Times New RomanS7`(X7k)1dxd'dxd "pdCEIMQUY]aAutoList6i)1)a)<:zTop of For7c(X7  ?%2A`Arial?  S\  `&Times New RomanS7`(X7k)2dxd0KS.SampleK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong jYk88:2  8dl6TypewriterK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      kkkk'dxd&0 d d2 0CommentB  -./01234 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.<:Default ParaYYYY)!dxdxd<6X9`("Courier 10cpiXx6X@8;X@+_ 0CG TimesBoldScalableXXz_ p^7X) `(CG TimesScalableblec P7P P u($USUS.,    1    _ԀSection6(b)(2)requirestheSecretarytoconsiderthecriteriasetforthinSection  6(b)(1)whenextendingcontrolsineffectpriortoJuly12,1985.Inaddition,thereportmust  includetheelementssetforthinSections6(f)(2)(A)(purposeofthecontrols);6(f)(2)(C)  (consultationwithindustryandothercountries);6(f)(2)(D)(alternativemeansattempted);and t 6(f)(2)(E)(foreignavailability).jYk$(.(3($ !USUS.,      0  (#$  0    u($USUS.,    2    _ԀSection6(b)(1)requirestheSecretarytomakedeterminationsregardingthecriteriaset  forththereinwhenimposing,extending,orexpandingcontrols.Thereportmustalsocontainthe  additionalinformationrequiredinSection6(f)(2)(A),(C)(E)(assetforthinfootnote1,supra.) 'USUS.,  _  XXChapter3RegionalStability  AY ) xd2EsxA  u($USUS.,    3    _ԀLimitationsexistwhenassessingtheeconomicimpactofcertaincontrolsbecauseofthe  unavailabilityofdataorbecauseoftheprevalenceofotherfactors,e.g.,currencyvalues,foreign  economicactivity,orforeignpoliticalregimes,whichmayrestrictimportsofU.S.productsmore  stringentlythantheUnitedStatesrestrictsexports.TABLE Add2d(jEGMSY_ekqAutoList14A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A. \ u($USUS.,    4    _ԀWhentheUnitedStatesimplementscontrolswithouttheimpositionofcorresponding  restrictionsbyothercountries,itisdifficulttoguardagainst_reexports_Ԁfromthirdcountriesto  thetargetcountry,tosecurethirdcountrycooperationinenforcementefforts,andtodetect  violationsabroadandinitiateproperenforcementaction.Therelativeeaseordifficultyof t identifyingthemovementofcontrolledgoodsortechnicaldataisalsoafactor.Controlson ` itemsthataresmall,inexpensive,easytotransportorconceal,orthathavemanyproducersand L  endusers,arehardertoenforce. H 'USUS.,  _  XXChapter2#XtXI#XXtCrimeControl/HumanRights#XtXؖ#  AY ) xd2EsxA "htCEIMQUY]aAutoList7i)1)a)Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5  u($USUS.,    13    _ԀXtXXXAlicensealsoisrequiredtoexportthistechnologyforantiterrorism(AT)reasons.#XtXXXtk# "hCEIMQUY]aAutoList8i)1)a)TABLE B  'USUS.,  __XX  Chapter2#XtXM#XXtCrimeControl/HumanRights#XtXئ#XXt  lAY ) xd2EsxA#XtX#  TABLE A "hCEIMQUY]aAutoList9i)1)a)TABLE C "hEGKOSW[_cAutoList10)1)a)Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 "hEGKOSW[_cAutoList11)1)a) ( 'USUS.,  _XXԀChapter4AntiTerrorismControls#XtX@# "hEGKOSW[_cAutoList12)1)a) "hEGKOSW[_cAutoList13)1)a)TABLE DTable_CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5  u($USUS.,    7    _ԀXtXXXTheDepartmentofCommercerequiresalicenseunderSection6(a)oftheActforall  computersgoingtoIran,NorthKorea,Sudan,orSyriawitha_CTP_Ԁof6_MTOPS_Ԁorabove.Note  alsothatcontrolsapplytoexportsofalllevelsofcomputerstoCubaandLibya.#XtXXXtj#TABLE B V u($USUS.,    8    _ԀXtXXXProvisionspertainingtoforeignavailabilitydonotapplytoexportcontrolsineffect  beforeJuly12,1985,undersections6(_i_)(InternationalObligations),6(j)(CountriesSupporting  InternationalTerrorism),and6(n)(CrimeControlInstruments).SeetheExportAdministration  AmendmentsActof1985,PublicLaw9964,section108(g)(2),Stat.120,13435.Moreover, t * sections6(_i_),6(j),and6(n)requirethatcontrolsbeimplementedundercertainconditions R withoutconsiderationofforeignavailability.#XtXXXtk#Table_ATable_BTable_E  'USUS.,  _XXԀChapter5EmbargoedCountriesandPersons#XtX@#Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5i)jY <6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial  'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter11SignificantItems:HotSectionTechnology#XtX=# 'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter6ToxicChemicals,ChemicalPrecursorsandAssociatedEquipment,TechnologyandSoftware#XtX=# h P)  _AY ) xdExA  XtXXXXXt   `    2004ReportonForeignPolicyBasedExportControls#؁##XtXؠ# P)  _AY ) xdExA  XX@ 2004ReportonForeignPolicyBasedExportControls ' 'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter12NuclearNonproliferation#XtX=#  'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter7BiologicalAgentsandAssociatedEquipmentandTechnology#XtX=# u($USUS.,    10    _ԀChapter7ofthisreportaddressesU.S.biologicalcontrols.  u($USUS.,    11    _ԀTheConventionontheProhibitionoftheDevelopment,Production,Stockpilingand  UseofChemicalWeaponsandontheirDestruction(the ChemicalWeaponsConventionor  _CWC_)wasratifiedbytheUnitedStatesonApril25,1997,andenteredintoforceonApril29,  1997.  u($USUS.,    17    _ԀTheanalysis,requiredbylaw,differsfornuclear_nonproliferation_Ԁcontrols.Itis  governedbytheNuclear_Nonproliferation_ԀActof1978(_NNPA_).Therefore,theheadingsunder  thissectiondifferfromtherestofthereport. E 'USUS.,  _XX  AppendixISummaryofPublicCommentsonForeignPolicyBasedExportControls #XtX=#  \AY ) xdEsxA   u($USUS.,    16    _ԀXtXXXAsofDecember2003,thecountriesinCountryGroupD:3includedAfghanistan,  Armenia,Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Belarus,Bulgaria,Burma,China(PRC),Cuba,Egypt,Georgia,  India,Iran,Iraq,Israel,Jordan,Kazakhstan,NorthKorea,Kuwait,_Kyrgyzstan_,Lebanon,Libya,  Macau,Moldova,Mongolia,Oman,Pakistan,Qatar,Russia,SaudiArabia,Syria,Taiwan, t Tajikistan,Turkmenistan,Ukraine,theUnitedArabEmirates,Uzbekistan,Vietnam,andYemen.#XtXXXtk#  u($USUS.,    12    _ԀAsofDecember2003,thecountriesintheCommerceCountryChartCBcolumn3  includedAfghanistan,Armenia,Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Belarus,Bulgaria,Burma,China(PRC),  Egypt,Georgia,India,Israel,Jordan,Kazakhstan,NorthKorea,Kuwait,_Kyrgyzstan_,Lebanon,  Macau,Moldova,Mongolia,Oman,Pakistan,Qatar,Russia,St.Kitts&Nevis,SaudiArabia, t Syria,Taiwan,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan,Ukraine,theUnitedArabEmirates,Uzbekistan, ` Vietnam,andYemen. # 'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter8MissileTechnologyControls#XtX=#  'USUS.,  _XXXX_XX  AppendixIIMultilateralExportControlRegimes  AY ) xdEsxA  u($USUS.,    15    _ԀXtXXXTheConventionontheProhibitionoftheDevelopment,ProductionandStockpilingof  Bacteriological(Biological)andToxinWeaponsandonTheirDestruction(_BWC_)wassignedin  1972andratifiedbytheUnitedStatesin1975.#XtXXXtk# u($USUS.,    14    _ԀChapter6ofthisreportaddressesU.S.chemicalcontrols. " 'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter9HighPerformanceComputers#XtX=#(hH  Z 6Times New Roman Regular / 'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter10Encryption#XtX=#Table_A k 'USUS.,  _  XX#XtXI#XXtAppendixIIIComputerTierCountryChart#XtX؋#XXt  AY ) xdEsxATable_A(99Z 6Times New Roman Regular  u($USUS.,    18    _ԀExportsof_HPC_ԀitemsclassifiedontheCommerceControlListunderExportControl  ClassificationNumber(_ECCN_)4A003canbeexportedtoCanadawithnolicenserequired  (_NLR_)ratherthanunderthelicenseexceptionforhighperformancecomputers(_CTP_).The  recordkeepingrequirementsdonotapplyfor_HPC_ԀexportstoCanada.Retransferand_reexport_ t restrictionsstillapply.  'USUS.,  _XX  AppendixIVSelectedRulesPublishedin2003#XtX=#  AY ) xd9EsxA[TABLE A(C Z(Times New Roman (zEGMSY_ekqAutoList15A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.  u($USUS.,    9    _XtXXXԀThegeneralpolicyofdenialstatedintheEARissupercededbyapolicyofdenial  pursuanttotheIranIraqArms_Nonproliferation_ԀActof1992.Seeinfraat52,discussion  regardingtheIranIraqArms_Nonproliferation_ԀAct.  #XtXXXte#(k9 Z(Times New Roman !USUS.,  _ AY ) xdExA    2004REPORTONFOREIGNPOLICYBASEDEXPORTCONTROLS    U.S.DepartmentofCommerce  BureauofIndustryandSecurity w AY ) xdEN xA O    Ӏ f  0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#TableofContents0ph(#h(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#PageNumberR  x(#x(#  Chapter10 ` 0 ` (#` (#Introduction0h (# (#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#1* z  (# (# Chapter20 ` 0 ` (#` (#CrimeControl/HumanRights0p (# (#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#9R  (# (# Chapter30 ` 0 ` (#` (#RegionalStability0 (# (#0(#(#0p(#(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#19*  (# (#    `     h      p   Chapter40 ` 0 ` (#` (#AntiTerrorismControls0 (# (#0p(#(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#26 (# (# Chapter50 ` 0 ` (#` (#EmbargoedCountriesandPersons0p (# (#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#40 (# (# Chapter60 ` 0 ` (#` (#ToxicChemicals,ChemicalPrecursorsandAssociatedb (# (# 0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#Equipment,TechnologyandSoftware0 (# (#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#59N (# (# Chapter70 ` 0 ` (#` (#BiologicalAgentsandAssociatedEquipmentandTechnology0 (# (#68&v (# (# Chapter80 ` 0 ` (#` (#MissileTechnologyControls0 (# (#0p(#(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#74N (# (# Chapter90 ` 0 ` (#` (#HighPerformanceComputers0p (# (#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#80& (# (# Chapter100 ` 0 ` (#` (#Encryption0h (# (#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#85 (# (# Chapter110 ` 0 ` (#` (#SignificantItems;HotSectionTechnology0 (# (#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#91   (# (# Chapter120 ` 0 ` (#` (#Nuclear_Nonproliferation_0 (# (#0p(#(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#94^"" (# (# AppendixI ` 0 SummaryofPublicCommentsonForeignPolicyExportControls0 (# (#976$$ (# (# AppendixII0 ` 0 ` (#` (#MultilateralExportControlRegimesin20030  (# (#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#101&^!& (# (# AppendixIII0 ` 0 ` (#` (#ComputerTierCountryChart0p (# (#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#102'6#( (# (# AppendixIV0 ` 0 ` (#` (#SelectedRulesPublishedbytheDepartmentofCommercein20030 (# (#103)%* (# (#   *%+ 9?%%d d9(S    XXCHAPTER1 # Introduction#XtX#  K  Exportcontrolsmaintainedforforeignpolicypurposesrequireannualextensionaccordingtothe 7  provisionsofSection6oftheExportAdministrationActof1979,asamended(theAct).Section # 6(f)oftheActrequiresthePresidenttosubmitareporttoCongresstoextendthecontrols.Such   authorityhasbeendelegatedtotheSecretaryofCommerce.Sections6(b)and6(f)oftheAct   requirethereporttoincludecertainconsiderationss v#  1      ׀anddeterminationsx, v#  2      ׀withrespecttothe   criteriaestablishedinthatsection.Thisreportcomplieswithalloftherequirementssetoutin   theActforextending,amending,orimposingforeignpolicycontrols. t  TheDepartmentofCommerceisactingundertheauthorityconferredbyExecutiveOrder L 13222ofAugust17,2001(ExecutiveOrder),asextendedbytheNoticeofAugust7,2003. 8 Therein,thePresident,byreasonoftheexpirationoftheAct,invokedhisauthority,including o$ authorityundertheInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct(_IEEPA_),tocontinuein [ effectthesystemofcontrolsthathadbeenmaintainedundertheAct.Underapolicyof G conformingactionsundertheExecutiveOrdertothoseundertheAct,theDepartmentof 3 Commerce,insofarasappropriate,isfollowingtheprovisionsofSection6oftheActwithregard  toextendingforeignpolicycontrols.   Withthisreport,allforeignpolicyexportcontrolsdiscussedhereinareherebyextendedforthe  periodfromJanuary21,2004,toJanuary20,2005.TheBureauofIndustryandSecurity(BIS)  (formerlyknownastheBureauofExportAdministration)oftheDepartmentofCommerceis p takingthisactionattherecommendationoftheSecretaryofState.Asfurtherauthorizedbythe \ Act,foreignpolicyexportcontrolsremainineffectforreplacementpartsandforpartscontained  H  ingoodssubjecttosuchcontrols.Thecontrolsadministeredinaccordancewithprocedures !4 establishedpursuanttoSection309(c)oftheNuclear_Nonproliferation_ԀActof1978similarly K remainineffect. 7  Eachchapterofthisreportdescribesaparticularcategoryofforeignpolicycontrolsand   delineatesmodificationsthathavetakenplaceoverthepastyear.Althoughthisreportcoversthe   2003calendaryear,mostofthestatisticaldatapresentedinthereportarebasedonfiscalyear   2003exportlicensingstatistics,unlessotherwisenoted.BISgeneratesthisdatafromthe   computerautomatedsystemitusestoprocessandtrackexportlicenseactivity.Duetothe  t tabulatingproceduresusedbythesysteminaccountingforoccasionallicenseapplicationsthat  ` listmorethanonecountryordestination,thesystemhascertainlimitationsasameansof L  gatheringdata.Inaddition,BISbasesthedatainthisreportonvaluescontainedinissuedexport 8  licenses.Suchvaluesmaynotrepresentthevaluesofactualshipmentsmadeagainstthose o$  licenses,becauseinsomecasesanexportermayshiponlyaportionofthevalueofanapproved [  licenseormaynotshipatall. G  Certaingoods,technology,andsoftwaredescribedinthisreportalsomayrequirealicensefor   nationalsecuritypurposesforexporttocertaindestinationsinaccordancewithSection5ofthe   Act.   XXtPartI:Highlightsinthe2004Report#XtX"#    RegionalStability   OnApril3,2003,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedanamendmenttothef  Export l AdministrationRegulations(EAR)f  Ԁthatexpandsthescopeofcontrolsonexplosivesdetection X equipment,nowclassifiedunderExportControlClassificationNumber(_ECCN_)2A983.The D Departmentalsoimposednewlicenserequirementsfortheexportand_reexport_Ԁofrelated {0 softwareandtechnology,undernewlycreated_ECCNs_Ԁ2D983and2E983.g f  Withthisamendment, g theDepartmentofCommerceimposednewlicenserequirementsforRSreasonsforexplosives S detectionequipment,software,andtechnologytof  g f  g ԀalldestinationsexceptmembersoftheNorth ?  AtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO),Australia,Japan,andNewZealandf  g f  . +!  AntiTerrorismControlsonDesignatedTerrorists  # OnJune6,2003,theDepartmentofCommerceamendedtheEARbyimposingsanctionson #  transactionsinvolvingSpeciallyDesignatedGlobalTerrorists(_SDGTs_),SpeciallyDesignated $! Terrorists(_SDTs_),andForeignTerroristOrganizations(_FTOs_)._SDGTs_,_SDTs_Ԁand_FTOs_,as %x" wellascertainotherdesignatedpersons,aresubjecttolicensingrequirementsmaintainedbythe &d # DepartmentoftheTreasuryandareidentifiedonalistofdesignatedpersonsmaintainedin 'P!$ AppendixAto31_CFR_ԀChapterV.ThecontrolsmaintainedbytheDepartmentoftheTreasury, (<"% includingthosewithrespectto_SDGTs_,_SDTs_Ԁand_FTOs_,arenotdiscussedinthisreport. s)(#&  7,%)  Iraq  K OnMay22,2003,theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(_UNSC_)issuedResolution1483that 3 liftedthecomprehensive_UNSC_ԀtradesanctionsonIraq,whileretainingrestrictionsonthesaleor  supplytoIraqofarmsandrelated_matriel_.Resolution1483alsoreiteratedcertainprovisionsof   related_UNSC_ԀResolutions707ofAugust15,1991,and687ofApril3,1991.Inparticular,those   provisionsrequirethatIraqeliminateitsnuclearweaponsprogramandrestrictitsnuclear   activitiestotheuseofisotopesformedical,industrial,oragriculturalpurposes.Suchprovisions   furthermandatetheeliminationofIraqschemicalandbiologicalweaponsprogramsaswellas  p itsballisticmissileprogram.TheDepartmentofCommerceispresentlyintheprocessof  \ amendingtheEARtoreflectIraqssignificantlychangedstatus.Atpresent,theDepartmentof H  theTreasurycontinuestorequirealicensefortheexporttoIraqofmostitemsontheCommerce 4  ControlList,otherthanitemscontrolledforantiterrorismreasonsonly. k   Syria  C  OnDecember12,2003,thePresidentsignedtheSyriaAccountabilityandLebaneseSovereignty +  RestorationAct(SAA)(Pub.L.108175).TheDepartmentofCommercehasresponsibilityfor   implementingSection5oftheSAA,insofarasitaffectstheEAR.   Rwanda   The_UNSC_ԀimposedanarmsembargoonRwandaonMay17,1994.In1995,the_UNSC_ x suspendedtheapplicationofthearmsembargototheGovernmentofRwandaifitemswere d shippedthroughspecifiedpointsofentry,andlaterterminated(effectiveSeptember1,1996)the P applicationoftheserestrictionsonsalesorsuppliestotheGovernmentofRwanda.Thesaleor < supplyofsucharmsandarmsrelated_materil_ԀtonongovernmentalforcesinRwandaremains s( prohibited. _ OnJuly30,2003,theDepartmentofStateimplementedthepartialliftingofthearmsembargo 7 forthoseitemssubjecttotheInternationalTrafficinArmsRegulations(_ITAR_)destinedforthe # GovernmentofRwanda.TheDepartmentofCommercewillbeimplementingacomparable   partialliftingofthearmsembargobyamendingtheEAR.    PersonsNamedPursuanttoExecutiveOrder13304  " PursuanttoExecutiveOrder13304,theDepartmentofCommercemaintainscontrolsonexports #p  topersonswhothreateninternationalstabilizationeffortsintheWesternBalkans,including $\! _Slobodan_Ԁ_Milosevic_,certainfamilymembersandcloseassociates,andpersonsunderopen %H" indictmentbytheInternationalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslavia.TheU.S.Government &4 # modifiedtheserestrictionsin2003andtheDepartmentofCommercewillpublishchangestothe k' !$ EARtoreflectthesemodifications. W( "%  Angola  /*#' ThePresidentdeclaredanationalemergencyrelatingto_UNITA_ԀbyExecutiveOrder12865on +$( September26,1993,incoordinationwithinternationalsanctionsadoptedbythe_UNSC_.The ,%) U.S.sanctionswerefurthertightenedbyExecutiveOrder13069ofDecember12,1997,and K ExecutiveOrder13098ofAugust18,1998.TheUnitedStatestooktheseactionsinaccordance 7 withUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolutions1127ofAugust28,1997,Resolution1173of # June12,1998,andResolution1176ofJune26,1998.   ExecutiveOrder13298ofMay6,2003,liftedallsanctionsimposedon_UNITA_Ԁintheseearlier   ExecutiveOrders.WiththesuccessfulimplementationoftheLusakaProtocolandthe   demilitarizationof_UNITA_,thePresidentdeterminedthatthecircumstancesthatledtothe  t declarationofanationalemergencyonSeptember26,1993,nolongerexist.Theliftingof  ` sanctionswasconsistentwithUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1448,whichliftedthe L  measuresimposedpursuanttopriorSecurityCouncilresolutionsrelatedto_UNITA_.The 8  DepartmentofCommercewillpublishanamendmenttotheEAR,whichwillremovereferences o$  tothesanctionsadministeredbytheDepartmentoftheTreasury. [   ChemicalandBiologicalControls  3  OnJune10,2003,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedarulereflectingdecisionsreachedby   theAustraliaGroup(AG)in_intersessional_ԀagreementandattheJune2002AGPlenary.Atthe  urgingoftheUnitedStates,thecontrolthresholdsin_ECCN_Ԁ2B352for_fermenters_Ԁandcrossflow  filtrationequipmentwereloweredtocaptureadditionalequipmentthatcouldbeusedinthe  productionofchemicalweapons.Theruleaddedeightbiologicaltoxinstothelistofcontrolled  itemsontheCCL.Additionally,editorialcorrectionsweremadetosomechemicalrelated l entriestoclarifythescopeofAGcontrols. X  MissileTechnologyControls  {0 Afterseveralyearsofdebate,agreementwasreachedintheMissileTechnologyControlRegime c (_MTCR_)todefinemissilerangeandpayload,keydeterminantsofthelevelofcontrolapplicable O torocketandunmannedaerialvehiclesystems.Insummary,payloadisnowdefinedasthat ; portionofarocketsystemorunmannedaerialvehiclethatisnotusedtomaintainflight;rangeis ' definedasthemaximumdistancethatarocketsystemorunmannedaerialvehicleiscapableof   travelinginstableflightasmeasuredbytheprojectionofitstrajectoryoverthesurfaceofthe   Earth.Clarifyingamendmentstothescopeandjurisdictionofcontrolsonglobalnavigation ! satellitereceivingequipmentwerealsoacceptedby_MTCR_Ԁmembers.OnSeptember22,2003, " theDepartmentofCommercepublishedaruleincorporatingtheserevisionsintheEAR. #x   HighPerformanceComputers  %P" OnJanuary14,2003,theDepartmentofCommerceamendedtheEARtoimplementrevisions &8 # thatwereagreeduponintheFebruary2002meetingofthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementonExport o'$!$ ControlsforConventionalArmsandDualUseGoodsandTechnologies(_Wassenaar_ [("% Arrangement).Thisruleremovedlicenserequirementsforexportsand_reexports_Ԁofgeneral G)"& purposemicroprocessorstomostdestinationstoconformwithchangesintheListofDualUse 3*#' GoodsandTechnologiesmaintainedandagreedtobygovernmentsparticipatinginthe +$( _Wassenaar_ԀArrangement.Thisruleretainedlicenserequirementsforexportsand_reexports_Ԁto  ,%) designatedterroristsupportingcountries.Inaddition,thisruleestablishedanewlicense K requirementfortheexportor_reexport_Ԁofgeneralpurposemicroprocessorsif,atthetimeofthe 7 exportor_reexport_,theexporteror_reexporter_Ԁknows,hasreasontoknow,orisinformedbyBIS # thattheitemwillbeorisintendedtobeusedforamilitaryenduseinacountrythatisofconcern   fornationalsecurityreasonsorbyamilitaryenduserinsuchacountry.    EncryptionItems    OnJune17,2003,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedaruletoimplementchangestothe  p _Wassenaar_ԀArrangementListofdualuseitems(finalizedinDecember2002)andclarifyU.S.  \ exportcontrolsoncertainlimitedusesofencryption.Thisupdateclarifieswhenencryption H  commoditiesandsoftwaremaybegivende_minimis_Ԁtreatment,whenshortrangewireless 4  devicesincorporatingencryptionmaybegivenmassmarketorretailtreatment,andthatspecially k  designedmedicalequipmentandsoftwarearenotcontrolledasencryptionor information W  securityitemsundertheEAR.Therulealsoexpandstheauthorizationsaccordingtowhich C  mosttravelersdepartingtheUnitedStatesmaytakeencryptionfortheirpersonaluse.Finally, /  thisruleimplementsthe2002_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementagreementtoeliminatenationalsecurity   basedcontrolsoncertaintypesof personalizedsmartcardsandequipmentcontrollingaccessto  copyrightprotecteddata.   Nuclear_Nonproliferation_   OnOctober22,2003,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedaruleinresponsetoanagreement h amongtheNuclearSuppliersGroup(_NSG_)membercountriestoestablishexportlicensing T proceduresforthetransferofitemsidentifiedontheAnnextothe Nuclear-RelatedDual-Use @ Equipment,Materials,andRelatedTechnologyList,whichispublishedbytheInternational w, AtomicEnergyAgency.  f   c  XXtPartII:FormatofAnalysisUsedinChapters212ofThisReport#XtXW#  ; Chapters212ofthisreportdescribethevariousexportcontrolprogramsmaintainedbythe ;  DepartmentofCommerceforforeignpolicyreasons.Eachoftheseprogramsisextendedfor '! anotheryear.Theanalysisrequiredforsuchanextensionispresentedineachchapterinthe " formatdescribedbelow. "  ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  $! Thissectiondefinestheexportcontrolsmaintainedforaparticularforeignpolicypurposethat %t" areimposedorextendedfortheyear2004.Eachofthefollowingchaptersdescribesthe &` # licensingrequirementsandpolicyapplicabletoaparticularcontrol. 'L!$  AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct  o)$#& Section6(f)(2)oftheActrequiresthattheSecretaryofCommercedescribethepurposeofthe W* $' controlsandconsiderordeterminewhethertoimposeorextendforeignpolicycontrolsbasedon C+$( specifiedcriteria,includingconsultationefforts,economicimpact,alternativemeans,andforeign /,%) availability.Foreachcontrolprogram,theDepartmentofCommercesconclusionsarebasedon K thefollowingrequiredcriteria: 7  A.ThePurposeoftheControl    Thissectionprovidestheforeignpolicypurposeandrationaleforeachparticularcontrol.    B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce   t ThissectiondescribestheSecretarysdeterminationsorconsiderationswithrespecttothe L  followingcriteria: 8   *,X` XX*1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. Whethersuchcontrolsare [  likelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurposeinlightofotherfactors,includingthe K  availabilityfromothercountriesofthegoodsortechnologysubjecttocontrol,andwhetherthe 7  foreignpolicypurposecanbeachievedthroughnegotiationsorotheralternativemeans. #   2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. Whetherthecontrolsarecompatiblewiththe  foreignpolicyobjectivesoftheUnitedStatesandwithoverallU.S.policytowardthecountryor  theproscribedendusesubjecttothecontrols.   3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. Whetherthereactionofothercountriestotheextensionof d suchexportcontrolsbytheUnitedStatesislikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectiveinachieving T theintendedforeignpolicypurposeortobecounterproductivetootherU.S.foreignpolicy @ interests. w,  4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry. Whethertheeffectofthecontrolsonthe O exportperformanceoftheUnitedStates,itscompetitivepositionintheinternationaleconomy, ? theinternationalreputationoftheUnitedStatesasareliablesupplierofgoodsandtechnology,or +  theeconomicwell-beingofindividualU.S.companiesexceedsthebenefittoU.S.foreignpolicy ! objectives.z v#  3       "   "  5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. WhethertheUnitedStateshastheabilitytoenforcethe K controls.Someenforcementproblemsarecommontoallforeignpolicycontrols._ v#  4      _ԀOther ;  enforcementproblemsareassociatedwithonlyoneorafewcontrols.Eachcontrolhasbeen ' assessedtodetermineifithaspresented,orisexpectedtopresent,anuncharacteristic   enforcementproblem.    C.ConsultationwithIndustry    Thissectiondiscussestheresultsofconsultationswithindustryleadingtotheextensionor  d impositionofcontrols.InaOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentof P  CommercesolicitedcommentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybased <  exportcontrols.CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartmentsTechnicalAdvisory s(  Committees(_TACs_)thatadviseBIS,aswellasfromthePresidentsExportCouncil _  SubcommitteeonExportAdministration.Commentsalsoweresolicitedfromthepublicviathe K  BIS_webpage_.ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember21,2003.Eightcommentswere 7  receivedfromthefollowingcompaniesandorganizations:AnalogDevices,Inc.;Federal #  ExpressCorporation;IndustryCoalitiononTechnologyTransfer(_ICOTT_);JupiterAluminum  Corp.;NationalChamberofIndustries&Commerce,_U.P._ԀIndia;SandiaNationalLaboratories  CooperativeMonitoringCenter;theSensorsandInstrumentationTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee  (_SITAC_);andSunMicrosystems.Adetailedreviewofthecommentsreceivedisavailablein  AppendixI. t  D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  L ThissectionreflectsconsultationsonthecontrolswithcountriesthatcooperatewiththeUnited o$ Statesonmultilateralcontrolsandwithothercountriesasappropriate. [  E.AlternativeMeans  3 Thissectionspecifiesthenatureandresultsofanyalternativemeansattemptedtoaccomplishthe  ! foreignpolicypurpose,orthereasonsforextendingthecontrolswithoutattemptinganysuch ! alternativemeans. "  #   F.ForeignAvailability  K Thissectionconsiderstheavailabilityfromothercountriesofgoodsortechnologycomparableto # thosesubjecttotheproposedexportcontrol.Italsodescribesthenatureandresultsoftheefforts   madepursuanttoSection6(h)oftheActtosecurethecooperationofforeigngovernmentsin   controllingtheforeignavailabilityofsuchcomparablegoodsortechnology.Inaccordancewith   theAct,foreignavailabilityconsiderationsdonotapplytoexportcontrolsineffectpriortoJune   12,1985,tocontrolsmaintainedforhumanrightsandantiterrorismreasons,ortocontrolsin  t supportoftheinternationalobligationsoftheUnitedStates.   `     XXt(CHAPTER2#XtXfu# s(     XXtCrimeControl/HumanRights s ( (Sections742.7,742.11,742.17)#XtXu#_V v#  5      _  < uExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  s( AsrequiredbySection6(n)oftheExportAdministrationActof1979,asamended,theUnited K  Statescontrolstheexportsofcrimecontrolanddetectionitemstoreflectitsconcernsaboutthe 7  observanceofhumanrightsinvariouscountriesoftheworld.TheU.S.Governmentrequiresa #  licensetoexportmostcrimecontrolanddetectioninstruments,equipment,relatedtechnology,   andsoftwaretoalldestinations,g ԀexceptAustralia,Japan,NewZealand,andmembersofthe   NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO).Alicenseisrequiredtoexportcertainf  g Ԁcrime  controlitemsf  g f  g Ԁincludingrestrainttypedevices(suchashandcuffs)anddischargetypearms(such  as_tasers_)g f  g Ԁtof  ԀalldestinationsexceptCanada.Speciallydesignedimplementsoftortureand t thumbscrews,whicharepartofthecrimecontrolcategory,requirealicenseforexporttoany ` destination.Inaddition,theU.S.Governmentmaintainsexportlicenserequirementsforcertain L crimecontrolitemsinfurtheranceoftheInterAmericanConventionAgainsttheIllicit 8 ManufacturingofandTraffickinginFirearms,Ammunition,Explosives,andotherRelated o$ Material. [  LicensingPolicy 3 CrimeControl/ImplementsofTorture    f  TheU.S.Governmenthasag f  g f  g Ԁgeneralf  g f  g Ԁpolicyofdenialforapplicationstoexportf  g Ԁcrimecontrol  itemsf  Ԁtoacountryinwhichthegovernmentengagesinaconsistentpatternofgrossviolationsof   internationallyrecognizedhumanrights.Forothercountries,theU.S.Governmentwillconsider ! applicationsforcrimecontrolitemsfavorably,onacasebycasebasis,unlessthereiscivil "l disorderinthecountryorregionconcerned,orthereisevidencethatthegovernmentmayhave #X violatedhumanrightsandthatthejudicioususeofexportcontrolswouldbehelpfulin $D  minimizingregionalinstability,deterringthedevelopmentofaconsistentpatternofsuch {%0! violations,orindemonstratingU.S.oppositiontosuchviolations. g& "   S'!# f  TheU.S.Governmenthasaf  policyofdenialforanylicenseapplicationg Ԁtoexportspecially K  designedimplementsoftortureandthumbscrewsf  g .Noapplicationsfortheexportoftheseitems 7 weresubmittedin2003. #  China    Followingthe1989militaryassaultondemonstratorsbythePeoplesRepublicofChina(PRC)   inTiananmenSquare,theU.S.GovernmentimposedconstraintsontheexporttothePRCof   certainitemsontheCommerceControlList(CCL).Section902(a)(4)oftheForeignRelations  p AuthorizationActforFY19901991,PublicLaw101246,suspendstheissuanceoflicenses  \ underSection6(n)oftheActfortheexportofanycrimecontrolordetectioninstrumentsor H  equipmenttothePRC.ThePresidentmayterminatethesuspensionbyreportingtoCongress 4  thatChinahasmadeprogressonpoliticalreformorthatitisinthenationalinterestoftheUnited k  Statestoterminatethesuspension.In2003,thePresidentdidnotexercisehisauthorityto W  terminatethissuspension. C   Indonesia    TheU.S.Governmentdeniesapplicationstoexportf  certaincrimecontrolitemstoIndonesia,  subjecttonarrowexceptions,consistentwithSection582oftheForeignOperations,Export  FinancingandRelatedPrograms1995Appropriationsand1994SupplementalAppropriations  Act(PublicLaw103306). |  Rwanda  T InconformitywithU.N.Resolution918andtheU.N.ParticipationAct,theU.S.Government < maintainsanembargoonthesaleorsupplyofarmsandrelatedmaterieltocertainentitiesin s( Rwanda.Asaresult,applicationstoexportitemscontrolledforcrimecontrolanddetection _ reasonsontheCCLtosuchentitiesaresubjecttoageneralpolicyofdenial. K  OrganizationofAmericanStatesMemberCountries  # TheDepartmentofCommercepublishedf  af  Ԁruleg ԀinApril1999f  g Ԁreflectingtheprovisionsofthe   OrganizationofAmericanStates(OAS)ModelRegulationsfortheControloftheInternational   MovementofFirearmsg .TheDepartmentofCommercedesignedtheseregulationstoharmonize ! importandexportcontrolsoverthelegalinternationalmovementoffirearmsamongOAS " memberstatesandtoestablishprocedurestopreventtheillegaltraffickingoffirearmsamong #p  thesecountries. $\! Undertheseprovisions,theDepartmentofCommerceg maintainsf  g Ԁforeignpolicycontrolson &4 # exportsofCommercecontrolledfirearms,includingshotgunswithabarrellengthof18inchesor k' !$ overandparts,buckshotshells,shotgunshellsandparts,andopticalsightingdevicestoallOAS W( "% membercountriesg ,includingCanada.Itemssubjecttothesecontrolsareidentifiedby FC C)"& Column1inthe LicenseRequirementssectionofthecorrespondingExportControl /*#' ClassificationNumbers(_ECCNs_).InsupportoftheOASModelRegulations,theU.S. +$( Governmentf  requiresf  ԀanImportCertificate(IC)g forg ԀtheexporttoallOASmembercountriesof ,%) thoseitemsaffectedbytheregulations.Ingeneral,theDepartmentofCommerceapproves K licenseapplicationsfortheexportoffirearmstoOASmembercountriesiftheapplicationis 7 supportedbyanIC.TheDepartmentofCommercedeniesapplicationsthatinvolveenduses # linkedtodrugtrafficking,terrorism,internationalorganizedcrimef  ,andothercriminalactivities.   Asdiscussedlaterinthischapter,duringFY2003approximately55percentofallapproved   crimecontrollicenseapplicationswereforitemsalsocontrolledforFCreasonstoOASmember   countries.    OtherLicensingConsiderations   ` TheDepartmentofStateannuallycompilestheCountryReportsonHumanRightsPractices. H  TheDepartmentofStatepreparesthesereportsinaccordancewithSections116(d)and502B(b) 4  oftheForeignAssistanceActof1961,asamended,forsubmissiontoCongress.Thefactual k  informationpresentedinthesereportsisasignificantelementinlicensingrecommendations W  madebytheDepartmentofState.InaccordancewiththeForeignAssistanceAct,thereisa C  policyofdenialforlicenseapplicationstoexportcrimecontrolitemstoanycountrywhose /  governmentengagesinaconsistentpatternofgrossviolationsofhumanrights.   TheInternationalReligiousFreedomActof1998(_IRFA_)callsforthePresidenttotake  diplomaticorotherappropriateactionwithrespecttoanycountrythatengagesinortolerates  violationsofreligiousfreedom._IRFA_Ԁalsoprovidesfortheimpositionofeconomicmeasuresor  commensurateactionswhenacountryhasengagedinsystematic,ongoing,egregiousviolations l ofreligiousfreedomaccompaniedbyflagrantdenialsoftherightstolife,liberty,orthesecurity X ofpersons,suchastorture,enforcedandarbitrarydisappearances,orarbitraryprolonged D detention.Forsuchcountries,_IRFA_ԀprovidesthattheDepartmentofCommerce,with {0 DepartmentofStateconcurrence,shallincludeontheCCLforreasonsofcrimecontrolf  Ԁor g detectiong ,andrequireexportlicensesfor,itemsthatarebeingusedf  g ,f  g Ԁorareintendedforusef  g ,f  g  S directlyandinsignificantmeasure,tocarryoutparticularlysevereviolationsofreligious ? freedom.f  g InOctober2001,f  g ԀtheSecretaryofStateg ,actingundertheauthorityofthePresident, + redesignatedfivecountries!Burmaf  g ,China,Iran,Iraq,andSudan!anddesignatedonenew   country!NorthKorea!as countriesg Ԁofparticularf  g concernundertheActg Ԁforf  Ԁhavingengagedg Ԁinf  g  ! org toleratedf  g Ԁparticularlysevereviolationsf  Ԁofreligiousfreedomg .Thesedesignationswere ! reiteratedinthemostrecentDepartmentofStateInternationalReligiousFreedomReporttothe " CongressonOctober7,2002.TheDepartmentofCommercehasnotaddedadditionalitemsto #|  theCCLpursuantto_IRFA_,butitreviewslicenseapplicationsforcrimecontrolitemstothese $h! destinationsg byapplyingthemostrestrictivelicensingpolicyapplicabletosuchcountries.g  %T"  m-./01234(03   AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct  w',!$  A.ThePurposeoftheControl  O)#& ThesecontrolsseektoensurethatU.S.-origincrimecontrolequipmentisnotexportedto '+$( countrieswhosegovernmentsfailtorespectinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights,orwhere ,%) civildisorderisprevalent.Denialofexportlicenseapplicationstosuchcountrieshelpsto K preventf  humanrightsviolationsandclearlysignalsU.S.concernsabouthumanrightsinthese 7 countries.Thef  g licenserequirementsformostdestinationsg Ԁallowg Ԁforclosef  g Ԁmonitoringofexports # ofcertaincrimecontrolitemsthatcouldbemisusedtocommithumanrightsviolations.   Controlsonimplementsoftorturesimilarlyhelptoensurethatsuchitemsarenotexportedfrom   theUnitedStates.TheDepartmentofCommercehasneitherreceivedapplicationsforexportof    speciallydesignedimplementsoftorturenorwoulditf  approveg Ԁtheexportofsuchitems.In  t addition,theDepartmentofCommerceapprovednolicenseapplicationfortheexportof  ` _thumbcuffs_. L   B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  o$   1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose .TheSecretaryhas G  determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose,inlight 7  ofotherfactors,includingthefactthattheforeignpolicypurposecannotbeachievedthrough #  negotiationsorotheralternativemeans.Thelackofcomplementarycontrolsbyotherproducer  nationslimitstheeffectivenessofthesecontrolsinpreventinghumanrightsviolations.The  controlsrestricthumanrightsviolatorsaccesstoU.S.-origingoodsandprovideimportant  symbolicevidenceofU.S.supportfortheprinciplesofhumanrights.Theimpositionof  stringentlicensingrequirementsforcrimecontrolitemsenablestheU.S.Governmenttomore t closelymonitoritemsthatcouldbeusedinhumanrightsviolations. `  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthese 8 controlsarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesandwillnothaveanysignificant s( adverseforeignpolicyconsequenceswiththeextensionofthiscontrolprogram.Thiscontrol _ programisfullyconsistentwithU.S.policyinsupportofinternationallyrecognizedhuman K rights,asexpressedbysuccessiveAdministrationsandCongress. 7  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadversereactionto ! thesecontrolsisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectivenorwillanyadversereactionby ! othercountriesbecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests.Thesecontrolsareunique, " serveadistinctforeignpolicypurpose,andariseoutofdeeplyheldconvictionsoftheU.S. #  Governmentandpeople.Othercountriescurrentlydonothaveequivalentregulations,butmany $x! haverestrictionsonexportsoflethalproductstoareasofcivilunrest.OnJanuary27,2003,the %d" EuropeanUnionissuedatraderegulationproposalconcerningtradeincertainequipmentand &P # productsthatcouldbeusedforcapitalpunishment,tortureorothercruel,inhumanordegrading '4&#  2  && > 0A978 0&!D " 0Saps D:D  # D0 LB4D " #  LЀ$0 9/!D 3 9 0A979 0&! " 0Policehelmetsandshields PF   T@80T@P80 XN@ "  T@80 T@ X$7,399,599 9/! 3 9 򀀀0A982 0&!D " 0Restraintdevices,e.g.,leg D  irons,shackles,handcuffs QG{0  l@229l@Q229 YOAD " l@229 l@ Y$7,135,507 9/!D 3 9 0A983 0&!" 0Speciallydesigned  implementsoftorture D: # D0   LB4" #  L$0  Ѐ 9/! 3 9 0A984 0&!g!" 0Shotgunsandbuckshot g" shotgung shells QGS# ؁@571؁@Q571 g$  YOAS%" ؁@571 ؁@ Y$19,155,315 9/!g&3 9 0A985 0&!'" 0Dischargetypearms(stun ( guns,shockbatons,etc.) QGt) e@173e@Q173 *  YOAt+" e@173 e@ Y$12,859,656 ,  9/!t-3 9 0A987 0&!?." 0Opticalsightingdevices QG?/ @514@Q514 YOA?0" @514 @ Y$39,305,608 MC!?13 # M 0E982 C94t2" #  CTechnologyforitemsunder t3 0A982/0A985 OE`4  @2@O2 WM?t5"  @2 @ W$2 MC!t63 # M 0E984 C94+ 7" #  CTechnologyforitemsunder + 8 0A984 D:!9 # D0 LB4+ :" #  L$0 + ;  9/!!<3 9 1A984 0&!"L=" 0Chemicalagentsincluding "L> teargascontaining1%orless #8? ofCSorCN PFo$$@  =@29=@P29 "LA  XN@o$$C"  =@29 =@ X$1,209,514 "LD  9/!o$$F3 9 1A985 0&!%G" 0Fingerprintingpowders,dyes %H andinks QG& I @_@125@_@Q125 %J  YOA& K" @_@125 @_@ Y$14,321,706 %L Ѐ 9/!& M3 9 3A980 0&![("N" 0Voiceprintidentificationand [("O analysisequipment OEG)"P  ?1?O1 [("Q  WM?G)"R"  ?1 ? W$8,700 [("S  9/!G)"T3 9 3A981 0&! d" 0Polygraphs,fingerprint  d analyzers,camerasand  P  equipment QG <  f@177 f@Q177  d  YOA <"  f@177  f@ Y$7,913,562  d  9/! < 3 9 3D980 0&!s  " 0Softwareforitemsunder s   3A980and3A981 PF_    (@12(@P12 XN@s "  (@12 (@ X$3,372,498 9/!s 3 9 3E980 0&!(" 0Technologyforitemsunder ( 3A980and3A981 D: # D0 (  LB4" #  L$0 (  9/!3 9 4A003* 0&!K" 0Digitalcomputersfor K computerizedfingerprint 7  equipmentonly D:#l  # D0 K  LB4#l " #  L$0 K  9/!#l 3 9 4A980 0&! !" 0Computersforfingerprint  " equipment PF #  &@11&@P11  $  XN@ %"  &@11 &@ X$5,368,925  &  9/! '3 9 4D001* 0&!X(" 0Softwareforitemsunder X) 4A003only D:D* # D0 X+  LB4D," #  L$0 X-  9/!D.3 9 4D980 0&!{/" 0Softwareforitemsunder {0 4A980 PFg1  5@215@P21 {2  XN@g3"  5@21 5@ X$1,815,493 {4  9/!g53 9 4E001* 0&!06" 0Technologyforitemsunder 07 4A003and4D001only D:8 # D0 09  LB4:" #  L$0 0;  9/!<3 9 4E980 0&!S=" 0Technologyforitemsunder S> 4A980 OE??  ?1?O1 S@  WM??A"  ?1 ? W$1 SB  9/!?C3 9 6A002c* 0&! D" 0Policemodelinfraredviewers  E only PF!F  &@11&@P11 XN@ G"  &@11 &@ X$895,695 9/! H3 9 6E001* 0&!+#tI" 0Technologyfordevelopment +#tJ ofitemsunder6A002conly D:$`K # D0 +#tL  LB4$`M" #  L$0 +#tN  9/!$`O3 9 6E002* 0&!%P" 0Technologyforproductionof %Q itemsunder6A002conly D:&R # D0 %S  LB4&T" #  L$0 %U  9/!&V3 9 9A980 0&!(LW" 0Mobilecrimescience (LX laboratories OE(8 Y  ?1?O1 (LZ  WM?(8 ["  ?1 ? W$1,250 (L\  @&/!(8 ]3 @ TOTAL 7&&!o*!^"& 7 [&Jo*!_&  0P@[1,958 c&RDo*!`"P  0 @& c$120,763,0311'%o*!a3  & 1 +"a  XXtNOTES: (1)Togivethereaderthebroadestperspectiveoftheitemscovered,#XtX؆#XXtԀTable1listsallcrimecontrol_ECCNs_ K includingthoseforwhichnolicenseapplicationsweresubmitted.(2)Those_ECCNs_Ԁmarkedwithanasterisk(*)list  itemsthatarecontrolledforcrimecontrolreasonsandforotherreasons,butthecorrespondingstatisticsrepresent  onlythecrimecontrolitemswithinthe_ECCN_.#XtX# N InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommercedenied29applicationsforcrimecontrolitemsvalued I  atabout$10.7million.Thelargestnumberofdenialsinvolvedshotguns(twelvecases),butby 5  value,dischargearmsweregreatest(duetodenialofonelicenseofhighvalue).Table2lists !  onlythosecrimecontrol_ECCNs_Ԁforwhichapplicationsweredenied.      Table2:CRIMECONTROLAPPLICATIONSDENIED(FY2003)     *td d'dd 'A dd A rdd rdd (#(#,'dd , dd ,dd ,dd +  *&&r r  * _ECCN_ 7&&&!! "&& 7 Description 7&&&!! "&& 7 Applications !  Denied 7&&&!  "&& 7   $Value >4&! 2  && > 0A979 0&!B " 0Policehelmets,shields OEB   ?1?O1 WM?B "  ?1 ? W$225 9/!B 3 9 0A982 0&! " 0Restraintdevices,e.g.,leg   irons,shackles,handcuffs OE  @2@O2    WM?"  @2 @ W$16,000    9/!3 9 0A984 0&!y." 0Shotgunsandshotgunshells PFy.  (@12(@P12 XN@y."  (@12 (@ X$348,618 9/!y. 3 9 0A985 0&!!" 0Dischargetypearms(e.g.,stun " guns,shockbatons) OE#  @5@O5 $  WM?%"  @5 @ W$10,044,817 & Ѐ 9/!'3 9 0A987 0&!e(" 0Opticalsightingdevicesfor e) firearms OEQ*   @8 @O8 e+ Ѐ WM?Q,"   @8  @ W$266,000 e-  9/!Q.3 9 1A985 0&!/" 0Fingerprintingpowders,dyes, 0 andinks OEr1  ?1?O1 WM?2"  ?1 ? W$15,236 @&/!33 @ TOTAL 7&&!= 4"& 7 U&D= 5&  0=@U29 ]&L>= 6"  0 =@& ]$10,690,8961'%= 73  & 1InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommerceapproved830exportlicenseapplicationf  g sf  g Ԁworth$41.9 E"8 millionforitemsaffectedbytheforeignpolicycontrolsonfirearmsandammunitioninstitutedin 1#9 1999insupportoftheOASModelRegulations.LicensestoCanadaaccountformore $: applicationsthananyothercountry,with474applicationsinFY2003.Approximately55  %; percentofallapprovedcrimecontrollicenseapplicationswereforitemsalsocontrolledfor %< FirearmsConventionreasonstoOASmembercountries.Thetablebelowliststhenumberand & = valueofexportlicensesthattheDepartmentofCommerceissuedforfirearms,ammunition, '!> sights,andrelateditemsaffectedbytheseforeignpolicycontrolsg appliedtoOAScountriesg inFY (n"? 2003. )Z#@  }+2%B @ TABLE3:APPLICATIONSFORFIREARMS,AMMUNITION, K @A A ANDSIGHTSTOOASCOUNTRIESAPPROVEDINFY2003  7 *td d'dd ' dd dd dd (#(#,dd ,dd ,dd ,dd +  3&&"   3_ECCN_ @&&/!s ("&& @ItemsControlled @&&/!s ("&& @Applications s ( Approved @&&/!_ "&& @  $Value s (   >4&_  2  && >OӀ0A984 0&!    0Shotgunsand    buckshotshotgun    shells H> l  p|@455p|@H  455 PFA   p|@455 p|@ Ps  $15,810,850     9/! 0 9  0A986 0&!7  0sOthershotgunshells H>7 d@165d@H  165 PFA7  d@165 d@ P   $12,730,517 7   9/!# 0 9  0A987 0&!X   0 Opticalsighting X  devicesforfirearms H>D  @j@210@j@H  210 X   PFAD   @j@210 @j@ P  Ӏ$13,317,452 X   @&/!D 0 @@  TOTAL 7&&! & 7 R&A &  0P@Rv  830 Z&ID  P  0 @& ZӀ?"$41,858,819(   & ( 5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedtheUnitedStateshasthe " abilitytoeffectivelyenforcethesecontrols.Crimecontrolitemsandimplementsoftortureare # easilyrecognizableanddonotpresentspecialenforcementproblemsrelatedtodetecting $ violationsorverifyinguse.However,enforcementcooperationwithothercountriesgenerallyis % difficultincasesinvolvingunilaterallycontrolleditems,suchasthese,andoftendependsonthe l& typeandquantityofgoodsinquestion.Inaddition,enforcementofcontrolson_reexports_Ԁis X' challengingandrestsinlargepartonthewillingnessoftherecipienttoabidebythetermsofthe D( exportlicense.TheU.S.Governmentconductspostshipmentverificationstoverifythatthe {0) listedenduserhasreceivedtheexportsandtoconfirmthattheenduserisusingthecontrolled g* itemsinawayconsistentwiththelicenseconditions. S+  C.ConsultationwithIndustry  +!- f  InaOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentofCommercesolicited #/ commentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols. #0 CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartmentsTechnicalAdvisoryCommittees $1 (_TACs_),whichadvisetheBureauofIndustryandSecurity(BIS),aswellasfromthePresidents %|2 ExportCouncilSubcommitteeonExportAdministration.Commentsalsoweresolicitedfrom &h 3 thepublicviatheBISwebsite.ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember21,2003,andeight 'T!4 commentswerereceived.Whilenoneofthecommentsspecificallyaddressedcrimecontrols,the (@"5 IndustryCoalitiononTechnologyTransfer(_ICOTT_)providedgeneralcommentsaboutall w),#6 foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols,statingthatthesecontrolsareunilateralandlargely c*$7 ineffective._ICOTT_Ԁrecommendedthatunilateralcontrolsshouldonlybeusedwhenthe O+%8 symbolismoftheactofimposingcontrolsoutweighstheinjurytoAmericanworkersand ;,%9 businesses.Inaddition,_ICOTT_Ԁsuggestedthatifunilateralcontrolsaretobeimposedwhilethe K UnitedStatesnegotiateswithitstradingpartnerstoseekmultilateralsupport,thoseunilateral 7 controlsshouldbeoflimitedduration.Adetailedreviewofallcommentsreceivedcanbefound # inAppendixI.g    f  Inaddition,tf  g heDepartmentofCommercehasconsultedextensivelywithexportersofcrime   controlitemsandwithhumanrightsgroupsconcernedaboutthepotentialformisuseofsuch   itemsinvariouspartsoftheworld.Itdoessomostfrequentlybyalmostdailyconsultationwith  t exportersaboutspecificitemsproposedforexporttospecificendusersandenduses.The  ` DepartmentsofStateandCommercehaveconsultedwithAmnestyInternationaltodiscussa L  widerangeofissuesrelatingtocrimecontrolitems.TheU.S.Governmenthasmadecertain 8  changesinthelicensingpolicyandcontrolledcommoditiesinresponsetotheconcernsofhuman o$  rightsgroups. [   D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  3  Mostothercountriesthatsupplycrimecontrolanddetectionitemshavenotimposedsimilar   exportcontrols.TheUnitedKingdomandCanadamaintaincontrolsoncertaincrimecontrol  commoditiesthataresimilartoU.S.controls.CertainEuropeanUnionmemberstatesprohibit  orimposeanauthorizationrequirementontheexportofdualuseitemsnotcoveredbythe  multilateralexportcontrolregimesforreasonsofpublicsecurityorhumanrightsconsiderations. p TheU.S.Governmentconsultsregularlywithothermembercountriesinthe_Wassenaar_ \ Arrangement,theNuclearSuppliersGroup,theMissileTechnologyControlRegime,andthe H AustraliaGroupregardingU.S.exportcontrols.OnJanuary27,2003,theEuropeanUnion 4 issuedatraderegulationproposalconcerningtradeincertainequipmentandproductsthatcould k  beusedforcapitalpunishment,torture,orothercruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentor W  punishment. C  E.AlternativeMeans    Section6(n)oftheActrequiresf  g theDepartmentofCommercetomaintainf  g exportcontrolson ! crimecontrolanddetectionequipment.Alternativemeansdonotsatisfythisstatutoryrequire " ment.TheU.S.Governmentdoes,however,usediplomaticefforts,sanctions,andothermeans #  toconveyitsconcernsaboutthehumanrightssituationinvariouscountries. $l!  ,%)  F.ForeignAvailability  K TheforeignavailabilityprovisiondoesnotapplytoSection6(n)oftheAct._W v#  6      _ԀCongresshas # recognizedtheusefulnessf  g andsymbolicvaluef  g ofthesecontrolsinsupportingU.S.Government   policyonhumanrightsissues,foreignavailabilitynotwithstanding.     XXt  yCHAPTER3 ( RegionalStability  P (Section742.6)#XtX#  d ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  P Rf  g egionalstability(RS)f  g controlsensurethatexportsand_reexports_Ԁofcontrolleditemsdonot (  contributedirectlyorindirectlytoacountrysmilitarycapabilitiesinamannerthatwouldalteror u  destabilizearegionsmilitarybalancecontrarytotheforeignpolicyinterestsoftheUnited a  Statesg .Thiscontroltraditionallycoversitemsspeciallydesignedormodifiedformilitary M  purposesandcertaindualusecommoditiesthatcanbeusedtomanufacturemilitaryequipment. 9  OnApril3,2003,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedanamendmenttothef  Export  AdministrationRegulations(EAR)f  Ԁthatexpandsthescopeofcontrolsonexplosivedetection  equipment.Theamendmentmovedexplosivedetectionequipmentfrom_ECCN_Ԁ2A993to_ECCN_  2A983.TheDepartmentalsoimposednewlicenserequirementsfortheexportand_reexport_Ԁof t relatedsoftwareandtechnology,undernewlycreated_ECCNs_Ԁ2D983and2E983.g f  g ԀWiththis ` amendment,theDepartmentofCommercehasimposedalicenserequirementforRSreasonsfor L theexportofexplosivedetectionequipment,softwareandtechnologytof  g f  g Ԁalldestinationsexcept 8 membersoftheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO),Australia,Japan,andNewZealandf  g f  . $ Theamendmentisdesignedtoenhancethesecurityandsafetyofairlinetravelandphysical q structures,includinggovernmentbuildings.TheDepartmentofStatesDirectorateforDefense ] TradeControlsisencouragingmanufacturersofsuchequipmenttoseekconfirmationoftheir I individualitemtransferstoDepartmentofCommerceexportlicensingjurisdictionbyusingthe 5  CommodityJurisdiction(22_CFR_Ԁ120.4)process.f  g  !!  LicensingPolicy  " f  Section742.6oftf  hef  EARf  g Ԁrequiresf  g Ԁalicensef  g ԀforRSreasonstoexportcertainimageintensifier $p  tubes,infraredfocalplanearrays,certainsoftwareandtechnologyforinertialnavigationsystems, %\! gyroscopesandaccelerometers,toalldestinationsexceptCanadaf  g .Alllicenseapplicationsfor &H " theseitemsarereviewedonacasebycasebasistodeterminewhethertheexportcould '4!# contribute,directlyorindirectly,toacountrysmilitarycapabilitiesinamannerthatwould ( "$ destabilizeoralteraregionsmilitarybalancecontrarytoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests. m) #%   E+$' Section742.6oftf  heEARf  g Ԁrequiresalicenseforf  RSreasonsf  g Ԁtoexportexplosivedetection a  equipmentandrelatedsoftwareandtechnology,militaryrelatedf  g Ԁitems(e.g.,certainvehiclesand M traineraircraft),andcertaincommoditiesusedtomanufacturemilitaryequipmenttoall 9 destinationsexceptmembernationsoff  Ԁg NATOf  g ,Australia,Japan,andNewZealand.TheU.S. %  Governmentwillgenerallyconsiderapplicationsforsuchlicensesfavorably,onacasebycase   basis,unlesstheexportwouldsignificantlyg affectf  g Ԁregionalstability.     AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct   ` ' A.ThePurposeoftheControl  8  ThiscontrolprovidesamechanismfortheU.S.Governmenttomonitortheexportoftheseitems q  torestricttheiruseininstancesthatwouldadverselyaffectregionalstabilityorthemilitary ]  balancewithinaregionandtoprotectthenationalsecurityf  g andforeignpolicyinterestsg ofthe I  UnitedStates.Thepurposeoftheexf  g f  g paf  nsionofcontrolsonexplosivedetectionequipmentg Ԁg and 5  impositionofcontrolsonrelatedsoftwareandtechnologyf  g Ԁf  g istoenhancethesecurityandsafetyof ! airlinetravelworldwideandphysicalstructuresincludinggovernmentbuildings.    B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce    1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. f  TheSecretaryhas \ determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose,inlight L ofotherfactors,includingtheavailabilityoftheseRScontrolleditemsfromothercountriesand 8 thatmostoftheitemssubjecttothesecontrolsarealsocontrolled,asaresultofinternational $ negotiations,bytheUnitedStatespartnersinthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementandtheMissile q TechnologyControlRegime(_MTCR_).Regionalstabilitycontrols,includingthenewand ] expandedf  g Ԁcontrolsonexplosivedetectiong g equipment,software,andtechnologyf  g f  ԀcontributetoU.S. I nationalsecurityandforeignpolicyobjectivesbyenablingtheUnitedStatestorestricttheuseor 5  availabilityofcertainf  g f  g sensitivef  g f  g U.S.origingoodsandtechnologiesthatwouldadverselyaffect !! regionalstabilityorthemilitarybalanceincertainareas.  "  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives .f  g TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthese #  controlsarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesandwillnothaveanysignificant $t! adverseforeignpolicyconsequenceswiththeextensionofthesecontrols.Rf  g egionalstability %`" controls,includingtheg f  g expandedf  Ԁandnewcontrolsonexplosivedetectiong f  equipment,software, &L # andtechnologyf  g f  g ԀareconsistentwithU.S.foreignpolicygoalstopromotepeaceandstabilityand '8!$ preventU.S.exportsthatmightcontributetoweaponsproduction,f  g Ԁdestabilizingf  Ԁmilitary ($"% capabilities,orterroristacts. q)#&  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries .TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadversereactionto I+$( thesecontrolsisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectivenorwillanyadversereactionby 9,%) othercountriesbecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests.Anumberofother a countrieslimitexportsofitemsandtechnologieswithmilitaryapplicationstoareasofconcern, M recognizingthatsuchf  g f  g itemsf  g Ԁandtechnologiescouldadverselyaffectregionalstabilityandmilitary 9 balances.Forexample,theUnitedStatesandothermembercountriesofthe_Wassenaar_ %  Arrangementeachhavetheirownnationalcontrolsontheexportofcertainnightvisiondevices.   Allmembersofthe_MTCR_Ԁmaintaincontrolsonsoftwareandtechnologyrelatedtomissile   guidanceandcontroldevices.AlthoughothercountriesmayobjecttonewunilateralRS   controls,alliesandpartnersoftheUnitedStatessupportU.S.effortsagainstg regionalconflictand  t f  terrorismandappreciatetheneedtokeepcertainequipmentandtechnologiesfromf  g thosewho  ` couldmisusetheitemstodestabilizecountriesorregionsf  g . L   4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry .TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadverse $  effectofthesecontrolsontheeconomyoftheUnitedStates,includingonthecompetitive u  positionoftheUnitedStatesintheinternationaleconomy,doesnotexceedthebenefittoU.S. a  foreignpolicyobjectives.Itemscontrolledforregionalstabilityf  g reasonsf  generallyrequiref   M  g licensef  g sf  g ԀforexporttoalldestinationsexceptNATOcountries,Australia,Japan,g ԀandNew 9  Zealand,includingtheexpandedandnewcontrolsonexplosivedetectionequipmentandrelated % softwareandtechnology.CertainRScontrolledf  g Ԁitems,includingthosecontrolledconcurrently  formissiletechnologyreasonsandcamerascontrolledunder_ECCN_Ԁ6A003,however,require  f  g licensesforexportg ԀtoalldestinationsexceptCanada.  InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommerceapproved2,883licenseapplicationsforf  itemsf  g  ` controlledforRSreasons,f  g Ԁwithatotalvalueof$1,101million.Sixteenapplicationsforthese L items(allwerecamerasin6A003)weredenied,withatotalvalueof$496,210.Inaddition,the 8 DepartmentofCommercereturnedwithoutaction(_RWA_)176applicationsg ,valuedat$21.5 $ million.Mostofthe_RWA_swereduetog commodityjurisdictionquestionsinvolvingthe q DepartmentofStateorf  g Ԁbecausef  Ԁinsufficientenduserorenduseinformationg Ԁwasprovidedf  g .The ] majorityof_RWA_Ԁcases,130ofthe176,wereforimagingcamerasg classifiedunderg f  g Ԁ_ECCN_ I 6A003. 5  Thelicensingvolumeforitemscontrolledforregionalstabilitywassignificantlylargerthanin  " FY2002,inwhichtheDepartmentofCommerceapproved1,662licenseapplicationsforf  itemsf  g  " controlledforRSreasons,f  g Ԁwithatotalvalueof$441million.Thisincreaseisduetoseveral #  factors.First,thecommercialmarketfornightvision/thermalimagingcamerascontrolledin $p! _ECCN_Ԁ6A003isgrowingrapidly.Second,BISimposednewregionalstabilitycontrolson %\" explosivedetectionequipmentandrelatedtechnology(_ECCN_Ԁ2A983,2D983and2E983). &H # Lastly,regionalstabilitycontrolswereappliedtoadditional_ECCNs_Ԁasaresultofthe space '4!$ qualifiedruleagreementsinlate2002. ( "% Thetablethatfollowsliststhetotalnumberandvalueby_ECCN_Ԁofexportlicensesthatthe Y*#' DepartmentofCommerceissuedforregionalstabilityitemsduringFY2003: E+$(  1,%) @  RegionalStabilityApplicationsApproved(FiscalYear2003)  a *{|fd ddd dd dd dd (#(#,dd ,[dd ,dd ,rdd +  *&&99 *_ECCN_ 7&&&!<"&& 7Description 7&&&!<"&& 7Numberof < Applications 7&&&! ("&& 7DollarValue >4&<"  && >1B018.a 9/!  9Equipmentfortheproductionofmilitary    explosivesandsolidpropellants D:!   # D0 C94  " #  C$0 9/!  " 92A983 9/!u   9Explosivesdetectionequipment PF!u   =@29=@P29 OE@u "  =@29 =@ O$4,432,618 9/!u " 92B018 9/! 9EquipmentontheInternationalMunitions  List D:!  # D0 LB4" #  LЀ$0 9/! 92D983 9/!a  9Softwareforequipmentin2A983 OE!a   @2@O2 ND?a "  @2 @ N$0 9/!a " 92E983 9/!  9Technologyforequipmentin2A983 OE!   ?1?O1 ND? "  ?1 ? N$0 9/! " 96A002.a.1 a ,.a.2,.a.3,. M c,.e 9/!9  9Opticaldetectorsanddirectviewimaging a! equipmentincorporatingimageintensifier M" tubesorfocalplanearrays PF!9#  A@35A@P35 OE@a$"  A@35 A@ O$3,588,251 9/!a%" 96A003.b. X& 3,.b.4 9/!D' 9Imagingcamerasincorporatingimage X( intensifiersorfocalplanearrays XN!D) 8@2588P8@X2,588 WMHX*"P 8@2588 8@ W$642,177,201 9/!X+" 96A008.j.1 9/!%, 9Spacequalified_LIDAR_Ԁequipment J@!%- # PJ0 I?:%."P #  I$0 9/!%/" 96A998.b 9/!D0 9Spacequalified_LIDAR_Ԁequipmentfor D1 meteorologicalobservation J@!02 # PJ0 I?:D3"P #  I$0 9/!D4" 96D001 9/!5 9Softwarefordevelopment/productionof 6 6A002,6A003,or6A008 J@!7 # PJ0 I?:8"P #  I$0 9/!9" 96D991 9/!} : 9Softwarefordevelopment/production/use } ; of6A998.b J@!i!< # PJ0 I?:} ="P #  I$0 \R!} >" N@6E001N@\6E001 [QC"? N@6E001 N@ [Technologyforthedevelopmentof "@ equipment,materials,orsoftware #tA controlledby6A,6B,6C,or6D OE!$`B  @3@O3 ND?"C"  @3 @ N$2 \R!"D" @6E002@\6E002 [QCA&E @6E002 @ [Technologyfortheproductionof A&F equipmentormaterialscontrolledby6A, -' G 6B,or6C OE!(!H  @2@O2 ND?A&I"  @2 @ N$201,000 9/!A&J" 96E991 9/!)8#K 9Technologyforproduction,development )8#L oruseofitemsin6A998.b OE!*$$M  @2@O2 ND?)8#N"  @2 @ N$0 9/!)8#O" 97D001 9/!1 d 9Softwareforthedevelopmentor 1 d  productionofequipmentin7Aor7B OE! P  @5@O5 ND?1 d"  @5 @ N$3 \R!1 d" Q@7E001Q@\7E001 [QC  Q@7E001 Q@ [Technologyforthedevelopmentofitems   in7A,7B,or7D PF!   (@12(@P12 OE@  "  (@12 (@ O$322,553 \R!  " @7E002@\7E002 [QC <  @7E002 @ [Technologyfortheproductionofitemsin  <  7Aor7B OE!(   @5@O5 ND? <"  @5 @ N$2,506 \R! <" ѵaU7E101ѵaU\7E101 u  [QCa ѵaU7E101 ѵaU [Technologyfortheuseofitemsin7A,7B, u or7D PF!a  5@215@P21 OE@u"  5@21 5@ O$9,102 9/!u" 99A018.a,.   b 9/!  9Militarytraineraircraftandvehicles   designedormodifiedformilitaryuse QG!  n@244n@Q244 PFA " n@244 n@ P$456,616,153 c&R! " 89C9E01889Cc9E018 b&QCM  89C9E018 89C& bTechnologyforthedevelopmentofitems M  in9A018.a,.b e&T!9l &  "@9P"@e9 d&SEM "P  "@9 "@& d$85,051 @&/!M "& @TOTAL @&/!!& @ h&W!"& @2883P@h2,883 g&VH#"P @2883 @& g$1,101,000,3091'%$"  & 10  XXtNOTE: Thenumberofsubcategoriesundercertain_ECCNs_Ԁthatarenotcontrolledforregionalstabilityreasons % isinsignificantandisnotreflectedinthisdata.#XtXql#&(#(#  5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthattheUnitedStateshas 7j( theabilitytoeffectivelyenforcethesecontrols.Imageintensifiertubes,infraredfocalplane 'Z) arrays,certainf  softwareandtechnologyforinertialnavigationsystems,gyroscopes,and F* accelerometersandotheritemscontrolledforregionalstabilitypurposesarealmostallsubjectto 2+ multilateralcontrolsforeithernationalsecurityormissiletechnologyreasons.Themultilateral , natureofthesecontrolsaidsinenforcement.TheDepartmentofCommercecaneffectively  - enforcethesecontrolsbyfocusingonpreventiveenforcement,usingregularoutreacheffortsto !. keepbusinessesinformedofitsconcerns,andgatheringleadsonactivitiesofconcern.Giventhe "/ enhancedantiterrorismeffortsoftheU.S.Government,itisexpectedthatindustrywillf  g Ԁcontinue #0 tof  g Ԁsupportenforcementefforts. $1  C.ConsultationwithIndustry  _&3 g f  TheDepartmentofCommerceconsultsregularlywithindustryanditsTechnicalAdvisory 7(j5 Committees(_TACs_)onRScontrols.Forexample,theDepartmenthascontinuedtoconsultthe #)V 6 SensorsandInstrumentationTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee(_SITAC_)astheU.S.Government *B!7  considerspossiblerevisionstothe_USML_snightvisionthermalimagingentry.(Ig ssuesregarding *."8 licensingf  Ԁjurisdictionf  off  Ԁnightvisionequipmentf  g arebeingaddressedintheinteragencyreviewof a the_USML_.) M  TheDepartmentofCommerceinformedtheRegulationsandProceduresTechnicalAdvisory %  Committee(_RPTAC_)oftheU.S.Governmentsintentiontoimposeregionalstabilitycontrolson   certainpowercontrolledsearchlights,bayonets,andmarineboilerstoreplaceunilateralnational   securitycontrolsontheseitems._RPTAC_Ԁcommentsweretakenintoconsiderationwhendrafting   anamendmenttotheEARforthispurpose.  t f  InaOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentofCommercesolicited L  commentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols. 8  CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartments_TACs_,whichadvisetheBureauof $  IndustryandSecurity(BIS),aswellasfromthePresidentsExportCouncilSubcommitteeon q  ExportAdministration.CommentsalsoweresolicitedfromthepublicviatheBIS_webpage_. ]  ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember21,2003,andeightcommentswerereceived. I  The_SITAC_Ԁsubmittedcommentsabouttheongoinginteragencyconsiderationoftheappropriate ! controlsforcommercialnightvisionandthermalimagingequipmentcontrolledinCategory6of   theCommerceControlList.The_SITAC_Ԁreiterateditscommentsfrompreviousyearsand  recommendedthatcommercialnightvisionandthermalimagingequipmentcontrolledin_ECCNs_  6A002,6A003,6E001,and6E002shouldbecontrolledinRScolumn2insteadofcolumn1,asa p firststeptowardreconsideringRScontrolsintheirentirety.Thischangewouldallowexportsto \ NATOmembercountries,Australia,Japan,andNewZealandwithoutanexportlicense,which H wouldamendtheexistingRScontrolsontheseitemstoreflectthatthesearenotcountriesand 4 regionsthatsufferfrominstability.The_SITAC_Ԁfurtherstatedthattreatingallregions,withthe   exceptionofCanada,asbeingpotentiallyunstable dilutesthefocusonregionswherestability m  maytrulybeinquestion.Themultiyearinteragencyconsiderationofthisissuehasresultedin Y thedevelopmentofforeigncompetitionintheUnitedKingdom,France,Japan,andIsrael,that E _SITAC_Ԁstateshashada negativeeffectonU.S.companies[that]farexceedstheperceived 1  benefittotheforeignpolicyobjective.The_SITAC_Ԁemphasizedthatthisrecentforeign ! competitionhasbecomerigorousandthattheU.S.regionalstabilitycontrolsareharmingU.S.  " industrywithoutsignificantregionalstabilitybenefits. " The_SITAC_Ԁfurthernotedinitscommentstheimportanceofthermalimagingitemsfor $l! firefighting,lawenforcement,andsecurityorganizationsworldwideandstatedthattheUnited %X" Statescallforbuildingalargeinternationalcoalitiontocombatterrorismisunderminedwhen &D # alliesaccesstoavailableU.S.technologyisrestricted. '0!$  D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  i)#& The_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementcontrolsmostitemsthattheUnitedStatescontrolsforRSpurposes. A+$( The_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementmembercountriesholdextensiveconsultationsandcertainmember -,%) countriesholdbilateraldiscussionsregarding_Wassenaar_Ԁissues.DuringFY2003theU.S. a Governmentengagedinextensiveconsultationswithits_Wassenaar_Ԁpartners._Wassenaar_ M participatingstateshaveagreedtoincorporatethe_Wassenaar_ԀDualUseControlListintotheir 9 ownnationalexportcontrolstopreventexportsthatcouldcontributetodestabilizingbuildupsof %  conventionalarms.Inaddition,membersofthe_MTCR_Ԁincorporatethe_MTCR_Ԁcontrollistinto   theirownnationalcontrollists.    E.AlternativeMeans   t TheUnitedStateshasundertakenawiderangeofactionstosupportandencourageregional L  stabilityandhasspecificallyencouragedeffortstolimittheflowofarmsandmilitarilyuseful 8  goodsandotherspecialequipmenttoregionsofconflictandtension.U.S.regionalstability $  f  exportf  g controlsremainanimportantelementinU.S.effortstolimitregionalinstability.Because q  mostoftheitemsthatUnitedStatescontrolsforRSpurposesarealsocontrolledbyits ]  _Wassenaar_Ԁand_MTCR_Ԁpartners,thecontrolsarelargelybasedoninternationalagreement,sono I  otheralternativemeanswerenecessary. 5   F.ForeignAvailability    MilitaryvehiclesandothermilitarytypeequipmentthatarecontrolledforRSpurposesmaybe  obtainedfromnumerousforeignsources.Nearlyallofthecommoditiesandrelatedsoftwareand p technologycontrolledforregionalstabilitypurposesarealsosubjecttomultilateralcontrolsfor \ eithernationalsecurityormissiletechnologyreasonsundermultilateralregimes.Manufacturers H ofimagingcamerascontrolledin_ECCN_Ԁ6A003havevoicedcomplaintstotheDepartmentof 4 CommercethatthereisconsiderableforeignavailabilityoftheseitemsinEuropeandJapan.The   U.S.Governmenthasmaintaineditscontrolsasithasdeterminedthattheforeignpolicy m  objectivesoverridetheimpactofforeignavailability. Y The_SITAC_Ԁhashighlightedtheincreasedforeigncompetition,andthusforeignavailability,in 1  commentsitfiledforconsiderationinthisreport,statingthatforeigncompetitionhasincreased ! significantlyinthelastthreeyears,bothfromcompetitorswithin_Wassenaar_Ԁmembercountries  " andelsewhere.Althoughtherearemultilateralcontrolsontheseitems,membersoftheEuropean " Uniondonotcontroltheexportoftheseitemsamongthemselves,butU.S.companiesare #  requiredtoobtainexportlicensesforexportstoalldestinationsexceptCanada.U.S.industry $l! believesthatthisdisparityhinderstheminthismarket.Therealsoareforeignmanufacturersof %X" explosivedetectionequipment!althoughnoneofwhichproduceitemswithtechnical &D # capabilitiesequivalenttoU.S.products.TheDepartmentofCommerceisnotawareofforeign '0!$ competitorsthat,atthistime,producethehighestlevelofFederalAviationAdministration }("% certifiedexplosivedetectionequipment.  i)#&  yXXt  CHAPTER4 f AntiTerrorismControls  < (Sections742.8,742.9,742.10,742.19,744.12,744.13,  P 744.14,744.16,746.2,746.3,746.4,and746.7)#XtXS#   d s ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  P PursuanttoSection6(j)oftheExportAdministrationAct(theAct),theSecretaryofStatehas z(  designatedsevencountries!Cuba,Iran,Iraq,Libya,NorthKorea,Sudan,andSyria!asnations f  whosegovernmentshaverepeatedlyprovidedsupportforactsofinternationalterrorism. R  EffectiveDecember28,1993,theActingSecretaryofStatedeterminedthattheUnitedStates *  wouldcontrolfivecategoriesofdualuseitemssubjecttomultilateralcontrolstocertainsensitive  endusersunderSection6(j)oftheAct,sincetheseitemsmeetthecriteriasetforthinSection  6(j)(1)(B)oftheAct.Specifically,theActingSecretarydeterminedthattheseitems,ifexported  tomilitary,police,orintelligenceorganizations,ortoothersensitiveendusersinadesignated  terroristsupportingcountry,couldmakeasignificantcontributiontothatcountrysmilitary t potentialorcouldenhanceitsabilitytosupportactsofinternationalterrorism.Asaresult,any ` suchexportissubjecttoa30daycongressionalnotificationperiodpriortoapproval.TheActing L SecretaryalsoadvisedthattheUnitedStatesshouldcontinuetocontrolotheritemsnot 8 specificallycontrolledunderSection6(j)forgeneralforeignpolicypurposesunderSection6(a) v$ toterroristsupportingcountries. b Section1503oftheEmergencyWartimeSupplementalAppropriationsAct,2003(Pub.L. : 108-11),grantedthePresidentauthoritytomakeinapplicable,withrespecttoIraq,Section620A &  oftheForeignAssistanceActandanyotherprovisionoflawapplicabletocountriesthathave ! supportedterrorism.OnMay7,2003,thePresidentexercisedthisauthoritybyissuanceof ! PresidentialDetermination2003-23,which,amongotherthings,suspendedtheapplicationof " mostprovisionsoftheIraqSanctionsActof1990(Pub.L.101-513).Inaddition,basedon # PresidentialDetermination200323,therequirementsofSection6(j)oftheActweremade $p  inapplicabletoIraq.TheDepartmentofCommerceispresentlyintheprocessofamendingthe %\! ExportAdministrationRegulationstoreflectIraqssignificantlychangedstatus.Atpresent,the &H " DepartmentoftheTreasurycontinuestorequirealicensefortheexporttoIraqofmostitemson '4!# theCommerceControlList,otherthanitemscontrolledexclusivelyforantiterrorismreasons. r( "$   J*#&  LicenseRequirementsandLicensingPolicy  R Theparagraphsbelowdescribetheitemsrequiringalicenseforantiterrorism(AT)reasonsfor & exportor_reexport_Ԁtothedesignatedterroristsupportingcountries,asappropriate.Pursuantto   the1993determinationoftheActingSecretaryofState,andsubsequentactionconsistentwith   suchdetermination,certainitemsarecontrolledpursuanttoSection6(j)oftheAct,whileothers   arecontrolledpursuanttoSection6(a).TheDepartmentofCommercerefersalllicense   applicationsforitemscontrolledforATreasonstotheDepartmentofStateforreview.  p TransactionsinvolvingexportsofitemscontrolledpursuanttoSection6(j)tomilitaryorother  \ sensitiveendusersindesignatedterroristsupportingcountries,asdescribedinparagraphA H  below,aresubjecttoageneralpolicyofdenial. 4  WithrespecttoitemscontrolledpursuanttoSection6(a),includingexportsofitemsdescribedin ^  paragraphAbelowtononsensitiveendusers,beforeapprovaladeterminationismaderegarding J  whethertherequirementsofSection6(j)apply.IftheSecretaryofStatedeterminesthatthe 6  particularexport couldmakeasignificantcontributiontothemilitarypotentialofsuchcountry, "  includingitsmilitarylogisticscapability,orcouldenhancetheabilityofsuchcountrytosupport  actsofinternationalterrorism,theDepartmentofCommerceandtheDepartmentofStatemust  notifytheappropriatecongressionalcommittees30daysbeforeissuingalicense,consistentwith  theprovisionsofSection6(j)oftheAct.Transactionsnotsubjecttosuchrequirementsare  reviewedonacasebycasebasis. l However,asdescribedfurtherinChapter5,theUnitedStatesmaintainscomprehensive D embargoesonexportsand_reexports_ԀtoCuba,Iran,Libya,andSudan.Asaresult,theU.S. 0 Governmentreviewslicenseapplicationsforexportsand_reexports_Ԁofmostitemstothese n countriesbasedonageneralpolicyofdenial,withcertainverylimitedexceptions.The Z DepartmentofCommercecontinuestomaintainATcontrolswithrespecttothesecountries, F thoughsuchcontrolsandtherelatedlicensingpoliciesaresecondarytothecomprehensive 2 embargoesinplace.TheselicensingpoliciesaredescribedfurtherinChapter5.    (j80m-./01234 A.  PursuanttoSection6(j)oftheAct,theDepartmentofCommercerequiresalicenseforthe ! exportofthefollowingitemstomilitaryorothersensitiveendusersindesignatedterrorist " supportingcountries: #|  0'` X,X` X0  "#(x8"3"  3د23  0 '   Allitemssubjecttonationalsecuritycontrols,exceptcomputerswithaperformancelevelof %T"  lessthan500milliontheoreticaloperationspersecond(_Wassenaar_ԀArrangement)._ v#  7      _3د݌&@ #'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  323  0 '   Allitemssubjecttochemicalandbiologicalweaponsproliferationcontrols(Australia R  Group).3݌>'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3!23  0 '   Allitemssubjecttomissileproliferationcontrols(MissileTechnologyControlRegime).3!N݌*'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3023  0 '   Allitemssubjecttonuclearweaponsproliferationcontrols(NuclearReferralList).30]݌ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3;23  0 '   Allmilitaryrelateditems(itemscontrolledbyCCLentriesendingwiththenumber18).3;h݌ '(#'(# Ќ  4,X` X'` X&4* X,X` X*B.  PursuanttoSection6(a)oftheAct,theDepartmentofCommercerequiresalicensefor   theexportofcertainitemstononsensitiveendusersindesignatedterroristsupportingcountries,  t includingthefollowing:  ` ! 'XX! $ "(Ixx "#"3"  3j2I3  0 '   Allitemsincategories15inparagraphAabove.3j݌8 '(#'(# Ќ   $ "(Ixx$ ""3"  3ҹ2I3  0 '   Aircraft,includinghelicoptersandengines,andrelatedsparepartsandcomponents.3ҹ݌v$ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3ܺ2I3  0 '   Heavydutyonhighwaytractors.3ܺ ݌b '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32I3  0 '   Offhighwaywheeltractors(10tons).3޻݌N '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32I3  0 '   Cryptographic,_cryptoanalytic_,and_cryptologic_Ԁequipment.3݌: '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32I3  0 '   Navigation,directionfinding,andradarequipment.3݌& '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32I3  0 '   Electronictestequipment.3վ݌'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3x2I3  0 '   Mobilecommunicationsequipment.3x݌'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3O2I3  0 '   Acousticunderwaterdetectionequipment.3O|݌'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3-2I3  0 '   Vesselsandboats(includinginflatableboats).3-Z݌'(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  32I3  0 '   Marineandsubmarineengines(outboardandinboard,regardlessofhorsepower).3@݌p'(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  32I3  0 '   Underwaterphotographicequipment.3D݌\'(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  32I3  0 '   Submersiblesystems.3݌H'(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  32I3  0 '   Computernumericallycontrolledmachinetools.3݌4'(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  32I3  0 '   Vibrationtestequipment.3݌r '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3m2I3  0 '   Certaindigitalcomputers(CompositeTheoreticalPerformance6).3m݌^ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3g2I3  0 '   Certaintelecommunicationstransmissionequipment.3g݌J'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3P2I3  0 '   Certainmicroprocessors(clockspeed>25_Mhz_).3P}݌6'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3T2I3  0 '   Certainsemiconductormanufacturingequipment.3T݌" '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  392I3  0 '   Softwarespeciallydesignedforcomputeraideddesign/computeraidedmanufacture ! integratedcircuitproduction.39f݌!'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3r2I3  0 '   Packetswitches(equipmentdescribedin_ECCN_Ԁ5A991.c).3r݌"'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3~2I3  0 '   Softwarespeciallydesignedforairtrafficcontrolapplications.3~݌# '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3u2I3  0 '   Gravitymeters(staticaccuracy<100_microgal_Ԁorwithquartzelement).3u݌$l!'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32I3  0 '   Certainmagnetometerswithsensitivity<1.0_nt_Ԁ_rms_Ԁperroothertz.3݌%X"'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32I3  0 '   Certainfluorocarboncompoundsforcoolingfluidsforradarandsupercomputers(described &D # in_ECCN_Ԁ1C006.d).3݌'0!$'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3 2I3  0 '   Highstrengthorganicandinorganicfibers(describedin_ECCN_Ԁ1C210).3 M݌n("%'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3=2I3  0 '   Certainmachinesforgearcutting(upto1.25meters)(describedin_ECCNs_Ԁ2B003and Z)#& 2B993).3=j݌F*#''(#'(#   "3"  32I3  0 '   Certainaircraftskinandsparmillingmachines.3݌2+$('(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3r2I3  0 '   Certainmanualdimensionalinspectionmachines(linearpositioningaccuracy R  3+L/300)(describedin_ECCN_Ԁ2B996).3r݌>'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32I3  0 '   Robotsemployingfeedbackinformationinrealtime.3݌*'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32I3  0 '   Explosivesdetectionequipment(describedin_ECCN_Ԁ2A983)andrelatedsoftwareand   technology(_ECCNs_Ԁ2D983and2E983).3݌ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3C2I3  0 '   Productiontechnologycontrolledunder_ECCN_Ԁ1C355.3Cp݌ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3L2I3  0 '   Commercialchargesanddevicescontrolledunder_ECCN_Ԁ1C992.3Ly݌ '(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  3^2I3  0 '   Ammoniumnitrate,includingcertainfertilizerscontainingammoniumnitrate,under_ECCN_  t 1C997.3^݌ `'(#'(# Ќ  % X'XǷ%C.0  ExportsofthefollowingadditionalitemstoIran,Sudan,andNorthKoreaaresubjecttoa8 (#(# licenserequirementunderSection6(a)oftheActforforeignpolicyreasons:Largediesel v$  engines(>400horsepower)andpartstopowertanktransporters;scubagearandrelated b  equipment;andpressurizedaircraftbreathingequipment. N  D.  ExportsofthefollowingadditionalitemstoIranandNorthKoreaaresubjecttoalicense &  requirementunderSection6(a)oftheActforforeignpolicyreasons:Portableelectricpower  generators.  E.  ExportsofthefollowingadditionalitemstoNorthKoreaaresubjecttoalicense  requirementunderSection6(a)oftheActforforeignpolicyreasons: p ! '` XX!  "#(Dxx!$ ""3"  32D3  0 '   Ringmagnets.3,݌H'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32D3  0 '   Hotcells.3݌4'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32D3  0 '   Gloveboxessuitableforusewithradioactivematerials.3݌r '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3p2D3  0 '   Softwarefor_neutronic_Ԁcalculations/modeling.3p݌^ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3s2D3  0 '   Softwareforradiationtransportcalculations/modeling.3s݌J'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3`2D3  0 '   Softwareforhydrodynamiccalculations/modeling.3`݌6'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3F2D3  0 '   Radiationdetection,monitoringandmeasurementequipment.3Fs݌" '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  362D3  0 '   Radiographicdetectionequipmentsuchasxrayconverters,andstoragephosphorimage ! plates.36c݌!'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3]2D3  0 '   Electrolyticcellsfor_flourine_Ԁproduction.3]݌"'(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  3^2D3  0 '   Particleaccelerators.3^݌# '(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  3*2D3  0 '   Industrialprocesscontrolhardware/systemsdesignedforpowerindustries.3*W݌$l!'(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  3*2D3  0 '   Freonandchilledwatercoolingsystemscapableofcontinuouscoolingdutiesof100,000 %X" BTU/hr(29.3kW)orgreater.3*W݌&D #'(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  3h2D3  0 '   Equipmentfortheproductionofstructuralcomposites,fibers,_prepregs_,andpreforms.3h݌'0!$'(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  32D3  0 '   Hardenedsteelandtungstencarbideprecisionballbearings(3mmorgreaterdiameter).3݌n("%'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32D3  0 '   304and316stainlesssteelplate.3݌Z)#&'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3x2D3  0 '   Monelplate.3x݌F*#''(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3:2D3  0 '   _Tributyl_Ԁphosphate.3:g݌2+$('(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3#2D3  0 '   Nitricacidinconcentrationsof20weightpercentorgreater.3#P݌,%)'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32D3  0 '   _Flourine_.3D݌R'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32D3  0 '   Alpha-emitting_radionuclides_.3#݌>'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32D3  0 '   Softwarespeciallydesignedforindustrialprocesscontrolhardware/systemscontrolledby * 1B999,n.e.s.(notelsewherespecified).3݌ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  352D3  0 '   Softwarespeciallydesignedforequipmentfortheproductionofstructuralcomposites,   fibers,_prepregs_,andpreformscontrolledby1B999,n.e.s.35b݌ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32D3  0 '   Bellowssealedvalves.3݌ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3|2D3  0 '   Isostaticpresses,n.e.s.3|݌ t'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3K2D3  0 '   Bellowsmanufacturingequipment,includinghydraulicformingequipmentandbellows  ` formingdies.3Kx݌L '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3u2D3  0 '   Laserweldingmachines.3u݌8 '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3B2D3  0 '   MIGwelders.3Bo݌v$ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32D3  0 '   Ebeamwelders.31݌b '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32D3  0 '   Monelequipment,includingvalves,piping,tanksandvessels.3݌N '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32D3  0 '   304and316stainlesssteelvalves,piping,tanksandvessels.3݌: '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32D3  0 '   Mininganddrillingequipment,asfollows:3݌& '(#'(# Ќ  0 ' 0` '(#'(# ' !Largeboringequipmentcapableofdrillingholesgreaterthantwofeetindiameter,and` (#` (# 0 ' !Largeearthmovingequipmentusedintheminingindustry.'(#'(#  % "#(Tpx "#"3"  3#2T3  0 '   Electroplatingequipmentdesignedforcoatingpartswithnickeloraluminum.3#P݌'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3%2T3  0 '   Pumpsdesignedforindustrialserviceandforusewithanelectricalmotorof5HPor  greater.3%R݌p'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3M2T3  0 '   Vacuumvalves,piping,flanges,gasketsandrelatedequipmentspeciallydesignedforusein \ highvacuumservice.3Mz݌H'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32T3  0 '   Spinformingandflowformingmachines.3݌4'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3d2T3  0 '   Centrifugal_multiplane_Ԁbalancingmachines.3d݌r '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3d2T3  0 '   Austeniticstainlesssteelplate,valves,piping,tanksandvessels.3d݌^ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3^2T3  0 '   Frequencychangerscapableofoperatinginthefrequencyrangefrom300upto600Hz, J n.e.s.3^݌6'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32T3  0 '   Massspectrometers,n.e.s.3݌" '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3T2T3  0 '   Allflashxraymachines,andcomponentsofpulsedpowersystemsdesignedthereof, ! includingMarxgenerators,highpowerpulseshapingnetworks,highvoltagecapacitors,and ! triggers.3T݌"'(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  32T3  0 '   Pulseamplifiers,n.e.s.3 ݌# '(#'(# Ќ  "3 "  3 2T3  0 '   Electronicequipmentfortimedelaygenerationortimeintervalmeasurement,asfollows:3  ݌$l!'(#'(# Ќ  % X'` X\%$' XX$ ' !0  Digitaltimedelaygeneratorswitharesolutionof50nanosecondsorlessovertime %X" intervalsof1microsecondorgreater,or&D #(#(# 0 ' !0'(#'(#Multichannel(threeormore)ormodulartimeintervalmeterand_chronometry_ '0!$ equipmentwithresolutionof50nanosecondsorlessovertimeintervalsof1 n("% microsecondorgreater.Z)#&(#(# ( X' X ( a "#(dxp % "#"3"  %'` XX%3 2d3  0 '   Chromatographyandspectrometryanalyticalinstruments.3 ݌F*#''(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32d3  0 '   Seismicdetectionequipment.3݌2+$('(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32d3  0 '   RadiationhardenedTVcameras,n.e.s.3݌,%)'(#'(# Ќ  % X'` X %  AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct  R  A.0  ThePurposeoftheControl *(#(# AntiterrorismcontrolsareintendedtopreventactsofterrorismandtodistancetheUnitedStates   fromnationsthathaverepeatedlysupportedactsofinternationalterrorismandfromindividuals   andorganizationsthatcommitterroristacts.ThecontrolsdemonstrateU.S.resolvenottotrade   withnationsorentitiesthatfailtoadheretoacceptablenormsofinternationalbehavior.The  t policyprovidestheUnitedStateswiththemeanstocontrolanyU.S.goodsorservicesthatmight  ` contributetothemilitarypotentialofdesignatedcountriesandtolimittheavailabilityofsuch L  goodsforuseinsupportofinternationalterrorism.U.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesalsoare 8  furtheredbyensuringthatitemsremovedfrommultilateralregimelistscontinuetobecontrolled v$  todesignatedterroristsupportingcountries.Antiterrorismcontrolsaremaintainedwithrespect b  toexportsand_reexports_ԀtoCuba,Iran,Libya,andSudan,aspartofbroaderU.S.embargoes, N  describedinChapter5below. :   NorthKorea   UndertheU.S.NorthKorea1994AgreedFramework,NorthKoreaagreedtofreezeand  eventuallydismantleitsnuclearprograminexchangeforheavyfueloilshipmentsandthe  constructionoftwolightwaterreactorsthatwouldbedifficulttouseforproliferationpurposes.  InDecember2002,theExecutiveBoardoftheKoreanPeninsulaEnergyDevelopment l Organization(_KEDO_),comprisedoftheUnitedStates,SouthKorea,Japan,andtheEuropean X Union(EU),suspendedoilshipmentstoNorthKoreaafterdiscoveringthatNorthKoreaviolated D itscommitmentsundertheAgreedFramework,theNuclear_Nonproliferation_ԀTreaty,North 0 KoreassafeguardsagreementwithInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,andtheJointNorth n SouthDeclarationonthe_Denuclearization_ԀoftheKoreanPeninsulabypursuinganenriched Z uraniumnuclearprogramfornuclearweapons.AsofDecember1,2003,_KEDO_sExecutive F BoardsuspendedtheNorthKorealightwaterreactorprogramforaperiodofoneyearin 2 responsetoNorthKoreasnuclearactivities.   Inaddition,althoughtherehasbeenabilateraldialogueonterrorismwithNorthKorea,AT ! controlsremainineffectbecauseofunresolvedissuesconcerningNorthKoreascontinuing " supportofinternationalterrorism.Thepurposeofthecontrolsistorestricttheimportof #|  equipmentusefulinenhancingthemilitaryorterroristsupportingcapabilitiesoftheregimeand $h! addressingotherU.S.foreignpolicyconcerns,including_nonproliferation_,humanrights,and %T" regionalstability. &@ #  Syria  j("% TheSyrianGovernmentcontinuestoprovidepoliticalandlimitedmaterialsupporttoanumber R)#& ofPalestiniangroupsthathavecommittedterroristacts,butcontendsthatthegroupsofficesin >*#' Syriaonlyundertakepoliticalandinformationalactivities.SyriaalsoallowsIrantoresupply *+$( _Hizballah_ԀinLebanonviaitsterritory.PriortoOperationIraqiFreedom,theU.S.Government ,%) hadseveralareasofconcernparticulartoSyriaanditsneighbor,Iraq,includingSyriasillicitoil R tradewiththeSaddamHusseinregimeandtheillicittransshipmentofdualuseandmilitary > relateditemsintoIraq.TheU.S.Governmentcontinuestoviewwithgraveconcernthe * unmonitoredmovementofantiCoalitioninsurgentsacrosstheSyriaIraqborder.Additionally,   theU.S.GovernmentcontinuestohaveconcernaboutSyriasprovisionofasafehavenfor   terroristorganizationsaswellasitsnuclear,missile,andchemical/biologicalprograms.   U.S.exportcontrolsreflectU.S.oppositiontotheseactivities.Thecontrolsalsopromoteother  t U.S.foreignpolicyinterests,includinghumanrightsandregionalstability.TheATcontrols  ` maintainedonexportsand_reexports_ԀtoSyriaareconsistentwiththegoalsoftheSyria L  AccountabilityandLebaneseSovereigntyRestorationActof2003. 8   B.0  Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce b (#(#  1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. TheSecretaryhas :  determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose,inlight &  ofotherfactors,includingtheavailabilityoftheseATcontrolleditemsfromothercountriesand  thattheforeignpolicypurposecannotbeachievedthroughnegotiationsorotheralternative  means.Althoughwidespreadavailabilityofcomparablegoodsfromforeignsourceslimitsthe  effectivenessofthesecontrols,thecontrolsdorestrictaccessbythesecountriesandpersonsto  U.S.origincommodities,technology,andsoftware,anddemonstratetheU.S.determinationto p opposeanddistanceitselffrominternationalterrorism. \  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthese 4 controlsarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesandspecificallywithoverallU.S. r  policytowardthedesignatedterroristsupportingcountries.TheSecretaryhasfurtherdetermined ^  thatthecontrolswillnothaveanysignificantadverseforeignpolicyconsequenceswiththe J extensionofthesecontrols.ThesecontrolsaffirmtheU.S.commitmenttorestricttheflowof 6 itemsandotherformsofmaterialsupporttocountries,individuals,orgroupsforterrorist "  purposes. !  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadversereactionto " thesecontrolsisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectivenorwillanyadversereactionby #  othercountriesbecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests.Mostcountriesare $l! generallysupportiveofU.S.effortstofightterrorismandstoptheproliferationofweaponsof %X" massdestructionincountriesofconcern. &D #  NorthKorea  n("% TheUnitedStatesmaintainedacomprehensivetradeembargoagainstNorthKoreafor50years. Z)#& Ingeneral,theU.S.allieshavelargelyactedinconcertwiththeUnitedStatestodenyNorth F*#' Koreastrategicequipmentandtechnology.TheeasingofU.S.sanctionstowardNorthKoreaand 2+$( theremovalofsomeU.S.controlsinJune2000wereechoedbyotherwesterncountries.U.S. ,%) allieswilllikelyfollowtheUnitedStatesleadregardingstrategictradewithNorthKoreauntil R NorthKoreaplacesfurtherlimitsonitsweaponsproliferationandmilitaryactivities. > InDecember2002,theExecutiveBoardoftheKoreanEnergyDevelopmentOrganization   (_KEDO_),whichiscomprisedoftheUnitedStates,SouthKorea,Japan,andtheEU,suspended   heavyfueloilshipmentstoNorthKoreaafterdiscoveringthatNorthKoreaviolatedits   commitmentsundertheAgreedFramework,theNuclear_Nonproliferation_ԀTreaty,NorthKoreas   safeguardsagreementwiththeInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,andtheJointNorthSouth  t Declarationonthe_Denuclearization_ԀoftheKoreanPeninsula,bypursuinganenricheduranium  ` programfornuclearweapons.AlsoinDecember2002,theUnitedStatesanditspartnersinthe L  NuclearSuppliersGroup(_NSG_)drafteda WatchListofitemsnotcurrentlycontrolledbythe 8  _NSG_.Theseitemsdonotmeetthelicensingthresholdofthe_NSG_Ԁexportcontrolregime; v$  however,theseitemsmaymakeamaterialcontributiontonuclearactivitiesofconcern.Manyof b  theitemsonthe WatchListarealreadycontrolledbytheUnitedStatesunilaterallyforAT N  reasons,sotheU.S.Governmentalreadyrequiresalicenseforexportor_reexport_Ԁofsomeof :  theseitemstoNorthKorea.Whiletheexpanded WatchListisnotintendedtobethebasisof &  expanded_NSG_Ԁcontrols,ithasincreasedthescrutinyby_NSG_Ԁmembercountriesofproposed  exportsofitemscontrolledbytheUnitedStatesforATreasons.  EffectiveDecember1,2003,theExecutiveBoardof_KEDO_ԀsuspendedtheNorthKoreanlight  waterreactorprogram,partoftheAgreedFramework,foraperiodofoneyear,becauseofNorth p Koreasnuclearactivities. \  Syria  4 TheUnitedStatesmaintainscontrolsinresponsetoSyriaslackofconcretestepstoendsupport r  fortheterroristgroupsthatmaintainapresenceinSyriaandSyriancontrolledareasofLebanon. ^  AlthoughmanyothercountriesconcurthatSyriasregionalactivitiesaredestabilizing,few J countriesmaintaincontrolssimilartothoseimplementedbytheUnitedStates. 6  4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthe ! adverseeffectofthesecontrolsontheeconomyoftheUnitedStates,includingonthe ! competitivepositionoftheUnitedStatesintheinternationaleconomy,doesnotexceedthe " benefittoUnitedStatesforeignpolicyobjectives.TheATcontrolsmaintainedondesignated #  terroristsupportingcountriesasawholehavehadsomeimpactonU.S.industry.Theimpactof $l! suchcontrolsisdescribedfurtherbelow,withrespecttocountriesnotpresentlysubjecttoa %X" comprehensiveembargo.Theeconomicimpactofacomprehensivecontrolsmaintainedon &D # Cuba,Libya,Iran,andSudan,countriessubjecttounilateralU.S.embargo,aredescribedfurther '0!$ inChapter5. n("%  NorthKorea  F*#' U.S.exportsanctionsonNorthKoreahavehadaminimalimpactonU.S.industry.North 2+$( Koreastotalimportsaverageabout$12billionperyear,withtheprimaryimportsincluding ,%) petroleum,grain,cokingcoal,machineryandequipment,andconsumergoods.Accordingtothe R KoreaTradePromotionCorporation,NorthKoreasfivemajortradingpartnersareChina,Japan, > Thailand,Singapore,SouthKorea,andRussia,whichaccountformorethantwothirdsofNorth * Koreastotaltrade.TheCIAestimatesthatNorthKoreanimportstotaled$1.3billionin2001.   BasedonU.S.CensusBureaustatistics,totalU.S.exportstoNorthKorea,althoughfarbelowthe   levelsofothercountries,havegenerallyincreasedsincethesigningoftheU.S.NorthKorea   AgreedFrameworkinOctober1994.Exportsrosefromonly$179,730in1994tobetween  t $3and$4millionannuallyfrom1995through1998.In1999,U.S.exportstoNorthKorea  ` nearlytripledto$11.3million.However,in2000U.S.exportsdroppedto$2.7millionandin L  2001U.S.exportswereonly$700,000,thevastmajorityofwhichwerecharityshipments.In 8  2002,however,U.S.exportstoNorthKoreatotaled$25million,thevastmajorityofwhichwere v$  intheformofcereals(60percent)andanimal/vegetablefats(20percent). b  ExportlicenseapplicationsapprovedbytheU.S.GovernmentforNorthKoreaincreasedfrom :  sixlicenses(valuedat$66,443)inFY1994toanannualaverageof40licensesintheFY1995 &  99period,valuedat$3.01milliononaverage(seeTable1).However,sinceFY2000,the  Departmenthasapprovedonlyahandfuloflicensesperyear.InFY2003,theDepartmentdid  notapproveanylicensesforNorthKorea;oneapplicationvaluedat$240,000wasrejectedand  twoapplications(valuedat$4.3million)werereturnedwithoutaction.  OnSeptember17,1999,PresidentClintonannouncedhisdecisiontoeasesomeofthesanctions \ maintainedagainstNorthKorea.ThesanctionseasingwasimplementedinJune2000,making H mostU.S.consumergoodseligibleforexportwithoutalicensetoNorthKorea.Thismay 4 accountforthedeclineinlicenseapplicationsforNorthKoreasinceFY2000,asthemajorityof r  thehumanitarianandlowlevelconsumeritemsformerlyrequiringalicensebecameeligibleto ^  beshippedwithoutalicense. J @\\ & ( Table1:ExportLicenseApplicationsApprovedforNorthKorea(FY19942003)  "  *fd ddd [dd [dd rdd r{|(#(#,( dd , dd ,A dd +  *&&!! *  FiscalYear 7&&&!^" && 7LNumberofApplications 7&&&!^"  "&& 7  TotalValueinU.S.Dollars WM&^" !2  && (@1994(@W:M  1994 pfB#" (@1994 (@  @6@pMӀ6 WM?##"  @6 @ WЀ$66,443 RH!#$3 ,@1995,@R  1995 qgB^% % ,@1995 ,@  ;@27;@qOӀ27 XN@^% &"  ;@27 ;@ XЀ$366,498,433'(" J RH!^% '3 0@19960@R  1996 qgB& ( 0@1996 0@  C@39C@qyPӀ39 XN@& )"  C@39 C@ XЀ$209,134,369 RH!& *3 4@19974@R  1997 qgB^( "+ 4@1997 4@  G@47G@qQӀ47 XN@^( ","  G@47 G@ XЀ$393,281,396 RH!^( "-3 8@19988@R  1998 qgB)#. 8@1998 8@  E@43E@qSӀ43 XN@)#/"  E@43 E@ XЀ$129,113,580 RH!)#03 <@1999<@R  1999 qgB^+ %1 <@1999 <@  @@32@@qdTӀ32 XN@^+ %2"  @@32 @@ X  Ӏ$407,887,147 RH!^+ %30 @@2000@@R_QU2000 zpB6d @@2000 @@  $@10$@zЀ10 XN@6d"  $@10 $@ X  Ӏ$31,130,643 RH!6d0 D@2001D@RV2001 yoB  D@2001 D@  @7@yЀ7 WM? "  @7 @ W  Ӏ$1,187,232 RH! 0 H@2002H@R X2002 yoB6 d H@2002 H@  "@9"@yЀ9 WM?6 d"  "@9 "@ W  $2,947,044 RH!6 d 0 L@2003L@R2003 ndB  " L@2003 L@ # nЀ0 LB4  " #  LЀ$0 7&&&!   7TOTAL ^&&M!6d "&&  0k@^220 ]&&L>6d"  0 k@&& ]  $1,541,246,2871'%6d0 && 1[ Syria  >l U.S.controlshavehadminimalimpactonindustrybecausetheU.S.Governmentdoesnot *X  requirealicenseformostitemsforSyriasleadingimportsectors,includingagriculturalitems D  andEAR99productsforthepetroleumindustry.DespitesetbackstotheSyrianeconomyin 0  recentyears,theeconomicreformsandinfrastructureimprovementsundertakenbythe   governmentintheearly1990s,whilelimited,haveenhancedthecountryspotentialasamarket   forU.S.exports.   From1992-2002,thevolumeofU.S.exportstoSyriahasbeenrelativelystable,fallingwithin  therangeof$161millionand$274millionperyear.Incalendaryear2002,U.S.exportstotaled  $274.1million.Cerealsaccountedforabout28percentofU.S.exports,followedbyvarious v typesofmachinery(e.g.,partsforbulldozersandinternalcombustionengines),withabout25 b percent.Otherleadingexportsincludedtobaccoandoilseeds. N| TheaverageannualvalueofexportlicensesissuedbytheU.S.GovernmentforSyriahas &T increasedinthelasttenyears.InFY1991,theU.S.Governmentapprovedeightlicenseswitha @ totalvalueof$1.04million.InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommerceapproved127license ,  applicationsforSyriawithavalueof$200.7million.Themajorityoflicenseditemsforthe ! periodcoveredbythetablebelowconsistsofaircraftpartsandcomponents,digitalcomputers,  " andcertainelectronicdevicesandtelecommunicationsequipmentcontrolledforforeignpolicy !# reasonsonly.TheU.S.Governmentdeniedsevenapplicationsvaluedat$2.9millioninFY "$ 2003,bringingthetotalnumberofapplicationsdeniedforSyriasinceFY1991to90applications #% withatotalvalueof$36million. $&   Table2:ApprovedLicensesforSyria(FY1991-2003) ^&(   * d d( dd (  dd  A dd A (#(#, ,m , +  8&&'6(d *6(d  (8  FiscalYear =&&,!^( +&& =fTotalApplicationsApproved =&&,!^( ,"&& =TotalValue(inU.S.dollars) pf,^( -" (  && @1991(@p 1991 ^T*r)!. @1991 @   @8 @^ 8 E;0r)!/"   @8  @ EЀ$1,041,504 \Rr)!0U (  @1992( @\ 1992 _U**"1  @1992  @  ?@31?@_ 31 F<1*"2"  ?@31 ?@ F$46,366,527 \R*"3U ( $@1993($@\ 1993 `V*+#4 $@1993 $@ Z@106Z@` 106 G=2+#5" Z@106 Z@ G$42,896,103 \R+#6U ( (@1994((@\ 1994 `V*( (@1994 (@ d@167d@` 167 G=2(" d@167 d@ G$76,379,096 \R(U ( ,@1995(,@\ 1995 `V*< ,@1995 ,@ `a@139`a@` 139 G=2<" `a@139 `a@ G$68,298,135 \R<U ( 0@1996(0@\ 1996 _U* P 0@1996 0@  T@80T@_ 80 F<1 P"  T@80 T@ F$81,006,877 \R P U ( 4@1997(4@\ 1997 `V* d  4@1997 4@ Y@100Y@` 100 G=2 d " Y@100 Y@ G$107,003,346 \R d U ( 8@1998(8@\ 1998 _U* x  8@1998 8@  @T@81@T@_ 81 F<1 x"  @T@81 @T@ F$80,707,010 WM xU ( <@1999(<@W 1999 `V*  <@1999 <@ Y@100Y@` 100 G=2 " Y@100 Y@ G$86,534,591 ND U ( @@2000(@@N 2000 `V* @@2000 @@ @^@121@^@`121 G=2" @^@121 @^@ G$141,539,669 VLU ( D@2001(D@V 2001 rh9 D@2001 D@ Z@106Z@r 106 YOA" Z@106 Z@ Y$70,269,323 e['U (  H@2002(H@e 2002 qg9. H@2002 H@  W@95W@q95 XN@."  W@95 W@ X$108,101,460 d&S'.U (  L@2003(L@d 2003 v&e9B  L@2003 L@& _@127_@v127 ]&LAB " _@127 _@& ]$200,664,118 P&?'B U ( &  (PTOTAL a&P!V &  0P@a1,261 `&ODV "P  0 @& `$1,110,807,760<20V !U (    & <  TheU.S.policyofcasebycasereviewforaircraftpartsandcomponentsandaircraftengine : " partsandcomponentsforairsafetyhasledtoanincreaseinaerospaceexportstoSyria.U.S. & # policynottoapprovethesaleofnewaircrafttoSyriahasresultedinagradualshiftfromthe $ exportofaircraftpartsandcomponentsforU.S.-originplanestotheexportofU.S.partsfor % non-U.S.-originplanes.AlthoughSyrianArabAirlines(SAA)operatesseveralBoeingaircraft, & whichrequirelargeamountsofsparepartstooperatesafely,SAArecentlypurchasedsixAirbus p' aircraft.ManyofthecomponentscurrentlyrequiredbySAAforuseontheBoeingaircraftare \( providedbyU.S.exporters.U.S.exportersarealsoprovidingpartsandcomponentsforthe H) Airbusaircraft,albeitatlowerlevels. 4* U.S.informationtechnologyfirmsalsoareincreasinglyaffectedbyexportcontrolsonSyria.The r , technologylevelatwhichexportlicensesarerequiredhasnotchangedinrecentyears,despite ^- rapidtechnologicaladvancements.Thishastheeffectofcontrollingevenverylowlevelitems. J. Forexample,thecontrollevelforcomputerexportstoSyriastandsat6milliontheoretical 6 / operationspersecond. "!0 TherecentlyenactedSyriaAccountabilityandLebaneseSovereigntyRestorationActof2003 "2 prohibitstheexportofallitemsontheCCLtoSyria,unlessthePresidentexercisesthewaiver #3 authorityprovided.TheDepartmentofCommercewillimplementthisprohibition,consistent $l4 withthePresidentsconstitutionalauthoritytoconductforeignpolicy.Theimpactofthis %X5 prohibitionislikelytobesignificant. &D6  5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedtheUnitedStateshas (!8 theabilitytoeffectivelyenforcethesecontrols.Becauseofthewellpublicizedinvolvementof n)"9 thesecountriesinactsofinternationalterrorism,thereispublicknowledgeandsupportforU.S. Z*": controls,whichfacilitatesenforcement.Thelargenumberofitemsexportedinnormaltradeto F+#; othercountries,includingsomeaircraftitemsandconsumergoodsthathavemanyproducersand 2,$< endusersaroundtheworld,createsinnumerableprocurementopportunitiesforbrokers,agents, R andfrontcompaniesworkingforthesecountries.Inaddition,differencesinexportlawsand > standardsofevidenceforviolationsalsocomplicatelawenforcementcooperationbetween * countries.g g    TheDepartmentofCommerceviewsthesecontrolsasakeyenforcementpriority,usingregular   outreacheffortsandotherprogramstokeepbusinessesinformedofconcerns,gatherleadson   activitiesofconcern,andconductsafeguardvisitstoverifyenduseandendusersofU.S.  t commodities.TheDepartmentismovingtoimplementastrongprogramtodealwith  ` procurementbyorfordesignatedterroristsupportingcountries.Thisprogramincludesenhanced L  agenttraining,developmentofatargetedoutreachprogramtofamiliarizeU.S.businesswith 8  concerns,andclosecooperationwithleadagenciesworkingterrorismissues. v$   C.0  ConsultationwithIndustry N (#(# g InaOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentofCommercesolicited &  commentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols.  CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartmentsTechnicalAdvisoryCommittees  (_TACs_)whichadvisetheBureauofIndustryandSecurity(BIS),aswellasfromthePresidents  ExportCouncilSubcommitteeonExportAdministration.Commentsalsoweresolicitedfrom  thepublicviatheBIS_webpage_.ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember21,2003,andeight p commentswerereceived. \ Whilenoneofitscommentsspecificallyaddressedantiterrorismcontrols,theIndustryCoalition 4 onTechnologyTransfer(_ICOTT_)providedgeneralcommentsaboutallforeignpolicybased r  exportcontrols,statingthatthesecontrolsareunilateralandlargelyineffective._ICOTT_ ^  recommendedthatunilateralcontrolsshouldonlybeusedwhenthesymbolismoftheactof J imposingcontrolsoutweighstheinjurytoAmericanworkersandbusinesses.Inaddition,_ICOTT_ 6 suggestedthatifunilateralcontrolsaretobeimposedwhiletheUnitedStatesnegotiateswithits "  tradingpartnerstoseekmultilateralsupport,thoseunilateralcontrolsshouldbeoflimited ! duration.Othercommentsofageneralnaturediscussedthelicensingtreatmentofembargoed ! countries.ThesecommentsaredescribedinmoredetailinChapter5below.Adetailedreview " ofallcommentsreceivedcanbefoundinAppendixI. #   D.0  ConsultationwithOtherCountries %X"(#(# TheUnitedStatescontinuestoconsultwithanumberofcountries,bothonabilateralanda '0!$ multilateralbasis,onactivitiesofdesignatedterroristsupportingcountries.Ingeneral,most n("% countriesaresupportiveofU.S.antiterrorismeffortsbutdonotimplementstrictexportcontrol Z)#& programssimilartotheUnitedStates. F*#'  ,%)  NorthKorea  R TheUnitedStatesiscloselyconsultingitsregionalalliesregardingantiterrorismcontrolson : NorthKorea.BecauseofthedisclosuresregardingNorthKoreasnuclearprogram,inDecember & 2002theUnitedStatesanditspartnersinthe_NSG_Ԁdrafteda WatchListofitemsnotcurrently   controlledbythe_NSG_.Theseitemsdonotmeetthelicensingthresholdofthe_NSG_Ԁexport   controlregime;however,theseitemsmaymakeamaterialcontributiontonuclearactivitiesof   concern.Manyoftheitemsonthe WatchListarealreadycontrolledbytheU.S.Government   unilaterallyforantiterrorismreasons.Whiletheexpanded WatchListisnotintendedtobe  p thebasisofexpanded_NSG_Ԁcontrols,ithasincreasedthescrutinybyour_NSG_Ԁpartnersof  \ proposedexportsofitemsthatarenot_NSG_ԄcontrolledbutthattheUnitedStatescontrolsfor H  AntiTerrorismreasons.AsofDecember1,2003,_KEDO_sExecutiveBoardsuspendedthe 4  NorthKoreanlightwaterreactorprogramforaperiodofoneyearinresponsetoNorthKoreas r  nuclearactivities. ^   Syria  6  TheUnitedStatesconsultsonanongoingbasiswithSyriaandtheothercountriesinvolvedin,or   partyto,theMiddleEastpeacenegotiations.OnMay3,2003,SecretaryofStatePowellmetin   DamascuswithSyrianPresident_Bashar_Ԁ_Assad_.   E.0  AlternativeMeans |(#(# TheUnitedStateshastakenawiderangeofdiplomatic,political,andsecurityrelatedsteps,in T additiontoeconomicmeasuressuchasexportcontrols,topersuadecertaincountriestostoptheir @ supportforterroristactivities.ExamplesoftheseeffortsincludethecontinuedU.S.actionsin ~, AfghanistanandIraq,aswellasconsultationswiththeSyrianGovernmentandlegislationsigned j intolawinanefforttobringaboutpolicychangesonthepartoftheSyrianGovernmentrelated V inparttoitssupportofterroristactivities.ThemethodsthattheUnitedStatesusesagainsta B country,terroristorganization,orindividualvaryandaredictatedbythecircumstancesprevailing . atanygiventime.Ingeneral,theUnitedStatesbelievesthatmaintenanceofATcontrolsisan   appropriatemethodtodemonstratetheobligationofeachofthedesignatedterroristsupporting ! countriestoactagainstterroristelementswithintheirjurisdictionorcontrol. !  F.0  ForeignAvailability #x (#(# TheforeignavailabilityprovisiondoesnotapplytoitemsdeterminedbytheSecretaryofStateto %P" requirecontrolunderSection6(j)oftheAct._ v#  8      _ԀCognizantofthevalueofsuchcontrolsin &< # emphasizingtheU.S.positiontowardcountriessupportinginternationalterrorism,Congress R specificallyexcludedthemfromforeignavailabilityassessmentsotherwiserequiredbytheAct. > However,theDepartmentofCommercehasconsideredforeignavailabilityofitemscontrolledto * designatedterroristsupportingcountriesunderSection6(a).Whiletherearenumerousforeign   sourcesforcommoditiessimilartothosesubjecttocontrol,thecontinuedmaintenanceof   sanctionsbymanyothercountriesseverelylimitstheimpactofforeignavailability.Inaddition,   thecontinuedU.S.Governmentantiterrorismcontrolsserveforeignpolicyintereststhatoverride   theimpactofforeignavailability.   t d XXt  CHAPTER5 z( EmbargoedCountriesandPersons  P (Parts736(Supplement1)and746)#XtX#  d ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy (#(#K(#_Ԉ P ThischapterdiscussestheDepartmentofCommercesimplementationofcomprehensiveand z(  partialembargoesmaintainedbytheU.S.GovernmentpursuanttotheEAR,eitherunilaterallyor f  toimplementU.N.SecurityCouncil(_UNSC_)Resolutions.Specifically,theU.S.Government R  maintainscomprehensiveeconomicembargoesagainstCuba,Iran,Libya,andSudan.TheU.S. >  Governmentalsomaintainedin2003certainpartialembargoes,includingprogramsrelatingto *  Syria,Rwanda,Angolaandotherpersons.   LicensingRequirementsandLicensingPolicy   Cuba  p TheDepartmentofCommercerequiresalicenseforexportor_reexport_ԀtoCubaofvirtuallyall H commodities,technology,andsoftwaresubjecttotheEAR,except: 4   "#(txxa "#! ` XX!"3"  32t3  0    Sometypesofpersonalbaggage,crewbaggage,certainaircraftontemporarysojourn,ship ^  stores(exceptasprohibitedbytheCubanDemocracyActof1992)andplanestoresunder J certaincircumstances.3݌6(#(# Ќ  "3"  32t3  0    CertainforeignoriginitemsintransitthroughtheUnitedStates.3݌" (#(# Ќ  "3"  32t3  0    ShipmentsforU.S.Governmentpersonnelandagencies.3݌!(#(# Ќ  "3"  3y2t3  0    Giftparcelsnotexceeding$200limitedtofood,clothing(nonmilitary),vitamins,seeds, ! medicines,medicalsuppliesanddevices,hospitalsuppliesandequipment,equipmentforthe " handicapped,personalhygieneitems,veterinarymedicinesandsupplies,fishingequipment # andsupplies,soapmakingequipment,certainradioequipment,andbatteriesforsuchequip $l  ment.TherearenofrequencyordollarvaluelimitsonfoodcontainedingiftparcelstoCuba.3y݌%X!(#(# Ќ  % X` X˧%TheDepartmentofCommercegenerallydenieslicenseapplicationsforexportsor_reexports_Ԁto '0!# Cuba.However,theDepartmentofCommerceconsidersapplicationsforthefollowingona n("$ case-by-casebasis: Z)#% ! '` XX!   "#(xx "#"3"  3E23  0 '   Exportstomeetbasichumanneeds.3Er݌2+$''(#'(# Ќ  _"3"  3-23  0 '   Exportsfromforeigncountriesofnon-strategic,foreignmadeproductscontaining20 R  percentorlessU.S.-originparts,componentsormaterials,providedtheexporterisnota > U.S.ownedorcontrolledforeignfirminathirdcountry.3-Z݌*'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  323  0 '   Exportsoftelecommunicationsequipment,totheextentpermittedaspartofa   telecommunicationsprojectapprovedbytheFederalCommunicationsCommission,   necessarytodeliverasignaltoaninternationaltelecommunicationsgatewayinCuba.3.݌ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3մ23  0 '   Exportsofbusinessandofficeequipmentifdestinedtohumanrightsorganizationsorto   individualsandnongovernmentalorganizationsthatpromoteindependentactivity.3մ݌ t'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3I23  0 '   CertaincommoditiesandsoftwareforU.S.newsbureausinCuba.3Iv݌ `'(#'(# Ќ  % X'` X%TheDepartmentofCommercereviewsapplicationsforexportsofdonatedandcommercially 8  suppliedmedicineormedicalitemstoCubaonacasebycasebasisandpursuanttothe v$  provisionsofsection6004(c)oftheCubanDemocracyActof1992.TheUnitedStatesdoesnot b  restrictexportsoftheseitems,exceptinthefollowingcases: N  ! '` XX!  "#(xx "#"3"  323  0 '   TotheextentSection5(m)oftheActorSection203(b)(2)ofthe_IEEPA_Ԁwouldpermitsuch &  restrictions.3ӹ݌'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  323  0 '   Whenthereisareasonablelikelihoodtheitemtobeexportedwillbeusedforpurposesof  tortureorotherhumanrightsabuses.3$݌'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3B23  0 '   Whenthereisareasonablelikelihoodtheitemtobeexportedwillbe_reexported_.3Bo݌'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3i23  0 '   Whentheitemtobeexportedcouldbeusedintheproductionofanybiotechnological p product.3i݌\'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  323  0 '   WhentheU.S.Governmentdeterminesitwouldbeunabletoverify,byonsiteinspection H andotherappropriatemeans,thattheitemtobeexportedwillbeusedforthepurposefor 4 whichitwasintendedandonlyfortheuseandbenefitoftheCubanpeople.Thisexception r  doesnotapplytodonationsofmedicineforhumanitarianpurposestoanongovernmental ^  organizationinCuba.3݌J'(#'(# Ќ  % X'` X%TheDepartmentofCommerceauthorizestheuseofLicenseExceptionAgricultural "  Commodities(_AGR_)forU.S.exportsandcertain_reexports_ԀofagriculturalcommoditiestoCuba. ! Section906(a)(1)oftheTradeSanctionsReformandExportEnhancementActof2000(TitleIX ! ofPub.L.106387),asamended(_TSRA_),requirestheexpeditedreviewofproposedexportsof " agriculturalcommoditiestoCuba.UnderLicenseException_AGR_,anexportermustsubmit #  priornotificationofaproposedtransactiontotheDepartmentofCommerce.Theexportermay $l! proceedwiththeshipmentwhentheDepartmentconfirmsthatnoreviewingagencyhasraisedan %X" objection(generallywithin12businessdays),providedthetransactionmeetsalloftheother &D # requirementsofthelicenseexception.Thisexpeditedreviewincludesthescreeningofthe '0!$ ultimaterecipientofthecommoditiestoensurethatitisnotinvolvedinpromotinginternational n("% terrorism.ExportsofmedicinesandmedicaldevicestoCubaarenoteligibleforLicense Z)#& Exception_AGR_Ԁandcontinuetobesubjecttothelicenseapplicationandreviewrequirementsof F*#' Section6004(c)oftheCubanDemocracyActof1992. 2+$( _ ,%)  Iran  R TheU.S.Governmenthasageneralpolicyofdenialforallitemscontrolledforchemical, * biological,missileandnuclearproliferationreasons;militaryrelateditemscontrolledfornational   securityorregionalstabilityreasons(CCLentriesendinginthenumber18);andallotheritems   controlledfornationalsecurityorforeignpolicyreasons,forallendusersinIran. v#  9      ׀Pursuantto   ExecutiveOrder12959ofMay6,1995,andExecutiveOrder13059ofAugust19,1997,the   DepartmentoftheTreasurymaintainscomprehensivetraderestrictionsonexportsand_reexports_  t ofCCLitemstoIranandisresponsibleforlicensing:(1)exportsfromtheUnitedStatestoIran;  ` (2)exportsand_reexports_ԀbyU.S.personstoIran,includingagriculturalandmedicalitems L  classifiedasEAR99(itemsnotontheCCL)toIranundertheprovisionsofthe_TSRA_;and(3) 8  _reexports_ԀofCCLitemsbyanypersontoIran.TheDepartmentofCommercehaslicensing v$  responsibilityfor_reexports_ԀofEAR99itemstoIranbynonU.S.persons.Toreinforcecontrols b  administeredbytheDepartmentof_theTreasury_,theDepartmentofCommercehasmadeita N  violationoftheExportAdministrationRegulationstoexportor_reexport_ԀtoIrananyitemthatis :  subjecttotheTreasuryDepartmentsregulationsandalsosubjecttotheEARwithoutTreasury &  authorization.   Libya   WhiletheDepartmentoftheTreasuryisprimarilyresponsibleforthelicensingofexportsto p Libya,theDepartmentofCommercelicenses_reexports_ԀtoLibyaofU.S.originitemssubjectto \ theEAR.Alicenseisrequiredforallsuch_reexports_,except: H ! '` XX!  "#(xx "#"3"  323  0 '   Medicineandmedicalsupplies.3݌r '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3k23  0 '   Foodandagriculturalcommodities.3k݌^ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3D23  0 '   Itemspermittedundercertainlicenseexceptions.3Dq݌J'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3,23  0 '   NonstrategicforeignproductsofU.S.-origintechnologyorsoftware.3,Y݌6'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3(23  0 '   StrategicforeignproductsofU.S.-origintechnologyorsoftwareexportedfromtheUnited "  StatesbeforeMarch12,1982.3(U݌!'(#'(# Ќ  % X'` X%TheDepartmentofCommercewillgenerallydenyapplicationsfor_reexport_Ԁofthefollowing: "   "#(xx "#! '` XX!"3"  323  0 '   Off-highwaywheeltractorswithcarriagecapacityof10tonsormore,exceptforsuch $l! tractorsinreasonablequantitiesforciviluse.3݌%X"'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  323  0 '   Aircraft(includinghelicopters),andspecifiedpartsandaccessories.3>݌&D #'(#'(# Ќ  _"3"  323  0 '   Othercommoditiesandrelatedtechnologyandsoftwarecontrolledfornationalsecurity R purposes,includingcontrolledforeignproducedproductsofU.S.technologyandsoftware > exportedfromtheUnitedStatesafterMarch12,1982,andoilandgasequipmentandrelated * technologyandsoftwarenotreadilyavailablefromnon-U.S.sources.3K݌ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3d23  0 '   ItemsforuseinthedevelopmentorconstructionoftheRas_Lanuf_Ԁpetrochemicalprocessing   complex,exceptfor(a)exportsor_reexports_Ԁpursuanttoacontractualarrangementineffect   priortoDecember20,1983;and(b)the_reexport_Ԁofgoodsortechnologyalreadyoutsidethe   UnitedStatesonDecember20,1983,forwhichlicenseapplicationswillbereviewedona  t casebycasebasis.3d݌ `'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3Q23  0 '   ItemspreviouslysubjecttoUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(_UNSC_)Resolution748of L  March30,1992(effectiveApril5,1992)and_UNSC_ԀResolution883ofNovember11,1993 8  (effectiveDecember1,1993)._UNSC_ԀResolution1506ofSeptember12,2003,liftedthe v$  measuressetinparagraphs4and5of_UNSC_ԀResolution748andparagraphs5and6of b  _UNSC_ԀResolution883,whichcorrespondstoitemssubjecttoaU.S.generalpolicyofdenial N  inPart746.4(c)(2)(ivvii)oftheEAR.TheU.S.Governmentmaintainsitsgeneralpolicyof :  denialfortheseitems.3Q~݌& '(#'(# Ќ  % X'` X%TheDepartmentofCommercewillconsiderexceptionstothisdenialpolicyonacase-by-case  basisforthefollowing:    "#(xx "#! '` XX!"3"  323  0 '   _Reexports_Ԁofcommoditiesortechnologyandsoftwareinvolvingacontractineffectpriorto p March12,1982,wherefailuretoobtainanauthorizationwouldnotexcuseperformanceof \ thecontract.3݌H'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3n23  0 '   The_reexport_Ԁofgoodsortechnologynotsubjecttonationalsecuritycontrolsalreadyoutside 4 theUnitedStatesonMarch12,1982,ortheexportofforeignproductsincorporatingsuch r  itemsascomponents.3n݌^ '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3<23  0 '   TheuseofU.S.-origincomponentsincorporatedincertainforeignoriginequipmentand J constituting20percentorlessbyvalueofthatequipment.3<i݌6'(#'(# Ќ  % X'` X%Allother_reexports_,withtheexceptionofhumanitarianitemsandmedicalequipmentasdefined ! inthe_TSRA_,willgenerallybedenied. !  Sudan  #  TheU.S.Governmenthasageneralpolicyofdenialfortheexportand_reexport_Ԁofallitems %X" controlledforchemical,biological,missileandnuclearproliferationreasons,militaryrelated &D # itemscontrolledfornationalsecurityorregionalstabilityreasons(CCLentriesendinginthe '0!$ number18),andcertainitemscontrolledfornationalsecurityorforeignpolicyreasons,suchas n("% aircraft,_cryptologic_Ԁitems,andexplosivedevicedetectors,forallendusersinSudan.Other Z)#& itemscontrolledtoSudanfornationalsecurityorforeignpolicyreasonsaresubjecttoapolicyof F*#' denialformilitaryendusersorendusesandarereviewedonacasebycasebasisfornon 2+$( militaryendusersorenduses.PursuanttoExecutiveOrder13067ofNovember3,1997,the ,%) DepartmentoftheTreasurymaintainscomprehensivetraderestrictionsonexportsand_reexports_ R toSudan.Whenaproposedexportor_reexport_ԀinvolvesanitemontheCCLrequiringalicense > fromboththeDepartmentof_theTreasury_ԀandtheDepartmentofCommerce,theDepartmentof * CommercewillonlyreviewalicenseapplicationiftheDepartmentoftheTreasuryhas   previouslyapprovedtheexportor_reexport_.TheDepartmentoftheTreasuryissolelyresponsible   forlicensingtheexportofagriculturalandmedicalitemsnotlistedontheCCLtoSudanunder   theprovisionsofthe_TSRA_.    Syria   ` TherecentlyenactedSyriaAccountabilityandLebaneseSovereigntyRestorationActof2003 L  prohibitstheexportofallitemsontheCCLtoSyria,unlessthePresidentexercisesthewaiver 8  authorityprovided.TheDepartmentofCommercewillimplementthisprohibition,consistent v$  withthePresidentsconstitutionalauthoritytoconductforeignpolicy.Theimpactofthis b  prohibitionislikelytobesignificant. N   Iraq  &  OnMay22,2003,the_UNSC_ԀissuedResolution1483thatliftedthecomprehensive_UNSC_Ԁtrade  sanctionsonIraq,whileretainingrestrictionsonthesaleorsupplytoIraqofarmsandrelated  _matriel_.Resolution1483alsoreiteratedcertainprovisionsofrelated_UNSC_ԀResolutions707of  August15,1991,and687ofApril3,1991.Inparticular,thoseprovisionsrequirethatIraq p eliminateitsnuclearweaponsprogramandrestrictitsnuclearactivitiestotheuseofisotopesfor \ medical,industrialoragriculturalpurposes.Suchprovisionsfurthermandatetheeliminationof H Iraqschemicalandbiologicalweaponsprogramsaswellasitsballisticmissileprogram.The 4 DepartmentofCommerceispresentlyintheprocessofpreparinganamendmenttheEARto r  reflectIraqssignificantlychangedstatus.Atpresent,theDepartmentoftheTreasurycontinues ^  torequirealicensefortheexporttoIraqofmostitemsontheCommerceControlList,otherthan J itemscontrolledforantiterrorismreasonsonly. 6  Rwanda  ! The_UNSC_ԀimposedanarmsembargoonRwandaonMay17,1994.In1995,the_UNSC_ " suspendedtheapplicationofthearmsembargototheGovernmentofRwandaifitemswere #  shippedthroughspecifiedpointsofentry,andlaterterminated(effectiveSeptember1,1996)the $l! applicationoftheserestrictionsonsalesorsuppliestotheGovernmentofRwanda.Thesaleor %X" supplyofsucharmsandarmsrelated_materil_ԀtonongovernmentalforcesinRwandaremains &D # prohibited. '0!$ OnJuly30,2003,theDepartmentofStateimplementedthepartialliftingofthearmsembargo Z)#& forthoseitemssubjecttotheInternationalTrafficinArmsRegulations(_ITAR_)destinedforthe F*#' GovernmentofRwanda.TheDepartmentofCommercewillimplementacomparablepartial 2+$( liftingofthearmsembargobyamendingtheEAR.Untilitdoesso,armsandrelated_materil_ ,%) subjecttoDepartmentofCommercelicensingjurisdictionremainunderembargotoallendusers R inRwanda.TheU.S.Governmentcontinuestorequirealicenseforforeignpolicypurposesfor > theexportor_reexport_ԀbyaU.S.persontoanynongovernmentenduserinRwandaofall_ITAR_Ԅ * controlledarmsandarmsrelatedmaterielofalltypes,regardlessoforigin,includingweapons   andammunition,militaryvehiclesandequipment,paramilitarypoliceequipmentandspareparts   fortheseitems.Theembargoappliestoallendusersforallarmsandarmsrelated_materil_   controlledintheEAR.TheU.S.GovernmentalsorequiresalicensefortheuseofanyU.S.   aircraftorvesseltosupplyortransportanysuchitemstoRwanda.TheU.S.Governmenthasa  t generalpolicyofdenialforexportor_reexport_Ԁof_ITAR_Ԁcontrolleditemstonongovernmentend  ` usersandEARcontrolleditemstoallendusersinRwanda.Proposedexportsor_reexports_Ԁtothe L  GovernmentofRwandaarereviewedonacasebycasebasis.  8  DesignatedTerroristPersonsandGroups  b  TheDepartmentofCommercerequiresalicensefortheexportfromtheUnitedStatesorbyU.S. :  personsofallitemssubjecttotheEARtoSpeciallyDesignatedGlobalTerrorists(_SDGTs_), &  SpeciallyDesignatedTerrorists(_SDTs_),andForeignTerroristOrganizations(_FTOs_).The  DepartmentofCommercealsorequiresalicenseforthe_reexport_ԀbynonU.S.personsofitems  ontheCCLtosuch_SDGTs_,_SDTs_,or_FTOs_Ԁandageneralpolicyofdenialappliestoall  applications._SDGTs_,_SDTs_,and_FTOs_Ԁareidentifiedonalistofdesignatedpersonsmaintained  bytheDepartmentoftheTreasuryinAppendixAto31_CFR_ԀChapterV.  p PersonsNamedPursuanttoExecutiveOrder13304  H OnMay28,2003,thePresidentissuedExecutiveOrder13304,whichterminatedthe r  emergencieswithrespecttotheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia(SerbiaandMontenegro)(FRY) ^  thatweredeclaredin1992and1998.Thisactionmodifiedtherestrictionsonexportsand J _reexports_ԀofanyitemssubjecttotheEARtopersonsdesignatedinpreviousExecutiveOrders 6 13088and13192pertainingtoformerYugoslavPresident_Slobodan_Ԁ_Milosevic_Ԁandothers "  associatedwithhim.ThesepersonswereincludedintheDepartmentoftheTreasuryslistof ! SpeciallyDesignatedNationalsandBlockedPersons(the_SDN_ԀList)identifiedbythebracketed ! suffixinitials[_FRYM_].TheU.S.Governmentcontinuescontrolsonsomeofthesepersonswho " remainonthe_SDN_ԀListbutundernewbracketedsuffixinitials[BALKANS]createdpursuantto #  ExecutiveOrder13304.TheDepartmentofCommerceincorporatesthe_SDN_ԀListin $l! SupplementNo.3toPart764oftheEAR.TheDepartmentofCommercewillamendtheEAR %X" toeliminatethe[_FRYM_]designationcurrentlylistedinPart744.16oftheEAR.This &D # designationhasalreadybeenremovedfromthe_SDN_ԀList. '0!$  Angola  Z)#& ThePresidentdeclaredanationalemergencyrelatingto_UNITA_ԀbyExecutiveOrder12865on 2+$( September26,1993,incoordinationwithinternationalsanctionsadoptedbythe_UNSC_.The ,%) U.S.sanctionswerefurthertightenedbyExecutiveOrder13069ofDecember12,1997,and R ExecutiveOrder13098ofAugust18,1998.TheUnitedStatestooktheseactionsinaccordance > withUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolutions1127ofAugust28,1997,Resolution1173of * June12,1998,andResolution1176ofJune26,1998.   ExecutiveOrder13298ofMay6,2003,liftedallsanctionsimposedon_UNITA_Ԁintheseearlier   ExecutiveOrders.WiththesuccessfulimplementationoftheLusakaProtocolandthe   demilitarizationof_UNITA_,thePresidentdeterminedthatthecircumstancesthatledtothe  t declarationofanationalemergencyonSeptember26,1993,nolongerexist.Theliftingof  ` sanctionswasconsistentwithUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1448,whichliftedthe L  measuresimposedpursuanttopriorSecurityCouncilresolutionsrelatedto_UNITA_.The 8  DepartmentofCommercewillpublishanamendmenttotheEARtoremovereferencestothe v$  sanctionsadministeredby_OFAC_. b    AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)ofTheAct :  PA.ThePurposeoftheControl    Cuba   TheUnitedStatesimposedanembargofourdecadesagobecauseCubanactionsposedaserious  threattothestabilityoftheWesternHemisphereandtheCubanGovernmentexpropriated l propertyofU.S.citizenswithoutcompensation.InMarch1982,asaresultofCubassupportfor X insurgentgroupsthatengagedinterrorism,theSecretaryofStatedesignateditasastatesponsor D ofterrorismunderSection6(j)oftheAct. 0 Ђ Iran  Z ThepurposeofthecontrolsistorestrictexportsofitemsthatwouldbeusefulinenhancingIrans B militaryorterroristsupportingcapabilitiesandtoaddressotherU.S.foreignpolicyconcerns, . including_nonproliferation_,humanrights,andregionalstability.In2003,Iranwasthemost   activestatesponsorofterrorism.Itsrecordagainstal_Qaida_Ԁhasbeenmixed,anditcontinuesto ! supportantiIsraelactivity.TheU.S.GovernmentalsohasconcernsregardingIransnuclear ! activitiesandcooperationwiththeInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA).U.S.export " controlsremaininplaceduetothesecontinuedIranianactivities.Byrestrictingitemswith #x  militaryuse,thecontrolsdemonstratetheresolveoftheUnitedStatesnottoprovideanydirector $d! indirectmilitarysupportforIranandtosupportotherU.S.foreignpolicyobjectives.TheUnited %P" Statessupportforexportsand_reexports_Ԁoffooditems,medicalsupplies,andmedicalequipment &< # ensuresthattheIranianpopulationreceiveswhatitneedsforhumanitarianpurposes. z'(!$  Libya  R)#& ThepurposeofthecontrolsistodemonstrateU.S.oppositionto,andtodistancetheUnited :*#' Statesfrom,Libyasinterventionintheaffairsofneighboringstatesandsupportforactsof &+$( internationalterrorismandinternationalsubversiveactivities.Libyahascontinueditseffortsto ,%) identifyitselfwiththewaronterrorismandthestruggleagainstIslamicextremism.Libyahas R addressedthe_UNSC_Ԁrequirementsrelatedtothe1988bombingofPanAmFlight103over > Lockerbie,Scotland,and,asaresultthe_UNSC_ԀliftedtheembargoonLibyavia_UNSC_ * Resolution1506onSeptember12,2003.However,theU.S.Governmentcontinuestomaintain   unilateralsanctionspendingimprovementnotonlyintermsofLibyaseffortsagainstterrorism   butalsoregardingtheir_WMD_Ԁactivitiesandmissiledeliverysystems.U.S.unilateralsanctions,   inplacesince1986,broadlyprohibitU.S.personsfromengaginginunauthorizedfinancial   transactionsinvolvingLibya.TheU.S.Governmentcontinuestomaintainitsgeneralpolicyof  t denialforitemslistedinPart746.4(c)(2)(ivvii),althoughthispolicywasoriginallyimplemented  ` pertherequirementsofcertainpartsof_UNSC_ԀResolutions748and883. L  Meanwhile,theU.S.Governmentspolicyofsupportforexportsand_reexports_Ԁoffood, v$  medicines,andmedicalequipmentensuresthattheLibyanpopulationhasaccesstoitems b  necessaryforbasichumanneeds. N   Sudan  &  TheU.S.GovernmentcontinuestohaveconcernsabouttheGovernmentofSudanssupportfor  certainterroristgroups,suchas_Hamas_ԀandthePalestineIslamicJihad,buttheUnitedStatesis  pleasedwithSudanscooperationandtheprogressmadeinitsantiterroristactivities.The  PresidentalsocertifiedtotheCongress,mostrecentlyonOctober22,2003,consistentwith  section6(b)(1)(A)oftheSudanPeaceAct(Pub.L.107245),thattheGovernmentofSudanand l theSudanPeoplesLiberationMovementarenegotiatingingoodfaithandthatthenegotiations X shouldcontinue.Inaddition,thePresidentnotedthatthesituationwithrespecttohumanitarian D accesshasimproveddramaticallyinsouthernSudansinceOctober2002.Atthesametime, 0 accesstosignificantpopulationsinneedofassistanceoutsideofsouthernSudanremainslimited. n TheU.S.embargoandexportcontrolsremaininplaceagainstSudantorestrictaccesstoitems Z thatcouldmakeasignificantcontributiontoSudansmilitarycapabilityandabilitytosupport F internationalterrorism.  2  Rwanda   ! ThecontrolsonarmsrelateditemstoRwandaremaininplacetopreventanyU.S.contributionto ! potentialconflictandtoconformtoUnitedNationsmandatedsanctions. "  DesignatedTerroristPersonsandGroups  $d! Thepurposeofcontrolsondesignatedterroristpersonsandgroupsistorestrictexportsofitems %L" thatwouldbeusefulinenhancingthecapabilityof_SDGTs_,_SDTs_Ԁand_FTOs_Ԁtoundertake &8 # terroristactsandtofurtherthegeneralpolicyoftheUnitedStatestopreventsupportersof v'$!$ terrorismandterroristelementsfromacquiringtechnologythatmightenhanceterrorist b("% capabilities.ThecontrolsenabletheDepartmentofCommercetouseitslicensingand N)"& enforcementresourcestosupportU.S._counterterrorism_Ԁeffortsbymonitoringandinvestigating :*#' unlicencedexports,_reexports_,anddiversionofitemssubjecttotheEARtopartiesdesignatedas &+$( terroristsbytheU.S.Government. ,%) Ї B.0  Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce R(#(#  1.  ProbabilityofAchievingIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. TheSecretaryhas * determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose,inlight   ofotherfactors,includingforeignavailabilityfromothercountriesandthattheforeignpolicy   purposecannotbeachievedthroughnegotiationsorotheralternativemeans.Therestrictions   havedeniedthesepersonsandnationscertaintraderelationswiththeUnitedStatesandother   nations.Thecontrolsputpressureonthesepersonstomodifytheiractions.Inaddition,the  t applicablecontrolsmayservetoreducethepotentialforconflict.  `  Cuba  8  TheUnitedStatesmaintainsanembargoagainstCubatoexpressU.S.oppositiontothe v$  continuedrepressivepoliciesoftheCastrogovernment.TheUnitedStateshasmodifiedthe b  embargoonnumerousoccasionstoaidtheCubanpeopleinbringingaboutatransitionto N  democracyandafreemarketeconomyandtoexpandhumanitarianassistancetotheCuban :  people. &   Iran   ThecontrolsonIranrestrictitsaccesstospecifiedU.S.originitemsthatcouldbeusedto  threatenU.S.interests.TheUnitedStateshassought,andwillcontinuetoseek,thecooperation  ofothercountriesincuttingofftheflowofmilitaryandmilitaryrelatedequipmenttoIran. p  Libya  H TheUnitedStatesmaintainsexportand_reexport_Ԁprohibitionsforcommoditiescontrolledfor 4 nationalsecurityreasons,forcertaintypesofoilterminalandrefiningequipment,foritemsused r  toserviceormaintainLibyanaircraftandairfields,andforallotheritemssubjecttotheEAR, ^  withfewexceptions.TheintentoftheserestrictionsistopreventU.S.contributionstoLibyas J involvementinactivitiesdetrimentaltotheU.S.nationalsecurityandforeignpolicyinterests. 6 Thecontinuationofthecontrolssendaclearsignalthat,despitetherecentUnitedNations "  SecurityCouncilresolutionthatliftedtheUnitedNationsembargo,theUnitedStatesisunwilling ! toresumenormaltraderelationsuntilLibyasbehaviorsignificantlyimproves. !  Sudan  #  ThecontrolsonSudanaffirmthecommitmentoftheUnitedStatestoopposeSudansabilityto $l! obtainanduseU.S.originitemsinsupportofmilitaryactivities.  %X"  Rwanda  '0!$ TheembargoonexportsofarmsrelateditemstoRwandaismaintainedconsistentwithrecent n("% _UNSC_Ԁaction.Basedonthemultilateralnatureofthesecontrols,theprobabilityissubstantial Z)#& thatthedesiredeffectwillresult. F*#'  DesignatedTerroristPersonsandGroups  ,%) Controlsonexportsand_reexports_Ԁto_SDGTs_,_SDTs_,and_FTOs_Ԁareintendedtopreventactsof R terrorismandtoaffirmU.S.oppositiontointernationalterrorismbylimitingtheabilityof > designatedterroristorganizationsandindividualstoobtainanduseU.S.originitemsinterrorist * operations.    2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthese   controlsarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesandwillnothaveanysignificant   adverseforeignpolicyconsequenceswiththeextensionofthesecontrols.Thecontrolscom  t plementU.S.foreignpolicyinotheraspectsofU.S.relationswiththesepersonsandcountries.  ` Theyencouragethesepersonstomodifytheiractionswiththegoalofimprovingconditionsin L  theirregion.ThesecontrolsareconsistentwithU.S.foreignpolicygoalsofpromotingpeaceand 8  stability,preventingweaponsproliferation,andhumanrightsabuses. v$   3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. g TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadversereactionto N  thesecontrolsisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolsineffective,norwillanyadversereactionby :  othercountriesbecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests.However,mostcountries &  havenotimposedembargoesascomprehensiveasthoseoftheUnitedStates.Somecountries  havechallengedcertainU.S.controlsasextraterritorial.OppositiontoU.S.foreignpolicybased  controlsbymanyofitsmajortradingpartners,includingsomecloseallies,continuestobea  pointofcontention.ThisreactionhasledsomeforeignfirmstodesignoutU.S.componentsor  tocitethelackoftheirownnationalsanctionsasamarketingtooltosecurebusinesscontracts p thatmighthavegonetoU.S.companies.Insomeinstances,foreigngovernmentshaveinstructed \ foreignfirmstoignoreU.S._reexport_Ԁcontrols. H  Cuba  r  AlthoughmostcountriesrecognizetherightoftheUnitedStatestodetermineitsownforeign ^  policyandsecurityconcernsandshareU.S.concernsregardingtheCubanregime,many J countries,particularlyCanada,MexicoandthemembersoftheEuropeanUnion,opposedthe 6 CubanLibertyandDemocraticSolidarity(_Libertad_)Actof1996(HelmsBurton)andcontinueto "  opposeunilateralU.S.controlsonCuba.ManynationshavejoinedtheUnitedStatesin ! promotingpoliticalfreedom,asaresultoftheCubanGovernmentsMarch2003sentencingof ! 75prodemocracyadvocatesforupto28yearsinprison.TheEuropeanUnionhastaken " significantstepstopressuretheCubanGovernmenttoreformbyimposingdiplomaticsanctions. #   Iran  %X" OthercountriesshareU.S.concernsregardingIranssupportofterrorism,humanrightsabuses, &D # andattemptstoacquire_WMD_.RecentdisclosureshavehighlightedIranseffortstodevelop '0!$ nuclearweaponscapabilities.ThememberstatesoftheG8,theEuropeanUnion,themembers n("% oftheNuclearSuppliersGroup,andothermultilateralbodieshavejoinedtheUnitedStatesin Z)#& expressingstrongconcernoverIransnuclearactivitiesandhavecalledonIrantocooperatemore F*#'  fullywiththeInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA).Ingeneral,however,U.S.controls 2+$( oncommercialgoodstoIranaremorestringentthanthoseofothercountries.Iranstrade R partnersincludeGermany,Japan,theUnitedKingdom,andmanyothernations. >  Libya    Manycountriesconcurredwith_UNSC_ԀResolution1506ofSeptember12,2003,whichendedthe   multilateralembargoonLibyabecauseLibyafulfilleditsobligationstotheUnitedNationsin   regardtothePanAm103bombing.MostcountriesdidnotsupporttheU.S.renewaloftheIran   LibyaSanctionsActin2001foranotherfiveyearperiodandwouldliketoseetheUnitedStates  t removethesanctionsmaintainedunderthe_IEEPA_Ԁonitemsincludingaircraftpartsand  ` componentsandoilwellequipment.TheU.S.Governmentcontinuestomaintainitsgeneral L  policyofdenialforitemslistedinPart746.4(c)(2)(ivvii),althoughthispolicyfortheseitems 8  wasoriginallyimplementedpertherequirementsofcertainpartsof_UNSC_ԀResolutions748and v$  883.TheUnitedStateshassoughtandwillcontinuetoseekthesupportofothercountriesin b  cuttingofftheflowofsensitiveitemstoLibya. N   Sudan  &  TheUnitedStatesimposedanembargoinresponsetocredibleevidencethatSudanassists  internationalterroristgroups,destabilizesneighboringgovernments,andviolateshumanrights.  WhiletheUnitedStateshasbeenpleasedwiththeprogressmadebytheSudaneseGovernment,  itcontinuestoconsultwithkeyalliesandurgesthemtotakeallpossiblemeasurestoconvince  Sudantohaltitssupportofterrorism.  p  Rwanda  H ThearmsembargoonRwandaisconsistentwithU.N.objectives;theU.S.Governmenthas 4 receivednosignificantobjectionstothese_UNSC_Ԅmandatedcontrols. r   DesignatedTerroristPersonsandGroups  J ManycountriessupportU.S.effortstofightterrorismthroughblockingdesignatedterrorist 6 groupsandindividualsfromacquiringcommoditiesthatcouldassistsaidgroupsincommitting "  futureactsofviolence.Whilesomecountriesareconsideringrestrictivelegislation,veryfew ! maintainexportcontrolssimilartothoseimplementedbytheUnitedStates. !  4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatany #  adverseeffectofthesecontrolsontheeconomyoftheUnitedStates,includingonthe $l! competitivepositionoftheUnitedStatesintheinternationaleconomy,doesnotexceedthe %X" benefittoUnitedStatesforeignpolicyobjectives. &D #  Cuba  n("% TheU.S.Governmentrequiresalicensefortheexportand_reexport_ԀofallU.S.origin Z)#& commodities,technology,andsoftwaresubjecttotheEARtoCuba.Inrecentyears,thenumber F*#' oflicenseapplicationsthattheDepartmentofCommerceapprovedtoCubaincreased 2+$( significantlybeforedecreasingsomewhatin2003.Theincreaseinapprovedexportlicense ,%) applicationstoCubacanbeattributedtochangesmadeduringthelate1990sinU.S.export R policies,includingtheresumptionofdirectflights,exportsofmedicinesandmedicalsupplies > andequipment,exportsoffoodandcertainagriculturalcommoditiesforsaletoindependentnon * governmententities,andtheexpansionofagriculturalcommoditieseligibleforexport   authorizationundertheproceduresspecifiedinLicenseException_AGR_.LicenseException   _AGR_Ԁwascreatedin2001toimplementthelicensingrequirementsforexportsofagricultural   commoditiestoCubaunder_TSRA_.   InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommerceapproved337licenseapplicationsvaluedatover  ` $1.8billionforCuba.ThisisadecreaseincomparisontothenumberofapprovedlicensesinFY L  2002butanincreaseinthevalueoftheapprovedlicenses.InFY2002,theDepartment 8  approved389applications(valuedat$1.59billion)andreturnedwithoutaction(_RWAd_)42 v$  licenceapplications(valuedat$140.5million).Thehighnumberof_RWAs_Ԁisattributedlargely b  toexporterssubmittinglicenseapplicationsforagriculturalcommoditieswhen,infact,theywere N  eligibletosubmitnotificationstouseLicenseException_AGR_.InFY2003,theDepartment :  authorized192notificationsvaluedat$1.02billionunderLicenseException_AGR_.The &  DepartmentofCommerceandreviewingagencieshadnoobjectionstothesenotifications,which  wouldhaveconvertedthenotificationintoalicenseapplication.Fivenotifications(valuedat  $5.14million)were_RWAd_ԀbecausetheproductswerenoteligibleforexportunderLicense  Exception_AGR_.     Table1:ExportLicenseApplicationsApprovedandLicenseException \ _AGR_ԀNotificationsAuthorizedforCuba(FY19962003)  H f*fd d  m m (#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd P+  *&&44 *  FiscalYear 7&&&!&& 7hNumberofApplications/  Notifications 7&&&!"&& 7  TotalValueinU.S.Dollars  {i WM&"  && 0@19960@W  1996 qgBV 0@1996 0@  T@83T@qjӀ83 u@V"  T@83 T@  parcels.Licensesforaircraftandoceanvesselsontemporarysojournaccountedfor83cases. * TheU.S.embargoonCubaisunilateral.AccordingtotheCIAsWorld_Factbook_Ԁ2001,Cuba   imported$4.8billionincommoditiesin2001.Leadingimportswerepetroleum,foodstuffs,   machinery,andchemicals,andleadingsupplierswereSpain,France,Canada,China,andItaly.   Ingeneral,southernFlorida(particularlytheportareaofTampa)andexportersthatwould  t benefitfromthecostadvantagesofU.S.proximitytoCubaaresignificantlyaffectedbythetrade  ` embargo.OtherU.S.companieswhoaresignificantexporterslikelyarealsoaffected.  L  Iran  v$  TheU.S.Governmentmaintainsapolicyofdenialoflicenseapplicationsfordual-useexportsto b  Iran,consistentwiththeprovisionsoftheIran-IraqArmsNon-ProliferationActof1992, N  containedintheNationalDefenseAuthorizationActofFY1993(_NDAA_),andtheU.S.trade :  andinvestmentembargoof1995.Priortothe1993_NDAA_Ԁandtheimpositionoftheembargo, &  U.S.exportstoIranrosesharplyintheearly1990sinresponsetoIransremovalofcertain  importrestrictions.From1991through1994,U.S.exportstoIrantotaledcloseto$2.2billion,  makingtheUnitedStatesthesixthlargestexportertoIranduringthisperiod.Suchexports,  however,amountedtoonly5percentofIranstotalimportsandlessthan1percentofoverall  U.S.exports.AsaresultofthedenialpolicymandatedbyFY1993_NDAA_Ԁandthe1995U.S. p tradeandinvestmentembargo,U.S.exportstoIranhavefallendramatically.In2002U.S. \ exportsinIrantotaled$27.1million,mostlytobaccoandcereals. H Since1997,theDepartmentofCommercehasapprovedonlyapplicationsfor deemedexports r  (transfersofcontrolledU.S.technologytoIraniannationalslegallyworkingintheUnitedStates), ^  ratherthanactualexports.InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommerceapproved16deemed J exportlicensesforIraniannationals.Incontrast,duringthefourfiscalyearspriortoFY1995 6 (FY1991-94),theDepartmentofCommerceapprovedanaverageof$177millioninapplications "  toIraneachyear.Table2showstheimpactofthe1993_NDAA_ԀandthetradeembargoonU.S. ! tradewithIran: !   Table2:ApprovedApplicationstoIran(FY1991-2003) #    * d d( dd ( ( dd ( ( dd P( (#(#,( , , +  8&&'%X"%X (8FiscalYear =&&,!%#&& =  NumberofApplications =&&,!%$ && =f  TotalValueinU.S.Dollars pf,%%0 (  && @1991(@pՆ1991 _U*& & @1991 @  @V@89@V@_Ѐ89 F<1& '"  @V@89 @V@ F$60,149,182 \R& (U (  @1992( @\1992 `V*'!)  @1992  @ ``@131``@`131 G=2'!*" ``@131 ``@ G$567,559,528 \R'!+U ( $@1993($@\1993 _U*)", $@1993 $@  F@44F@_Ѐ44 F<1)"-"  F@44 F@ F$63,834,952 \R)".U ( (@1994((@\1994 _U*"*#/ (@1994 (@  $@10$@_Ѐ10 F<1"*#0"  $@10 $@ F$16,774,377 \R"*#1U ( ,@1995(,@\1995 SI*6+$2 ,@1995 ,@ # SЀ0 :0%6+$3" #  :Ѐ$0 \R6+$4U ( 0@1996(0@\1996 SI*J,%5 0@1996 0@ # SЀ0 :0%J,%6" #  :Ѐ$0 \RJ,%7U ( 4@1997(4@\1997 ^T*( 4@1997 4@  @5@^Ѐ5 E;0("  @5 @ EЀ$19 \R(U ( 8@1998(8@\1998 ^T*< 8@1998 8@  @6@^Ѐ6 E;0<"  @6 @ EЀ$10,012 WM<U ( <@1999(<@W1999 _U* P <@1999 <@  $@10$@_Ѐ10 F<1 P"  $@10 $@ FЀ$20,408 ND P U ( @@2000(@@N2000 _U* d  @@2000 @@  7@237@_23 F<1 d "  7@23 7@ F$35 ND d U ( D@2001(D@N2001 _U* x  D@2001 D@  3@193@_19 F<1 x"  3@19 3@ F$32 VL xU ( H@2002(H@V2002 qg9  H@2002 H@  $@10$@q10 XN@ "  $@10 $@ X$23 `V' U (  L@2003(L@ `2003 qg9 L@2003 L@   0@160@ q16 XN@"  0@16 0@   X$36 K&&:'U (   (K  TOTAL [&&J!&&  0v@[`363 Z&&I>"  0 v@&& Z$708,348,6047-+3 (  && 7  TheU.S.tradeandinvestmentembargotransformedthecompositionofU.S.tradewithIran.   Since1996,thefirstfullyearoftheembargo,topU.S.exportstoIranhavebeencompletely x  differentthaninpreviousyears.Incalendaryear2003,U.S.exportsweremainlytobaccoand d  cerealsandotherfoodstuffs,withpharmaceuticalproductsmakinguptheremainder.AsTable3 P  demonstrates,theagricultural,aerospace,andoilindustrieshavebeenamongthosemostdirectly <  affectedbytheembargo.From1991through1994,U.S.exportsofaircraftenginepartstoIran ( totalednearlyg $9.4million,averaging$2.3millionperyearandpeakingatmorethan$7.5 z millionin1994.By1996,aerospaceexportsdeclinedtovirtuallyzero. f  Priortotheembargo,theUnitedStatescompetedwithIransmajortradingpartnersinexportsof >" industrialmachinery,motorvehiclesandautoparts,powergeneratingmachinery,measuringand *# controllingdevices,computers,plasticsandresins,andindustrialorganicchemicals.In2002, $ Iranimportedatotalof$21.8billioningoodsanditsleadingtradepartnerswereGermany,Italy, % France,China,andSouthKorea. &   Table3:TopU.S.ExportstoIran,1991-1995(FASValue,inU.S.Dollars) `(   * dd( ( (#(#,,,+  8&&' 8* 8 (8_S.I.C._ԀNumber =&&,! `+&& =  DescriptionofGoods =&&,! `, && =#  TotalValue ka' `-0 ( && n@3511(n@k3511 ?5*!t. n@3511 n@ ?Turbinesandturbinegeneratorsets '!t/ '$322.5million \R!t03 ( @3531(@\3531 ?5*"1 @3531 @ ?Constructionmachineryandparts '"2 '$307.8million \R"33 ( @3533(@\3533 ?5*$4 @3533 @ ?Oilandgasfieldequipment '$5 'Ѐ$250.1million \R$63 ( @2044(@\2044 ?5*%7 @2044 @ ?Milledriceandby-products '%8 'Ѐ$166.3million \R%93 ( \@0115(\@\115 ?5**&: \@0115 \@ ?Corn  *&; $137.4million \R*&<3 ( r@2873(r@\2873 ?5*>'= r@2873 r@ ?Nitrogenousfertilizers  >'> $124.2million \R>'?3 ( @3714(@\3714 ?5*R( @ @3714 @ ?Motorvehiclepartsandaccessories  R( A $50.8million \RR( B3 (  @2821( @\2821 ?5*f)"C  @2821  @ ?Plasticsmaterialsandresins  f)"D $45.4million \Rf)"E3 ( >@3743(>@\3743 ?5*z*#F >@3743 >@ ?Railroadequipmentandparts  z*#G $42.7million Z&Iz*#H3 ( @3569(@Z3569 L&;9+($I @3569 @& LGeneralindustrialmachineryandequipment 4&#+($J& 4$41.8million7-++($K3 ( & 7Ї  TheU.S.embargoonIranhashadadamagingimpactonU.S.industry,becauseofthereaction R offoreignfirmstoU.S._reexport_Ԁrequirements.U.S.exportersreportthattheirproductsareoften > designedoutofforeignmanufacturedgoodstoensurethatforeignexportsdonotfallwithinthe * scopeofU.S.controls.This designingoutdamagesU.S.exports,bothforsalestoembargoed   countriesandnon-embargoedcountries.    Libya    AccordingtoCensusBureaustatistics,U.S.exportstoLibyaincalendaryear2002totaled  t $18.2million,mostlyconsistingofcereals.However,thisaccountsforanegligiblepercentage  ` ofLibyastotalimportsof$6.3billionin2002,accordingtotheCIAsWorld_Factbook_.Libyas L  majorsuppliersincludeItaly(29percentofimports),Germany(12percent),theUnitedKingdom 8  (7percent),andTunisia(6percent).Libyasmajorimportsweremachinery,transport v$  equipment,food,andmanufacturedgoods. b  U.S.exportstoLibyahavedeclinedsteadilysince1979whenU.S.exportcontrolswerefirst :  expanded.Sincethen,theUnitedStateshasauthorizedexportstofulfillpre1982contractual &  obligationsandhumanitarianaid.AnnualU.S.exportsand_reexports_ԀtoLibyafellfrom  $860millionin1979tolessthan$1millionannuallyfrom1987through1994.TotalU.S.  exportstoLibyahavebeenminimalsincethen,withoccasionalshipmentsofcereals.InFY  2003,theDepartmentofCommerceissuedtwo_reexport_Ԁlicensesvaluedat$682,000including  licensesformedicalequipmentandsatellitecommunications.TheDepartmentalso_RWAd_Ԁfive p applications(valuedat$1.1million)inFY2003,andrejectedthreeapplicationsfor_reexport_Ԁof \ medicalequipmentvaluedat$36,177onforeignpolicygrounds. H  Sudan  r  U.S.unilateralexportsanctionsonSudanhavehadaminorimpactonU.S.industry.Sudans ^  pooreconomicperformanceoverthepastdecadehaspreventedthecountryfromimportinga J significantamountofgoodsfromanysupplier,includingtheUnitedStates.BeforetheU.S. 6 embargowentintoeffectonNovember4,1997,thesmallamountofitemsthatSudanimported "  fromtheUnitedStatesgenerallydidnotrequireanexportlicenseand,thus,wasnotaffectedby ! theexportcontrols.AccordingtoCensusBureaustatistics,U.S.exportstoSudanincalendar ! year2002totaled$10.8million!mostlywheat,cereals,andvegetables.TheCIAestimatesthat " Sudanstotalimportsfromallsourceswere$1.5billionin2000;leadingsupplierswereChina, #  SaudiArabia,Germany,andtheUnitedKingdom.Leadingimportswerefoodstuffs, $l! manufacturedgoods,machineryandtransportequipment,andmedicines. %X" TheU.S.aerospaceindustryappearstohavebeenthemostaffectedbytheATcontrolsonSudan. '0!$ AircraftexportsfromtheUnitedStatestoSudantotaledmorethan$6.4millionin1992,butno n("% suchexportshavebeenreportedsince1994.Exportsofaircraftenginesandaircraftengineparts Z)#& showasimilardecline,fallingfrom$845,142in1992tobarely$10,000in1997.By1998,U.S. F*#' aerospaceexportstoSudanhadfallentovirtuallyzero. 2+$(  ,%) ThenumberofU.S.exportlicensesissuedforSudanwasnegligiblebeforethesanctionswere R implemented,sincelowleveltechnologyitems(whichdidnotrequireexportlicenses) > constitutedthebulkofU.S.exports.Aftersanctionswereimposed,theTreasuryDepartment * assumedlicensingresponsibilityforSudan.Sincethen,theDepartmentofCommercehasonly   processedlicenseapplicationswithSudaneseenduserswhentheapplicationisfora deemed   export.TheDepartmentofCommerceonlyreviewsotherlicenseapplicationsifthe   DepartmentoftheTreasuryhaspreviouslyapprovedtheexportor_reexport_.However,the   DepartmentoftheTreasuryissolelyresponsibleforlicensingtheexportofagricultural  t commoditiesandmedicalitemsnotlistedontheCCLtoSudanundertheprovisionsof_TSRA_.  ` TherewerenoDepartmentofCommercelicenseapplicationsapprovedorrejectedforSudanin L  FY2003andthreewerereturnedwithoutaction,withinstructionsfortheexportertocontactthe 8  DepartmentoftheTreasury. v$    Table4:ApprovedLicensesforSudan(FY1992toFY2003) N    * d d(#(#,', ,m +  8&&'& &  (8FiscalYear =&&,!N && =  TotalApplicationsApproved =&&,!N  && =ӀTotalValue(inU.S.dollars) f\'N  ( && $@1993($@f1993 ^T*b $@1993 $@  @2@^2 E;0b"  @2 @ E$5,404,000 \Rb3 ( (@1994((@\1994 SI*v$ (@1994 (@ # S0 :0%v$" #  :Ѐ$0 \Rv$3 ( ,@1995(,@\1995 SI*8 ,@1995 ,@ # S0 :0%8" #  :Ѐ$0 \R83 ( 0@1996(0@\1996 ^T*L 0@1996 0@  @7@^7 E;0L"  @7 @ EЀ$571,992 \RL3 ( 4@1997(4@\1997 _U*` 4@1997 4@  $@10$@_10 F<1` "  $@10 $@ F$7,095,973 \R`!3 ( 8@1998(8@\1998 SI*t" 8@1998 8@ # S0 :0%t#" #  :Ѐ$0 \Rt$3 ( <@1999(<@\1999 ^T*% <@1999 <@  ?1?^1 E;0&"  ?1 ? EЀ$1 ND'3 ( @@2000(@@N2000 ^T*( @@2000 @@  ?1?^1 E;0)"  ?1 ? E$1 QG*3 ( D@2001(D@Q2001 e[9+ D@2001 D@ # e0 LB4," #  L$0 e['-3 (  H@2002(H@e2002 e[9. H@2002 H@ # e0 LB4/" #  L$0 g&V'03 (  L@2003(L@g2003 l&[9* 1 L@2003 L@& # l0 S&B4* 2" # & S$0 K&:'* 33 ( & (K  TOTAL [&J!>!4&  05@[21 Z&I>>!5"  0 5@& Z $13,071,967 7-+>!63 ( & 7  Rwanda  #7 ThearmsembargoonRwandahashadlittleimpactonU.S.industry.U.S.exportstoRwanda $8 were$10.4millionin2002,ofwhichabout70percentwascomprisedofanimal/vegetablefats, $9 ediblevegetables,andmillingproducts.Muchoftheremainderwasvarioustypesofelectrical %: andmechanicalequipment.TheDepartmentofCommercedidnotreceiveanylicense &t ; applicationsfornonarmsrelateditemstoRwandaduringFY2003. '`!<  DesignatedTerroristPersonsandGroups  )8#> TheDepartmentofCommercedidnotreviewanylicenseapplicationsfor_SDGTs_,_SDTs_,or v*$$?  _FTOs_ԀinFY2003.Asaresult,theeconomicimpactofthesecontrolsispresumablyminimal. b+%@ TheDepartmentoftheTreasurymaintainsrestrictionsonactivitiesofU.S.personsinvolving R designatedterroristentities,whichtheDepartmentofCommercescontrolsaugment. >  5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedtheUnitedStateshas   theabilitytoeffectivelyenforcethesecontrols.Controlsonexportstoembargoedand   sanctionedcountriesandpersons,includingthosediscussedinthischapter,raiseanumberof   challenges.Theseincludetheneedtoconcentratelimitedresourcesonpriorityareas,developing   newstrategiestolimit_reexport_Ԁviolations,strengtheningthecooperativerelationshipwithother  x lawenforcementagenciesintheUnitedStatesandoverseas,andmaintainingaconsistent  d outreachefforttohelplimitU.S.businessvulnerability.Overall,theembargoesaregenerally P  understoodandsupportedbytheU.S.public.VoluntarycooperationfrommostU.S.exportersis <  expected. z(   C.0  ConsultationwithIndustry R (#(# f  InaOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentofCommercesolicited *  commentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols.  CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartmentsTechnicalAdvisoryCommittees  (_TACs_),whichadvisetheBureauofIndustryandSecurity(BIS),aswellasfromthePresidents  ExportCouncilSubcommitteeonExportAdministration.Commentsalsoweresolicitedfrom  thepublicviatheBIS_webpage_.ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember21,2003,andeight t commentswerereceived. ` FederalExpresscommentedthattheUnitedStatesmaintenanceofunilateralembargoesthatare 8 notconsistentwiththecontrolsbythemultilateralexportcontrolregimescausesasignificant v$ burdenonitsbusinessgiventhenatureofitsbusiness.FederalExpressrecommendedthatthe b U.S.Governmentuse smartsanctionsthattargetonlyspecificactivitiesofconcerninlieuof N broadembargoesagainstanentirecountry.Thecompanycontendsthatthiswouldlevelthe : playingfieldforU.S.companiesinworldwidecompetition.FederalExpressalsocitedthe &  confusionbetweentheCommerceandTreasuryDepartmentsregulationsforembargoed ! destinations.Asexamples,thecompanypointsoutthatcertainprovisionsoftheEARpertaining ! toIranareinconflictwiththoseoftheTreasuryregulations,andhighlightedtheparticular " concernaboutthelackofregulatoryprovisionsintheEARpertainingtotheU.S.embargoon #  Sudan. $p! Whilenoneofitscommentsspecificallyaddressedembargoedcountriesorpersons,theIndustry &H # CoalitiononTechnologyTransfer(_ICOTT_)providedgeneralcommentsaboutallforeignpolicy '4!$ basedexportcontrols,statingthatthesecontrolsareunilateralandlargelyineffective._ICOTT_ r( "% recommendedthatunilateralcontrolsshouldonlybeusedwhenthesymbolismoftheactof ^) #& imposingcontrolsoutweighstheinjurytoAmericanworkersandbusinesses.Inaddition,_ICOTT_ J*#'  suggestedthatifunilateralcontrolsaretobeimposedwhiletheUnitedStatesnegotiateswithits 6+$( tradingpartnerstoseekmultilateralsupport,thoseunilateralcontrolsshouldbeoflimited R duration.AdetailedreviewofallcommentsreceivedcanbefoundinAppendixI.g  >  TheDepartmentofCommercecontinuestoreceiveinquiriesandtoconsultwithindustryin   regardtolicensingpolicyandpracticesforembargoedcountries.TheDepartmentalsoworksin   coordinationwiththeDepartmentofState,theDepartmentofDefense,andtheDepartmentof   theTreasurytokeepindustryinformedofchangesinlicensingrequirementsandpoliciestoward   embargoedcountries.DuringFY2003theDepartmentofCommerceissuedaCDwithdetailed  t countryoverviewsforthesanctionedandembargoeddestinations,andaddedtheseoverviewsto  ` theBIS_webpage_Ԁunderanew RegionalConsiderationsheading. L   D.0  ConsultationwithOtherCountries v$ (#(# TheU.S.GovernmenthasmadereasonableeffortstoachievethepurposesoftheU.S.embargoes N  andsanctionsthroughnegotiationswithothercountries,throughinternationalfora,andthrough :  theUnitedNations,asspecifiedinthespecificcountrydescriptionsthatfollow. &   Cuba   TheAdministrationhasworkedhardwithothernations,especiallynationsinEuropeandLatin  America,toresolvedisputesthatarisebecauseofimplementationoftheU.S.embargo.  AlthoughdifferencesremainbetweentheUnitedStatesandothercountriesconcerningthebest l methodtoencouragedemocracyandhumanrights,theEuropeanUnionsdecisiontoimpose X diplomaticsanctionsonCubainresponsetotheCubanGovernmentsMarch2003sentencingof D 75prodemocracyadvocatesremainsveryhelpful. 0  Iran  Z TheUnitedStateshasanongoingdialoguewithitsalliesandpartnersonIransactivities.The B UnitedStatescontinuestoworkwithotherstatestocurbIransproliferationactivities,especially . inlightofrecentdisclosuresaboutIransnuclearprogram.    Libya  ! ExtensiveconsultationwithothernationsonLibyancontrolscontinuestotakeplaceunderthe " auspicesoftheUnitedNations,whichlifteditsembargoonLibyaonSeptember12,2003.The #t  UnitedStatesalsohasconductednumerousbilateraldiscussionsonthistopic. $`! g g Sudan  &8 # TheUnitedStatescontinuestoconsultwithothercountriesregardingtheinternalconflictin r' !$ Sudanandthehumanitarianneedsofthepopulation.Manyoftheseconsultationshaveoccurred ^( "% withintheforumoftheUnitedNations. J)"&    _  ,%) Rwanda  R MostcountriessupportinternationaleffortstostabilizeRwandaandtopreventfurtherethnic : conflictandregionalinstability,includingthroughcompliancewiththeUnitedNationsarms & embargo.    g DesignatedTerroristPersonsandGroups    TheUnitedStatescooperateswithalliesandpartnersandsharesinformationontheactivitiesof   designatedterroristentities.ItisexpectedthatstronginternationalsupportfortheU.S.fight  l againstterrorismwillfurtherfacilitatedialogueonforeignexportcontrolexpansion.  X  E.0  AlternativeMeans 0 (#(# TheU.S.Governmentimposesembargoesandsanctionsinanefforttomakeastrongstatement n  againstaparticularcountryspoliciesorapersonsactions.Restrictionsonexportscan Z  supplementotheractionsthattheU.S.Governmenttakestochangethebehaviorofthetarget F  countriesandpersons,includingsuchactionsasseveringdiplomaticrelations,banningimports 2  intotheUnitedStates,seekingU.N.denunciations,andcurtailingordiscouragingbilateral   educational,scientific,orculturalexchanges.U.S.Governmentembargoesandsanctions   complementdiplomaticmeasuresandcontinuetobeusedtoinfluencethebehaviorofthese  countriesandpersons.   F.0  ForeignAvailability h(#(# TheforeignavailabilityofitemscontrolledunderSection6(a)hasbeenconsideredbythe T DepartmentofCommerce.Ingeneral,numerousforeignsourcesofcommoditiesandtechnology @ similartothosesubjecttothesecontrolsareknown,especiallyforitemscontrolledbytheU.S. ~, Government.Whiletheembargoesandcomprehensivesanctionsdescribedinthischapterare j widelyfollowedandmanyhavesignificantmultilateralsupport,theU.S.Governments V continueduseofembargoesandsanctionsserveforeignpolicyintereststhatoverridetheimpact B offoreignavailability.  .  d S  _XXtChapter_Ԁ6 * J  ToxicChemicals,ChemicalPrecursorsandAssociatedEquipment, R  Technology,andSoftware f  (Sections742.2,742.18,744.4,744.6,and745)#XtXf#XXt v#  10       z (   #XtX#ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  N TheU.S.Governmentmaintainsexportcontrolsoncertainchemicals,equipment,materials, x&  software,technology,andentireplantstofurtherU.S.foreignpolicyopposingtheproliferation d  anduseofchemicalweapons.TheU.S.Governmentimplementsthesecontrolsincoordination P  withtheAustraliaGroup(AG),aninformalforumof33nationsthatcooperatetohaltthe <  proliferationofchemicalandbiologicalweapons.(SeeAppendixIIforcompletelistofAG (  members.)TheUnitedStatesfulfillsitsobligationsundertheChemicalWeaponsConvention  (_CWC_)bymaintainingcontrolsoncertainchemicals._| v#  11      _   AustraliaGroupControls   TheAGformedin1985whentheUnitedStatesand15othernationsagreedtoimposeexport Z controlsonanumberofchemicalsthatcouldbeusedtoproducechemicalweapons.Sincethen, F theAGhasexpandeditsmembershipandhasexpandeditsexportcontrollisttocoverother 2 chemicalandbiologicalweaponsrelateditems.AGmembercountriesusetheAGcontrollist p andguidelinesasabasisfordevelopingandimposingtheirnationalexportcontrols. \   LicenseRequirementsandLicensingPolicyforAGControls  4 Thelicensingrequirementsforchemicals,equipment,materials,software,technology,andentire  ! plantsimposedinaccordancewithAGcommitmentsareasfollows: !  A.   TheU.S.GovernmentrequiresalicensefortheexporttoalldestinationsoutsideAG #~ membercountriesofAGcontrolledprecursorandintermediatechemicals,whicharecapableof $n  _beingusedintheproductionoftoxicchemicalwarfareagents,aswellasrelevantprocesscontrol R software,technologyfortheuse,productionand/ordisposalofsuchitems,andthefacilities > designedtoproducethem. * TheU.S.Governmentrequiresalicensefortheexporttospecifieddestinationsofcertain   chemicalmanufacturingfacilitiesandequipment,toxicgasmonitoringsystemsanddetectorsthat   canbeusedintheproductionofchemicalwarfareagents,andthetechnologyfortheuseofsuch   items.ThecountriestowhichtheselicensingrequirementsapplyarelistedinColumnCB:3of  t theCommerceCountryChart,Part738,SupplementNo.1oftheExportAdministration  ` Regulations(EAR)._ v#  12      _ԀTheselicensingrequirementsalsoapplyfortheexportoftheseitemsto L  designatedterroristsupportingcountries. 8  OnJune10,2003,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedarulereflectingdecisionsreachedby b  theAGin_intersessional_ԀagreementandattheJune2002AGPlenary.Attheurgingofthe N  UnitedStates,thecontrolthresholdsinExportControlClassificationNumber(_ECCN_)2B352 :  for_fermenters_Ԁandcrossflowfiltrationequipmentwereloweredtocaptureadditionalequipment &  thatcouldbeusedintheproductionofchemicalweapons.Therule(68FR34526)addedeight  biologicaltoxinstothelistofcontrolleditemsontheEAR;thisactionisreferencedinChapter7  ofthisreport.Additionally,editorialcorrectionsweremadetosomechemicalrelatedentriesto  clarifythescopeofAGcontrols.ThisruleupdatedthelistofStatePartiestothe_CWC_Ԁtoadd  Andorra,Guatemala,Palau,SaintVincentandtheGrenadines,SamoaandThailand.SinceJune p 2003,_Timor_Ԁ_Leste_,Tong,SaoTome,Afghanistan,_Kyrgyzstan_,CapeVerde,andBelizehave \ becomestatepartiestothe_CWC_. H OnDecember1,2003,theDepartmentofCommerceissuedarevisiontotheruleissuedonJune r  10,2003(68FR34526),amendingtheEARtoimplementtheunderstandingsreachedattheJune ^  2002plenarymeetingoftheAustraliaGroup(AG).TheJune10,2003,finalrulecontained J errorsintheListofItemsControlledforExportControlClassificationNumbers(_ECCNs_)2E001 6 and2E002ontheCommerceControlList(CCL),butalsocontainedanerrorinthelicensing "  policyprovisionsoftheEARthatapplytoitemsidentifiedontheAGlists.TheDecember1 ! revisioncorrectedthoseerrors. !   " TheU.S.GovernmentalsocontrolsitemssubjecttotheEARbecauseofchemicalorbiological R enduseorenduserconcerns.ThesecontrolsarepartoftheEnhancedProliferationControl > Initiative(_EPCI_),announcedbythePresidentonDecember13,1990. *  ! '` XX! $ "(Ixx "#"3"  32I3  0 '   TheU.S.Governmentrequiresalicensefortheexportofanycommodity,technology,or   softwarewhentheexporterknowsthatitwillbeusedinthedesign,development,   production,stockpiling,oruseofchemicalweaponsin,orby,specificcountries(Country   GroupD:3,EAR,Part740,SupplementNo.1).Inaddition,theU.S.Governmentmay  t informanexporteror_reexporter_Ԁthatalicenseisrequiredduetoanunacceptableriskthat  ` theitemswillbeusedin,ordivertedto,chemicalweaponsproliferationactivitiesanywhere L  intheworld.3*݌8 '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3k2I3  0 '   NoU.S.personmayknowinglysupportsuchanexport,_reexport_,ortransferwithouta b  license. Supportisdefinedasanyaction,includingfinancing,transportation,orfreight N  forwarding,thatfacilitatestheexport,_reexport_,ortransferoftheseitems.3k݌: '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32I3  0 '   Inaddition,noU.S.personmay,withoutalicense,performanycontract,service,or  employmentknowingthatitwilldirectlyassistinthedesign,development,production,  stockpiling,oruseofchemicalweaponsin,orby,acountrylistedinCountryGroupD:3.3݌'(#'(# Ќ  % X'` XZ% B.   TheDepartmentofCommercereviewsapplicationsforlicensesonacasebycasebasisto p determinewhethertheexportwouldmakeamaterialcontributiontothedesign,development, ` production,stockpiling,oruseofchemicalweapons.WhentheDepartmentofCommerce L determinesthatanexportwillmakesuchacontribution,thelicensewillbedenied. 8  TradeRestrictionsundertheChemicalWeaponsConvention  b TheChemicalWeaponsConvention(_CWC_ԀorConvention),whichenteredintoforceinApril 6 1997,bansthedevelopment,production,stockpiling,retention,useortransferofchemical "  weaponsandestablishesanextensiveverificationregime.The_CWC_ԀAnnexonChemicals ! groupsspecifiedchemicals,whichincludebothtoxicchemicalsandchemicalprecursors,into ! three SchedulesbasedonfactorsspecifiedintheConvention,suchastheleveloftoxicityand " otherpropertiesthatenabletheiruseinchemicalweapons.Thetoxicchemicalsandprecursors #  onSchedule1posethehighestlevelofriskinlightofthedangersidentifiedintheConvention $l! andhavefew,ifany,commercialapplications;thetoxicchemicalsandprecursorsonSchedule2 %X" poseasignificantriskinlightofthedangersidentifiedinthe_CWC_Ԁandarenotproducedinlarge &D # commercialquantities;andthetoxicchemicalsandprecursorsonSchedule3poseariskinlight '0!$ ofthedangersidentifiedinthe_CWC_Ԁandmaybeproducedinlargecommercialquantities. n("% Chemicalwarfareagentsdeemedtohavemilitaryapplication,whichbytheirordinaryanddirect Z)#& chemicalactionproduceapowerfulphysiologicaleffect,arecontrolledbytheDepartmentof F*#' StateundertheInternationalTrafficinArmsRegulations. 2+$(  ,%)  LicenseRequirementsandLicensingPolicyfor_CWC_ԀControls  R Theexportrestrictionsandlicensingrequirementsforchemicalsandtechnologyimposedin * fulfillmentof_CWC_Ԁtreatyobligationsareasfollows:    A.   ExportsofSchedule1chemicalssubjecttoDepartmentofCommercejurisdictionare   bannedtodestinationsthatarenotincountriesthathaveratifiedoraccededtothe_CWC_,   identifiedasStatesnotPartytotheConvention.Alicenseandpriornotificationofaplanned  x exportisrequiredforexportsofSchedule1chemicalstoallStatesParties,includingCanada.  d LicensesarerequiredfortheshipmentofSchedule2chemicalstoStatesnotPartytothe_CWC_. P  ShipmentsofcertainSchedule3chemicalsrequirealicensetoStatesParties.Enduse <  certificatesfromthegovernmentsofimportingcountriesarerequiredforexportsofSchedule3 z(  chemicalstoStatesnotPartytothe_CWC_. f  Inaddition,theU.S.Governmenthasunilaterallyimposedalicenserequirementforchemical >  weaponsreasonsfortheexportoftechnologytoproduce_PFIB_,phosgene,_cyanogen_Ԁchloride,and *  hydrogencyanidetoallStatesnotPartytothe_CWC_,exceptIsraelandTaiwan. v#  13      ׀This  requirementistheresultofinteragencydiscussionsstemmingfromconcernsbyagenciesofthe  U.S.Governmentoverthepotentialchemicalweaponsuseofthefourchemicals.   B.   TheDepartmentofCommercepolicyistoreviewexportlicenseapplicationsfor t Schedule1chemicalstoStatePartiesonacasebycasebasis.Exportsmaybeapprovedonlyto d StatePartiesandonlyforpurposesnotprohibitedbythetreaty.TheDepartmentofCommerce P hasapolicyofdenialfortheexportofSchedule1chemicalstoStatesthatarenotaPartytothe < _CWC_. z( TheDepartmentofCommercehasageneralpolicyofdenialforapplicationstoexportSchedule R 2chemicalstoStatesnotPartytothe_CWC_.TheDepartmentofCommercealsowillgenerally > denyapplicationstoexportSchedule3chemicalstoStatesnotPartytothe_CWC_,unlessanend *  usecertificatefromtheimportingcountryhasbeenobtained. ! TheU.S.Governmentreviewsexportsand_reexports_Ԁoftechnologyrelatedtothedevelopment " andproductionoffourchemicals!_PFIB_,phosgene,_cyanogen_Ԁchloride,andhydrogencyanide! #  onacasebycasebasistomostdestinationsforwhichalicenseisrequired.However,thereisa $t! policyofdenialforCuba,Iran,Iraq,Libya,Sudan,andNorthKorea. TherecentlyenactedSyria %`" AccountabilityandLebaneseSovereigntyRestorationActof2003prohibitstheexportofall &P # itemsontheCCLtoSyria,unlessthePresidentexercisesthewaiverauthorityprovided.The '    AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)ofTheAct    1 A.ThePurposeoftheControl    ThepurposeofthesecontrolsistosupporttheeffortsoftheAGtohalttheproliferationof  t chemicalweaponsandtocomplywithinternationalobligationsunderthe_CWC_.Inaddition,  ` thesecontrolsimplementcertainmeasuresspecifiedinExecutiveOrder12735ofNovember16, L  1990,itssuccessor,ExecutiveOrder12938ofNovember14,1994,and_EPCI_.Insodoing,the 8  controlsprovidetheU.S.Governmentwiththeauthoritytocontroltheexportofanyitemfrom v$  theUnitedStateswhenthereisasignificantriskthatitwillbeusedforchemicalweapon b  proliferationpurposes. N  TheAGworkstofurther_nonproliferation_Ԁobjectivesthroughtheharmonizationofexport &  controls,theexchangeofinformation,andotherdiplomaticmeans.Inadditiontofurtheringthe  objectivesoftheAG,thesecontrolssupportU.S.complianceeffortswiththe_CWC_.Toensure  thatStatePartiesdonottransferchemicalsthatcouldassistStatesnotPartytothe_CWC_Ԁin  acquiringchemicalweapons,the_CWC_ԀrequiresthatStatePartiesrestricttheexportofcertain  chemicalslistedinthe_CWC_sAnnexonChemicals.Thecontrolsalsosupportthegoalsofthe p 1925GenevaProtocolfortheProhibitionoftheUseinWarofAsphyxiating,Poisonousorother \ Gases,andofBacteriologicalMethodsofWarfare,whichprohibitstheuseinwartimeof H chemicalorbiologicalweapons. 4  B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  ^   1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. TheSecretaryhas 6 determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose,inlight "  ofotherfactors,includingforeignavailabilityfromothercountriesandthattheforeignpolicy ! purposehasbeensupportedthroughnegotiationswithothercountries.Manyoftheitems ! coveredbythesecontrolshavecommercialusesandarewidelyavailablefromforeignsources. " Someofthemajorsourcesoftheseitemsarelocatedinindustrializedcountriesthataremembers #  oftheAGandareStatePartiestothe_CWC_.Althoughitisnotexpectedthatexportcontrols $l! alonecanpreventtheproliferationofchemicalweapons,thesecontrolsstrengthenU.S.effortsto %X" stemthespreadofsuchweaponsandcontinuetobeasignificantpartoftheoverall &D # _nonproliferation_ԀstrategyoftheUnitedStates. '0!$  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthese Z)#& controlsarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesandwillnothaveanysignificant F*#' adverseforeignpolicyconsequenceswiththeextensionofthesecontrols.TheU.S.Government 2+$( hasastronginterestinremainingattheforefrontofinternationaleffortstostemtheproliferation ,%) ofchemicalweapons.Thesecontrolsarecompatiblewiththemultilateralexportcontrolsfor R chemicalsandrelatedequipmentandtechnologyagreedtobytheAG.Moreover,theU.S. > Governmenthasabindinginternationalobligationunderthe_CWC_Ԁtoprohibitandeliminate * chemicalweapons,nottoassistanyone,inanyway,inchemicalweaponsactivities,andto   controlcertainchemicalexports.    3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadversereactionto   thesecontrolsisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectivenorwillanyadversereactionby  t othercountriesbecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests.TheU.S.Government  ` continuestodiscusschemicalexportcontrolswithcountriesoutsideoftheAGtoadvancethe L  goalsof_nonproliferation_.ThegovernmentsofsomedevelopingcountriesclaimthatAGexport 8  controlsdiscriminateagainstlessindustrializednationsbydeprivingthemofgoodsand v$  assistanceinthefieldofchemicaltechnology.TheUnitedStatesbelievestheseassertionsare b  false.Infact,ininternationalfora,theU.S.Governmenthassoughttodispelthisperceptionby N  clarifyingthepurposeofthecontrolsandbydemonstratingthattheU.S.Governmentdeniesfew :  exportlicenserequestsforshipmenttodevelopingcountries. &   4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatany  adverseeffectofthesecontrolsontheeconomyoftheUnitedStates,includingonthe  competitivepositionoftheUnitedStatesintheinternationaleconomy,doesnotexceedthe  benefittoUnitedStatesforeignpolicyobjectives.InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommerce p approved779licenseapplications,valuedat$646.9million,fortheexportor_reexport_Ԁof \ controlledchemicalprecursorsandequipment.Themajorityofthevalueoftheseapprovals H (morethan90percent)wasforprecursorchemicalscontrolledin_ECCN_Ԁ1C350;thesechemicals 4 havemanycommercialuses.Sixteenlicenseapplicationsvaluedat$232,626weredenied,and r  85applicationsworth$59.2millionwerereturnedwithoutaction.Theactualtradeinthese ^  controlledcommoditiesissignificantlygreaterthanthevalueofthelicenseapplicationsbecause J exportersmayexportmanyofthesecommoditiestoselectedAGmembercountrieswithouta 6 license. "   5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedtheUnitedStateshas ! theabilitytoeffectivelyenforcethesecontrols.Thesize,dispersion,diversity,andspecialized " natureofthedualusechemicalindustrymakedetectingandinvestigatingpotentialviolations #  difficultforenforcementpersonnel.Challengesincludedistinguishingcommercialprocurement $l! fromchemicalweaponsrelatedtransactions,andestablishingappropriatecommoditythresholds %X" fortargetingandtrackingexportsand_reexports_Ԁforverificationofenduseandendusers.In &D # addition,enforcementofficersmaybeexposedtopersonalsafetyriskswhenseizingand '0!$ inspectingchemicalmaterials. n("% Tomeetthechallengeofeffectiveenforcementofthesecontrols,theDepartmentofCommerce F*#' hasdirectedresourcestowardpreventiveenforcement,inadditiontocontinuedeffortstopursue 2+$( allleadsprovidedbyintelligence,industry,andothersourcesonactivitiesofconcern.Analysis ,%) ofShippersExportDeclarationshelpsensurethattheshipmentslabeled NoLicenseRequired R areinfacteligibleforsuchtreatment.Also,theDepartmentofCommercesextensiveoutreach > programeducatescompaniesaboutexportcontrolsrelatedtochemicalproductsandhelps * preventtheillegalexportofdualuseproductsthatcanbeusedtomakechemicalweapons.    C.ConsultationwithIndustry    TheDepartmentofCommerceinteractswiththechemicalindustryinanumberofways,  t includingwithindividualcompaniesseekingexportlicenses,throughtheTechnicalAdvisory  ` Committees(_TACs_),andthroughtradeassociations.TheDepartmentconsultsregularlywith L  exportingfirmsonproposedexporttransactionsandmarketingplanstofacilitatethethorough, 8  yetprompt,reviewofexportlicenseapplications.Throughthe_TACs_,theDepartmentkeeps v$  industryrepresentativesabreastofproposalsforthereviewofitemsonthecontrollistandgives b  themtheopportunitytoprovidetechnicalinput. N  TheDepartmentofCommerceworkswithchemicalindustryassociations,includingthe &  AmericanChemistryCouncilandtheSyntheticOrganicChemicalManufacturersAssociation,  andwithgovernmentagenciessuchastheFederalBureauofInvestigationandtheDepartmentof  Defense,togainvaluableinputregarding_CWC_ԀimplementationandtomeettheUnitedStates  _CWC_Ԁresponsibilities.(SeeSectionE, AlternativeMeans.)  f  InaOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentofCommercesolicited \ commentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols. H CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartments_TACs_ԀwhichadvisetheBureauof 4 IndustryandSecurity(BIS),aswellasfromthePresidentsExportCouncilSubcommitteeon r  ExportAdministration.CommentsalsoweresolicitedfromthepublicviatheBIS_webpage_. ^  ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember21,2003,andeightcommentswerereceived. J  D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  "  ThesecontrolsareconsistentwiththemultilateralexportcontrolcriteriaoftheAG,which ! includesmanyoftheworldsmajorchemicalproducersandtraders.Assuch,thecontrolshave " beenagreedthroughnegotiationswiththemembercountriesoftheAG.Inaddition,anumberof #  nonAGcountries,includingRussiaandUkraine,havetakenstepstoadoptAGtypecontrols. $l! AnimportantelementoftheAGseffortstocurbtheproliferationofchemicalweaponsis %X" contactingnonmemberstoencouragethemtoobservesimilarexportcontrols.TheU.S. &D # GovernmentcontinuestoencourageharmonizationofexportcontrolprovisionsamongAG '0!$ participantstoensurealevelplayingfieldforU.S.exporters. n("%  ,%)  E.AlternativeMeans  R TheU.S.Governmentcontinuestoaddresstheproblemoftheproliferationofchemicalweapons * onanumberoffronts.Directnegotiationswithcountriesintentonacquiringchemicalweapons   arenotlikelytopreventtheuseofcontrolledmaterialsinsuchactivities,noraresuch   negotiationslikelytoaffectthebehaviorofthesecountries.   Alternativemeanstocurtailtheacquisitionanddevelopmentofchemicalwarfarecapabilities,  t suchasdiplomaticnegotiations,donotobviatetheneedforcontrols.Examplesofadditional  ` meansthattheU.S.Governmenthasused,andwillcontinuetouse,inanattempttocurbtheuse L  andspreadofchemicalweaponsinclude: 8  ! '` XX! 6 "#(gxx$ ""3"  3c2g3  0 '   Sanctions:TheChemicalandBiologicalWeaponsControlandWarfareEliminationActof b  1991(Pub.L.102182,TitleIII,Dec.4,1991,105Stat.1245)providesfortheimposition N  ofsanctionsonforeignentitiesandcountriesforcertainkindsofchemicalandbiological :  weaponsrelatedactivity.TheU.S.Governmenthasimposedsanctionsunderthisauthority &  oncertainentitiesforchemicalweaponsrelatedactivities.3cc݌'(#'(# Ќ   7 "#(wxx6 "#"3"  3f2w3  0 '   Universalityofthe_CWC_:Asanothertoolforstemmingtheproliferationofchemical  weapons,the_CWC_Ԁimposesaglobalbanonthedevelopment,production,stockpiling,  retentionanduseofchemicalweapons.The_CWC_Ԁalsoprohibitsthedirectorindirect p transferofchemicalweapons,restrictstradeincertainchemicalstoStatesnotPartytothe \ _CWC_Ԁandhascreatedaninternationalorganizationtomonitorthedestructionofchemical H weaponsandtheproduction,use,andtradeoftoxicchemicalsandchemicalprecursorsin 4 andamongStatePartiestothe_CWC_.3ff݌r '(#'(# Ќ  % X'` Xb%Aspartofits_CWC_Ԁimplementationactivities,theDepartmentofCommercealsocollects J industryreportsregardingtheproduction,processing,consumption,importandexportoftoxic 6 chemicalsandchemicalprecursorsforpurposesnotprohibitedbythe_CWC_Ԁ(e.g.,industrial, "  agricultural,andotherpeacefulpurposes),whichareforwardedtotheOrganizationforthe ! ProhibitionofChemicalWeapons(_OPCW_).TheDepartmentofCommercealsoescorts ! inspectorsfromthe_OPCW_ԀastheyinspectcertainU.S.chemicalfacilitiestoverifythatactivities " areconsistentwiththeinformationprovidedintheindustryreportsandwithothertreaty #  provisions. $l!  F.ForeignAvailability  &D # PastreviewsconductedbytheDepartmentofCommercerevealedthatawiderangeofAG n("% chemicalprecursorsandproductionequipmentwasavailablefromnonAGcountries.NonAG Z)#& suppliersofprecursorsand/orrelatedproductionequipmentincludeBrazil,Chile,Colombia, F*#' India,Mexico,China(PRC),SouthAfrica,thecountriesoftheformerSovietUnion,Taiwan, 2+$( andThailand.However,mosthavebecomePartytothe_CWC_Ԁandwilltakestepsunderthis ,%) treatytopreventchemicalweaponsproliferation.Assuch,theU.S.Governmenthasmade R effortsthroughitsmembershipinboththeAGand_CWC_Ԁtosecurethecooperationofforeign > governmentstocontroltheforeignavailabilityofchemicalprecursorsandproductionequipment.  *   XXt   CHAPTER7 z( BiologicalAgentsandAssociatedEquipmentandTechnology  P (Sections742.2,744.4and744.6) v#  14      #XtXr#   d r ExportControlProgramDescriptionAndLicensingPolicy  P TheU.S.Governmentexercisesexportcontrolsovercertainmicroorganisms,toxins,biological z(  equipment,andrelatedtechnologytofurtherU.S.foreignpolicyinterestsinopposingthe f  proliferationanduseofbiologicalweapons.TheU.S.Governmentimplementstheseexport R  controlsmultilaterallyincoordinationwiththeAustraliaGroup(AG),aforumof33nations >  cooperatingtohalttheproliferationofchemicalandbiologicalweapons.TheU.S.Government *  alsosupportsinternationaleffortstoeffectatotalbanonbiologicalweaponsincompliancewith  theConventionontheProhibitionoftheDevelopment,ProductionandStockpilingof  Bacteriological(Biological)andToxinWeaponsandonTheirDestruction(_BWC_)._| v#  15      _   LicensingRequirementsandLicensingPolicy  t Thelicensingrequirementsforbiologicalagents,relatedequipment,andtechnology,asspecified L ontheCommerceControlList(CCL),areasfollows: 8  A.   TheU.S.Governmentrequiresalicensefortheexporttoalldestinationsofcertainhuman b pathogens,_zoonoses_,toxins,animalpathogens,geneticallymodifiedmicroorganismsandplant R pathogens,aswellasthetechnologyfortheirproductionand/ordisposal. > TheU.S.Governmentrequiresalicensefortheexporttospecifiedcountriesofcertaindualuse ! equipmentandmaterialsthatcanbeusedintheproductionofbiologicalagents,andrelated " productiontechnology.Thecountriesforwhichthislicensingrequirementappliesarethose " indicatedinColumnCB:3oftheCommerceCountryChart,SupplementNo.1toPart738ofthe # EAR,aswellastheembargoeddestinationsidentifiedinEARPart746. $t   %`! OnDecember1,2003,theDepartmentofCommerceissuedarevisiontotheruleissuedonJune R 10,2003(68FR34526),amendingtheExportAdministrationRegulations(EAR)toimplement > theunderstandingsreachedattheJune2002plenarymeetingoftheAustraliaGroup(AG).The * June10,2003,finalrulecontainederrorsintheListofItemsControlledforExportControl   ClassificationNumbers(_ECCNs_)2E001and2E002ontheCommerceControlList(CCL),as   wellasanerrorinthelicensingpolicyprovisionsoftheEARthatapplytoitemsidentifiedonthe   AGlists.TheDecember1revisioncorrectedthoseerrors.   TheU.S.GovernmentalsocontrolsitemssubjecttotheEARbecauseofbiologicalenduseor  ` enduserconcerns.ThesecontrolsarepartoftheEnhancedProliferationControlInitiative L  (_EPCI_),announcedbythePresidentonDecember13,1990. 8   $ "(Ixx7 "#! '` XX!"3"  3/2I3  0 '   TheU.S.Governmentrequiresalicensefortheexportofanycommodity,technology,or b  softwarewhentheexporterknowsthatitwillbeusedinthedesign,development, N  production,stockpiling,oruseofbiologicalweaponsin,orby,specificcountries(Country :  GroupD:3,EAR,Part740,SupplementNo.1_ v#  16      _).Inaddition,theU.S.Governmentmay &  informanexporteror_reexporter_Ԁthatalicenseisrequiredduetoanunacceptableriskthat  theitemswillbeusedin,ordivertedto,biologicalweaponsproliferationactivitiesanywhere  intheworld.3/\݌'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  32I3  0 '   NoU.S.personmayknowinglysupportsuchanexport,_reexport_,ortransferwithouta p license. Supportisdefinedasanyaction,includingfinancing,transportation,orfreight \ forwarding,thatfacilitatestheexport,_reexport_,ortransferoftheseitems.3B݌H'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3;2I3  0 '   Inaddition,noU.S.personmay,withoutalicense,performanycontract,service,or r  employmentknowingthatitwilldirectlyassistinthedesign,development,production, ^  stockpiling,oruseofbiologicalweaponsin,orby,acountrylistedinCountryGroupD:3.3;h݌J'(#'(# Ќ  % X'` X% B.   TheDepartmentofCommercewillreviewapplicationsforlicensesonacasebycase "  basistodeterminewhethertheexportwouldmakeamaterialcontributiontothedesign, ! development,production,stockpiling,oruseofbiologicalweapons.WhentheDepartmentof ! Commercedeterminesthatanexportwillmakesuchacontribution,theapplicationwillbe " denied. #   %\"   AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)ofTheAct  R ? A.ThePurposeoftheControl  * ThecontrolsdescribedaboveareintendedtopreventaU.S.contributiontotheproliferationand   illegaluseofbiologicalweapons,andtosupportmultilaterallycoordinatedcontrolefforts.The   controlsalsoprovidetheregulatoryauthoritytostoptheexportofanyitemfromtheUnited   Stateswhenthereisasignificantriskthatitwillbeusedforbiologicalweaponspurposes.The  t controlsimplementcertainmeasuresdirectedinExecutiveOrder12735ofNovember16,1990,  ` itssuccessor,ExecutiveOrder12938ofNovember14,1994,andtheEnhancedProliferation L  ControlInitiativeannouncedonDecember13,1990. 8  TheU.S.GovernmentimplementsthesecontrolsincoordinationwiththeAG.TheAGworksto b  accomplishthisobjectivethroughtheharmonizationofexportcontrols,theexchangeof N  information,andotherdiplomaticmeans.Inaddition,theseEARcontrolsdemonstratethe :  commitmentoftheUnitedStatestoitsobligationunderthe_BWC_Ԁnottodevelop,produce, &  stockpile,acquireorretainbiologicalagents,weapons,equipmentorthemeansofdeliveryfor  warfarepurposesortoassistothersinsuchactivities.Thecontrolsalsoadvancethegoalsofthe  1925GenevaProtocolfortheProhibitionoftheUseinWarofAsphyxiating,Poisonousorother  GasesandofBacteriologicalMethodsofWarfare(GenevaProtocol),prohibitingtheuseinwar  ofchemicalorbiologicalweapons. p  B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  H  1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. TheSecretaryhas r  determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose,inlight ^  ofotherfactors,includingtheU.S.GovernmentsnegotiationswithitspartnersintheAGandin J the_BWC_.TheSecretaryhasmadethisdeterminationdespitetheexistenceofcertainfactors, 6 includingavailabilityoftheseitemsfromothersources,thatchallengethatachievement.These "  controlsaffirmU.S.oppositiontothedevelopment,proliferation,anduseofbiologicalweapons ! andservetodistancetheUnitedStatesfromsuchactivities. !  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthese #  controlsarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesandwillnothaveanysignificant $l! adverseforeignpolicyconsequenceswiththeextensionofthesecontrols.TheU.S.Government %X" hasastronginterestinremainingattheforefrontofinternationaleffortstostemtheproliferation &D # ofbiologicalweapons.Also,thesecontrolsarecompatiblewiththemultilateralexportcontrols '0!$ forbiologicalmaterialsagreedtobytheAG. n("%  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadversereactionto F*#' thesecontrolsisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectivenorwillanyadversereactionby 2+$( othercountriesbecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests.TheU.S.Government ,%) continuestodiscussbiologicalexportcontrolswithcountriesoutsideoftheAGtoadvancethe R goalsof_nonproliferation_. >  4.  EconomicImpactonU.S.Industry. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadverse   effectofthesecontrolsontheeconomyoftheUnitedStates,includingonthecompetitive   positionoftheUnitedStatesintheinternationaleconomy,doesnotexceedthebenefittoUnited   Statesforeignpolicyobjectives.InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommerceapproved695license   applications,valuedat$41million,fortheexportor_reexport_Ԁofbiologicalagentsandequipment.  t ThevastmajorityoftheapprovalswerefortoxinsinExportControlClassificationNumber  ` (_ECCN_)1C351.Thisincludesa$32millionapprovedexportoftoxinstobeusedasraw L  materialsfortheproductionofmedicalproducts.TheDepartmentofCommercedeniedfour 8  licenseapplicationsforbiologicalagents/equipmentvaluedat$339,870,andreturnedwithout v$  action34licenseapplicationsvaluedat$168,144. b   5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedtheUnitedStateshas :  theabilitytoeffectivelyenforcethesecontrols.Enforcingcontrolsonbiologicalweapons &  materialsposesproblemssimilartotheenforcementofchemicalcontrols,butwithadditional  difficulties.Biologicalmaterialsaremicroscopicorganismsthatrequiretechnicalexpertiseand  specializedfacilitiestoidentifyandtohandlethem.Becauseoftheirsize,biologicalagentscan  oftenbeconcealedandtransportedwithease.  Tomeetthechallengeofeffectiveenforcementoftheseproliferationcontrols,theDepartmentof \ Commercehasredirectedresourcestowardpreventiveenforcement.Enforcementpersonnel H conductanextensive,ongoingoutreachprogramtoeducateindustryaboutexportcontrols.The 4 programalsoisdesignedtoincreaseindustrysawarenessofsuspectordersforproductsor r  equipmentthatcouldbeusedforbiologicalweaponsproliferation.Incaseswhere_unlicensed_ ^  shipmentsofbiologicalmaterialshavealreadytakenplace,theDepartmentofCommercehas J foundthat,asinotherexportcontrolenforcementcases,commercialshippingdocumentationcan 6 formthebasisforsuccessfulinvestigationsandprosecutions. "   C.ConsultationwithIndustry  ! Exportersofbiologicalproductsincludecommercialfirmsaswellasacademicandgovernment #  entities.TheDepartmentofCommercemaintainsongoinginteractionwithindividualexporters, $l! TechnicalAdvisoryCommittees(_TACs_),andtradeassociationstodiscussproposedexport %X" transactionsandmarketingplanstofacilitatethethorough,yetprompt,reviewofexportlicense &D # applications.Throughthe_TACs_,theDepartmentofCommercekeepsindustryrepresentatives '0!$ abreastoflicensingproposalsforitemsonthecontrollistandgivesthemtheopportunityto n("% providetechnicalinput.Duringthereportingperiod,theDepartmentofCommerce Z)#& representativesparticipatedinbriefingsonchemical/biologicalexportcontrolissuesfortrade F*#' associationssuchasthePharmaceuticalResearchandManufacturersofAmericaandthe 2+$( BiotechnologyIndustryOrganization. ,%) Їf  InanOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentofCommercesolicited R commentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols. > CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartments_TACs_,whichadvisetheBureauof * IndustryandSecurity(BIS),aswellasfromthePresidentsExportCouncilSubcommitteeon   ExportAdministration.CommentsalsoweresolicitedfromthepublicviatheBIS_webpage_.   ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember21,2003,andeightcommentswerereceived.   SandiaNationalLaboratoriesCooperativeMonitoringCenterprovidedasummaryofnewrules  t implementedbytheU.S.GovernmentsincetheattackofSeptember11,2001,relatingtothe  ` domesticlabtolabtransferofcertainmicrobiologicalagentsandtoxins.Sandianotesthatthere L  arenocomparablecontrolsfortheinternationaltransferoftheseagentsandrecommendsthat 8  theseagents,currentlycontrolledbyHealthandHumanServices(_HHS_)andtheU.S.Department v$  ofAgriculture(USDA),shouldbeaddedtotheCCL.Sandiaprovidedalistofthese_HHS_Ԅand b  USDAregulatedpathogens.Adetailedreviewofallcommentsreceivedcanbefoundin N  AppendixI. :   D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries   Recognizingthatmultilateralcoordinationofexportcontrolsandenforcementactionsisthemost  effectivemeansofrestrictingproliferationactivities,theU.S.Governmentcoordinatesits p controlsonbiologicalitemswithothercountriesintheAG.OnJune10,2003,theEAR \ provisionspertainingtobiologicalcontrolswererevisedtoaddeightnewtoxinstothelistof H AGcontrolledhumanand_zoonotic_ԀpathogensandtoxinsdescribedinExportControl 4 ClassificationNumber(_ECCN_)1C351.TheEARwasalsorevisedtoincludemedicalproducts r  (_ECCN_Ԁ1C991)containinganyoftheeighttoxinsnowsubjecttocontrol.Theserevisionstothe ^  EAR,proposedbytheUnitedStates,weremadebasedonactionstakenattheAGPlenary J meetingheldinJune2002.AdditionalactionstakenattheAGPlenarythatledtorevisionsin 6 theEARentriesonchemicalsandchemicalequipmentarereferencedinChapter6ofthisreport. "  TheU.S.Governmentcontinuestoaddresstheproblemofbiologicalweaponsproliferation ! throughavarietyofinternationalforaandurgesotherAGmemberstopursueexportcontrol " cooperationwithnonmembersonabilateralorregionalbasis. #   E.AlternativeMeans  %X" TheU.S.Governmentcontinuestoaddresstheproblemofbiologicalweaponsproliferationona '0!$ numberoffronts.Directnegotiationswithcountriesintentonacquiringbiologicalweaponsare n("% notlikelytopreventtheuseofU.S.originmaterialsforsuchactivities;neitheraresuch Z)#& negotiationslikelytoaffectthebehaviorofthesecountries. F*#'   2+$( Alternativemeanstocurtailtheacquisitionanddevelopmentofbiologicalwarfarecapabilities, R  suchasdiplomaticnegotiations,donotobviatetheneedforcontrols.Thefollowingexamples > demonstrateadditionalmeansthathavebeen,andwillcontinuetobe,usedinanattempttocurb * theuseandspreadofbiologicalweapons:     "(Dxx$ "! 'XX!"3"  3p2D3  0 '   RegulationsissuedbythePublicHealthService(42_CFR_ԀPart72)pursuanttothe The   AntiterrorismandEffectiveDeathPenaltyActof1996(Sec.511ofPub.L.104132,April   24,1996,110Stat.1214)placeadditionalshippingandhandlingrequirementsonlaboratory  t facilitiesthattransferorreceiveselectinfectiousagentscapableofcausingsubstantialharm  ` tohumanhealth.3p݌L '(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3!2D3  0 '   TheChemicalandBiologicalWeaponsControlandWarfareEliminationActof1991(Pub. v$  L.102182,TitleIII,December4,1991,105Stat.1245)providesfortheimpositionof b  sanctionsonforeignpersonsorcountriesforcertainkindsofchemicalandbiological N  weaponsrelatedactivity.Todate,nosanctionshavebeenimposedforbiologicalweapons :  relatedactivities.3!N݌& '(#'(# Ќ  % X'XO%ThenegotiationsandalternativemeansundertakenbytheU.S.Governmentdemonstratethat  reasonableeffortshavebeenmadetoachievethepurposesofthecontrolsbuttheseactionshave  nothadtheresultsthatareaseffectiveasthemaintenanceandrenewalofthecontrols.   F.ForeignAvailability  \ MostoftheAGcontrolledbiologicalagents,andrelatedequipmenttoproducethem,are 4 availablefrommanysources.(Biologicalagentsare,infact,endemic.)Notwithstandingthe r  difficultiesrelatedtotheeffectivecontroloftheseitems,theUnitedStatesanditsAGpartners ^  consideritnecessarytomaintaincontrolsinordertostemshipmentstopotential_proliferators_. J ForeignavailabilityisafactorconsideredbytheAGmembercountriesintheircoordinationof 6 controls.  "   XXt   CHAPTER8 z( MissileTechnologyf  g Controlsf  g   P (Sections742.5and744.3) #XtX#  d  ExportControlProgramDescriptionAndLicensingPolicy  P TheMissileTechnologyControlRegime(_MTCR_)wascreatedonApril16,1987,bytheUnited z(  States,Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,andtheUnitedKingdomtolimittheproliferation f  ofmissilescapableofdeliveringnuclearweapons.The_MTCR_Ԁwasexpandedin1993toinclude R  missiledeliverysystemsforalltypesofweaponsofmassdestruction(_WMD_)andnowhas33 >  membercountries.SeeAppendixIIforacompletelistof_MTCR_Ԁmembercountries.Therealso *  areseveralcountries,includingIsraelandRomania,thatunilaterallyadheretothe_MTCR_  Guidelines.  The_MTCR_ԀGuidelinesandtheEquipment,SoftwareandTechnologyAnnexformthebasisfor  U.S.missiletechnologycontrols.The_MTCR_ԀGuidelinesprovidelicensingpolicy,procedures, t reviewfactors,andstandardassurancesonmissiletechnologyexports.TheAnnexisthelistof ` missilerelatedf  g f  g itemsf  Ԁandisdividedintotwocategories.CategoryIitemsincludemissile L systemsandmajorsubsystems,productionfacilities,andproductionequipmentformissile 8 systemscapableofdeliveringa500kgpayloadtoatleasta300kmrange.CategoryIIitems v$ includematerials,components,andproductionandtestequipmentassociatedwithCategoryI b items,aswellasmissilesubsystems,productionfacilities,andproductionequipmentformissile N systemswitha300kmrange,regardlessofpayload. : TheDepartmentofCommerceisresponsibleforadministeringcontrolsonmanufacturing ! equipmentforCategoryIitems,andalldualuseitemsinCategoryII.Thereareapproximately ! 120entriesontheCommerceControlList(CCL)thataresubjecttomissiletechnologycontrols. " CategoryIitemshaveastrongpresumptionofdenial,andthetransferofproductionfacilitiesfor # CategoryIitemsisprohibited.TheDepartmentofCommercewillapprovetheexportof $p  CategoryIIitemsonlyafteracasebycasereview.TheUnitedStatesobservesthemultilateral %\! commitmenttohonorthedenialoflicensesbyothermembersandtosupportsuchdenials &H " througha noundercutpolicy.Thispolicyenhancesf  g Ԁeffortstopreventmissileproliferationand '4!# g g preventsf  g Ԁunfaircommercialadvantageamongregimemembers. r( "$ _MTCR_Ԁmembercountriesseektofosterthecooperationofnonmembercountriesinlimitingthe J*#& spreadofdeliverysystemsfor_WMD_Ԁandhavefocusedsucheffortsinan_MTCR_Ԅsponsored 6+$' seriesofworkshopsandseminars.Thiseffort!begunin1996!allows_MTCR_Ԁmembersand ",%( invitednonmemberstoexploredifferentapproachestoimproveexportcontrolsandprevent R missileproliferation. > f  g LicensingRequirementsandf  g Licensingf  g Policy    Insummary,thelicensingrequirementsandpolicyformissiletechnologycontrolsdescribedin   Parts742.5and744.3oftheExportAdministrationRegulations(EAR)areasfollows:    A.   TheU.S.Governmentrequiresalicensefortheexportor_reexport_Ԁtoalldestinations  ` (exceptCanada)ofthosedualuseitemsspecificallyidentifiedontheCCLascontrolledfor P  missiletechnologyreasons.Thisexclusionforf  g f  g Canadaiscurrentlyunderreview. <  OnSeptember22,2003,theEARwasrevisedtoreflectchangestothe_MTCR_ԀAnnexthatwere f  agreedtobymembercountriesattheSeptember2002PlenaryinWarsaw,Poland.The R  definitionsformissilerangeandpayload,whicharekeydeterminantsofthelevelofcontrol >  applicabletorocketandunmannedaerialvehiclesystems(andhadbeenthesubjectofseveral *  yearsofdebateinthe_MTCR_),wereaddedtothelistoftermsintheAnnex.Amendmentsto  certainentriesontheCCLtoclarifythescopeandjurisdictionofcontrolsonglobalnavigation  satellitereceivingequipmentwerealsopublishedandmadeeffectivebythisrule(68FR54655).  Additionally,theU.S.GovernmentcontrolsitemssubjecttotheEARduetomissilerelatedend t useorenduserconcerns.ThesecontrolsarepartoftheEnhancedProliferationControlInitiative ` (_EPCI_),announcedbythePresidentonDecember13,1990. L  $ "(Ixx "! '` XX!"3"  32I3  0 '   TheU.S.Governmentrequiresalicensefortheexportofanycommodity,technology,or v$ softwarewhentheexporterknowsthatitwillbeusedinthedesign,development, b production,stockpiling,oruseofmissilerelatedprojectsin,orby,specificcountries N (CountryGroupD:4,EAR,Part740,SupplementNo.1).Inaddition,theU.S.Government : mayinformanexporteror_reexporter_Ԁthatalicenseisrequiredduetoanunacceptablerisk &  thattheitemswillbeusedin,ordivertedto,missilerelatedproliferationactivitiesanywhere ! intheworld.3݌!'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3A2I3  0 '   NoU.S.personmayknowinglysupportsuchanexport,_reexport_,ortransferwithouta #  license. Supportisdefinedasanyaction,includingfinancing,transportation,orfreight $p! forwarding,thatfacilitatestheexport,_reexport_,ortransferoftheseitems.3An݌%\"'(#'(# Ќ  "3"  3g2I3  0 '   Inaddition,noU.S.personmay,withoutalicense,performanycontract,service,or '4!$ employmentknowingthatitwilldirectlyassistinthedesign,development,production, r( "% stockpiling,oruseofmissilesormissilerelatedprojectsin,orby,acountrylistedin ^) #& CountryGroupD:4.3g݌J*#''(#'(#   % X'` X% 6+$( g B.   TheDepartmentofCommercewillreviewapplicationsforlicensesonacasebycase R  basistodeterminewhethertheexportwouldmakeamaterialcontributiontotheproliferationof B missiles.WhentheDepartmentofCommercedeterminesthatanexportwillmakesucha . contribution,theapplicationwillbedenied.      AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)ofTheAct    l A.ThePurposeoftheControl   x Thesecontrolscurtailtheavailabilityofgoodsandtechnologyf  g andothersupportf  g thatcould P  contributetomissileproliferation.U.S.exportcontrolsonspecifictypesofmissilerelated <  equipmentandtechnology,incoordinationwithothersuppliercountries,limitstheproliferation z(  ofmissilesystemsandrelatedtechnology.ThesecontrolscomplementU.S.andinternational f  nuclear,chemical,andbiological_nonproliferation_Ԁeffortsbyblockingthedevelopmentof R  unmanneddeliverysystemsfor_WMD_.ThesecontrolslendclearU.S.supporttothecollective >  effortofthe_MTCR_Ԁtoaddressmountinginternationalconcernregardingmissileproliferation. *   B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce    1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. TheSecretaryhas  determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose,inlight t ofotherfactors,includingthelimitedforeignavailabilityoftheseMTcontrolleditemsfrom ` othercountriesandthattheforeignpolicypurposehasbeeninpartachievedthrough L negotiations.Althoughsomecontrolleditemsareavailablefromothercountries,cooperation 8 amongtheUnitedStates,its_MTCR_Ԁpartners,andotherlikemindedcountries,manyofwhichare v$ majorproducersoftheitemsundercontrol,hashinderedtheeffortsof_proliferators_Ԁtodevelopor b acquiremilitarilyeffectivemissiles.TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatextendingthesecontrols N islikelytolimitthespreadofmissiledeliverysystems. :  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthese ! controlsarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesandwillnothaveanysignificant ! adverseforeignpolicyconsequenceswiththeextensionofthesecontrols.Haltingthespreadof " missilesandrelatedequipmentandtechnologyworldwideisakeyU.S.nationalsecurityand #  _nonproliferation_Ԁobjective.Missiletechnologyexportcontrolsareconsistentwith,and $p! contributeto,achievingthisobjective.U.S.membershipinthe_MTCR_Ԁcomplementsexisting %\" nuclear,chemical,andbiological_nonproliferation_Ԁpoliciesbyf  g f  g curbingf  Ԁthespreadofmissile &H # technologyandequipmentforthedeliveryoff  _WMD_f  g . '4!$  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadversereactionto ^) #& thesecontrolsisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectivenorwillanyadversereactionby J*#' othercountriesbecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests.TheUnitedStatesis 6+$( confidentthatothermembersofandunilateraladherentstothe_MTCR_,manyofwhomarealso ",%) theleadingsuppliersoff  g f  g missilerelatedf  g Ԁtechnology,willcontinuetosupportandstrengthenthis R controlregime._MTCR_ԀpartnersshareinformationregardingdenialsofAnnexitemsandare > committedtof  g f  a noundercutpolicy._MTCR_Ԁpartnersalsoshareinformationaboutpotential * f  g activitiesoff  g proliferationconcerng ,andhavecooperatedtointerdictspecificshipmentsof   proliferationconcern.Thenumberof_MTCR_Ԁmembersandothercountrieswillingtocooperate   withtheregimehasincreasedoverthepastfewyears.Finally,theUnitedStatesandits_MTCR_   partnersareactivelyengagedinanoutreachprogramtoencourageadditionalcountriestoadhere   totheGuidelinesandimplementeffectiveexportcontrolson_MTCR_Ԁitems.  t  4.  EconomicImpactonU.S.Industry. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadverse L  effectofthesecontrolsontheU.S.economy,includingonthecompetitivepositionoftheUnited 8  Statesintheinternationaleconomy,doesnotexceedthebenefittoU.S.foreignpolicyobjectives. v$  OnlyanarrowlistofitemsaresubjecttomissilecontrolsandtheeffectonoverallU.S.exportsis b  limited.Thecommitmentby_MTCR_Ԁtoa noundercutpolicyhelpsensurethatnomember N  obtainsanunfaircommercialadvantageintheinternationalmarketplace. :  InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommerceapproved590applications,valuedat$955million,for  theexportor_reexport_Ԁoff  g missilerelateditemsf  .Ofthese,400applicationsvaluedat$850million  wereforexportsdestinedto_Wassenaar_Ԁmembercountries.Inaddition,theDepartmentof  Commercedenied10applicationsvaluedat$7.9million,andreturnedwithoutaction20  applicationsvaluedat$4million.Comparativelyfewlicensesformissiletechnologyitemsare p deniedduetothefollowingreasons:(1)exportersdonotgenerallypursuetransactionsthey \ understandwillberejected(basedong theapplicablelicensingpolicyf  g );and(2)mostofthe H transactionsaretocountriesthatdonotposemissileproliferationconcerns(e.g.,_MTCR_ 4 membernations). r   5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedtheUnitedStateshas J theabilitytoeffectivelyenforcethesecontrols.Multilateralcontrolsonmissiletechnology 6 provideastrongframeworkforcooperativeenforcementeffortsoverseas.However,thereare "  challengesfortheenforcementofcontrolsondualusegoodsrelatedtomissiledevelopment. ! First,itisdifficulttodetectf  g f  Ԁandf  g Ԁinvestigatecasesundertheg knowledgef  g Ԁstandardsetbythe ! _EPCI_Ԁ catchallprovision.Second,somecountriesdonotyethave catchalllawsorhave " differentstandardsfor catchall,whichcomplicateslawenforcementcooperation.Third, #  identifyingillegalexportsand_reexports_Ԁofmissilerelatedgoodsrequiressignificantresources. $l! Toenforcethesecontrolseffectively,theDepartmentofCommercecontinuestofocuson &D # preventiveenforcement,includinganoutreachprogramtoeducatecompaniesaboutexport '0!$ controlsandtoincreaseawarenessof redflagsthatmayindicateriskytransactions.This n("% programisanimportantcomponentoftheDepartmentofCommerceseffortstoprevent Z)#& companiesfromillegallyexportingdualuseproductsorequipmentthatcouldbeusedtomake F*#'  missiles.Recognizingtheimportanceofexportenforcement,the_MTCR_Ԁhelditsthird 2+$( EnforcementExpertsmeetingatthe_MTCR_ԀPlenaryinBuenosAires,Argentina,inSeptember R 2003. >  C.ConsultationwithIndustry    TheDepartmentofCommercenormallyholdsdiscussionswithindustryrepresentativesonissues   involvingthe_MTCR_ԀAnnexthroughtheTransportationTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee   (_TransTAC_),andotherrelevant_TACs_Ԁasappropriate.Further,theDepartmentofCommerce  t participatesininteragencyworkinggroupsthatreviewproposedchangestotheAnnexand  ` engagesindiscussionsoftheproposalswithcompaniesthathaverelevantexpertise. L  f  InanOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentofCommercesolicited v$  commentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols. b  CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartments_TACs_,whichadvisetheBureauof N  IndustryandSecurity(BIS),aswellasfromthePresidentsExportCouncilSubcommitteeon :  ExportAdministration.CommentsalsoweresolicitedfromthepublicviatheBIS_webpage_. &  ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember21,2003,andeightcommentswerereceived.   D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries   Consultationwithother_MTCR_ԀmembersisafundamentalelementofU.S.missiletechnology p controlpolicy.Consultationswithnon_MTCR_ԀcountriesalsoareessentialtoU.S.missile \ _nonproliferation_Ԁpolicy.TheU.S.Governmentsharesinformationaboutactivitiesofconcern H withothercountriesandseekstopreventorstopcertaintransactionsofmissileproliferation 4 concern.TheUnitedStatesalsosharesdenialinformationwithits_MTCR_Ԁpartners. r  Ascitedearlier,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedanamendmenttotheEARon J September22,2003,toimplementchangestothe_MTCR_ԀAnnexthatwereagreedtobythe 6 UnitedStatesandits_MTCR_ԀpartnersattheSeptember2002Plenarymeeting. "   E.AlternativeMeans  ! ThemissilesanctionprovisionsinSection73oftheArmsExportControlAct,andSection11B #  oftheExportAdministrationAct,providefortheimpositionofexport,import,andprocurement $l! sanctionsonforeignentitiesengagedincertainkindsofactivitiesrelatingtothetransferof %X" _MTCR_ԀAnnexitemstonon_MTCR_Ԁadherentcountries.Inthepast,theUnitedStateshas &D # imposedmissilesanctionsonentitiesinChina,Egypt,India,f  g f  g Iran,f  g Macedonia,Moldova,North '0!$ Korea,Pakistan,Russia,SouthAfrica,andSyria.Missilesanctionsareusedtoencouragethe n("% governmentsofthesanctionedentitiestoadoptresponsible_nonproliferation_Ԁbehaviorandtosend Z)#& aclearmessageabouttheUnitedStatesstrongcommitmenttomissile_nonproliferation_. F*#'   2+$( DiplomaticeffortsbytheUnitedStatesand_MTCR_Ԁpartnerstoencourageadditionalcountriesto R  adhereunilaterallytothe_MTCR_ԀGuidelinescontinue.Sucheffortsareaimedatencouraging > non_MTCR_Ԁmemberstoimplementandenforceeffectivemissilef  g technologyf  g exportcontrols. * TheUnitedStateshasanobligationtomaintainandrenewitsexportcontrolsbasedonits   membershipinthe_MTCR_Ԁyethaspursuedalternativemeanstoachievethepurposeofthe   controlsthroughitsconsultationswithnon_MTCR_Ԁcountries.    F.ForeignAvailability   t Possiblesuppliersofmissiletechnologythatarenot_MTCR_Ԁmembersinclude,butarenotlimited L  to,China(PRC),Egypt,India,Israel,andTaiwan.Someofthesecountries,suchasIsrael, 8  adhereunilaterallytothe_MTCR_ԀGuidelinesandapply_MTCR_Ԅtypecontrols.TheUnitedStates v$  continuestoapproachothernationsthatproduce_MTCR_ԀAnnexcontrolleditemstosecuretheir b  cooperationincontrollingtheforeignavailabilityoftheseitemsandurgingtheirvigilancein N  applying_MTCR_ԀGuidelinestohelppreventmissileproliferation.TheU.S.Governmenthas :  imposedsanctionsonentitiesinanumberofcountrieswhenthoseentitieshavenotalteredtheir &  proliferationbehavior.    XXt4_  CHAPTER9 z( HighPerformanceComputers  P (Section742.12)#XtXP #  d      ExportControlProgramDescriptionAndLicensingPolicy  P G!  f  g f  TheUnitedStatesmaintainscf  g ontrolsonhighperformancecomputers(_HPCs_)f  f  g f  inrecognitionof z(  thestrategicandproliferationsignificanceof_HPCs_,includingsoftwareandtechnology.Such f  controlsareadjustedfromtimetotimetof  g Ԁreflectadvancesincomputertechnologyand R  expandingworldwideavailability.TheExportAdministrationRegulations(EAR)setforth >  specialprovisionsforexportsand_reexports_Ԁof_HPCs_Ԁandrelatedsoftwareandtechnology *  controlledfor _XP_reasons. _XP_controlssupplementrequirementsthatapplybasedonother  controlreasons. _XP_controlsapplyunlessaLicenseExceptionisavailable,andvaryaccording  todestination,enduser,andenduse.  Alicenseisrequiredfor _XP_reasonsforexportsand_reexports_Ԁofcomputers,including t electronicassembliesandspeciallydesignedcomponents,thathaveacompositetheoretical ` performance(_CTP_)greaterthan190,000milliontheoreticaloperationspersecond(_MTOPS_)f  f  g Ԁto L  TierIIIcountries.Thef  g ԀTierIIIf  countriesaresetforthinsection740.7(d)oftheEAR.Alicense 8 isalsorequiredfor _XP_reasonsforexportsand_reexports_Ԁofcomputershavinga_CTP_Ԁgreater v$ than28,000_MTOPs_Ԁto TierIVcountries.TheTierIVcountriesareCuba,Iran,Iraq,Libya, b NorthKorea,Sudan,andSyria.(SeeChapters4and5ofthisreportforadditionalforeign N controlsthatapplytoexportsofcomputerstoTierIVcountries.) : OnJanuary14,2003,theDepartmentofCommerceamendedtheEARtoimplementrevisions ! thatwereagreeduponintheFebruary2002meetingofthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementonExport ! ControlsforConventionalArmsandDualUseGoodsandTechnologies(_Wassenaar_ " Arrangement).Thisruleremovedlicenserequirementsforexportsand_reexports_Ԁofgeneral # purposemicroprocessorstomostdestinationstoconformwithchangesintheListofDualUse $p  GoodsandTechnologiesmaintainedandagreedtobygovernmentsparticipatinginthe %\! _Wassenaar_ԀArrangement.Thisruleretainedlicenserequirementsforexportsand_reexports_Ԁto &H " designatedterroristsupportingcountries.Inaddition,thisruleestablishedanewlicense '4!# requirementfortheexportor_reexport_Ԁofgeneralpurposemicroprocessorsif,atthetimeofthe r( "$ exportor_reexport_,theexporteror_reexporter_Ԁknows,hasreasontoknow,orisinformedbythe ^) #% BureauofIndustryandSecurity(BIS)thattheitemwillbeorisintendedtobeusedforamilitary J*#& enduseinacountrythatisofconcernfornationalsecurityreasonsorbyamilitaryenduserin 6+$' suchacountry. ",%( Ї@7 7 f  g AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)ofTheActf  g f  g Ԉ R f  g f  g A.ThePurposeoftheControl  * f  g f  Recognizingthestrategicandproliferationsignificanceof_HPCs_,thepurposeof _XP_f  g Ԁcontrolsis   topreventthetransferordiversionoff  g f  _HPCs_f  g Ԁtoendusersthatmayf  g Ԁusethecomputersinan   unauthorizedmanner,detrimentaltoU.S.foreignpolicyandnationalsecurityinterests.    B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce   `  1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose .TheSecretaryhas 8  determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose,inlight v$  ofotherfactors,includingtheavailabilityfromothercountriesandthattheforeignpolicy b  purposehasbeenpartiallyachievedthroughnegotiationsonexportcontrolswiththe N  participatingstatesofthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangement.Thewidespreadavailabilityofthe :  components,technicalknowhowneededtobuild_HPCs_,andthespeedwithwhichthe &  technologyoftheseitemsimproves,arechallengestoachievingthecontrolsobjectives.U.S.  controlsfor_HPCs_Ԁaredesignedtopermitthegovernmenttocalibratecontrollevelsandlicensing  conditionsdependingonthenationalsecurityorproliferationriskposedbyaspecificdestination,  enhanceU.S.nationalsecurity,andpreservethetechnologicalleadofU.S.industrybyensuring  thatcontrolsoncomputersareeffectiveanddonotunnecessarilyimpedelegitimatecomputer p exports. \  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthese 4 controlsarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesandwillnothaveanysignificant r  adverseforeignpolicyconsequenceswiththeextensionofthesecontrols.Thecontrolsare ^  consistentwiththeU.S.foreignpolicygoalsofpreventingU.S.exportsthatmightcontributeto J destabilizingmilitarycapabilitiesandpreventingtheproliferationofweaponsofmass 6 destruction(_WMD_)andmissiles.Since_HPCs_Ԁcanbeusedf  g inf  g f  g f  developmentoff  g Ԁsuchweapons, "  U.S.exportcontrols,inconcertwiththoseofourallies,f  f  g f  permitdenialoff  g f  g Ԁ_HPCs_Ԁtopotential ! _proliferators_.ExtensiveU.S.participationinvariousmultilateralcontrolgroups,specificallythe ! _Wassenaar_ԀArrangement,demonstratestheU.S.commitmentinthisregard. "  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadversereactionto $l! thesecontrolsisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectivenorwillanyadversereactionby %X" othercountriesbecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests.Sincemanyofthe &D # countriesthathavethecapacitytoproduce_HPCs_ԀshareU.S.oppositiontotheproliferationof '0!$ _WMD_,thereisahighdegreeofcooperationbetweentheUnitedStatesanditspartnersin n("% multilateralexportcontrolregimes. Z)#&  4.  EconomicImpactonU.S.Industry. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadverse 2+$( effectofthesecontrolsontheU.S.economy,includingonthecompetitivepositionoftheUnited ,%) Statesintheinternationaleconomy,doesnotexceedthebenefittoU.S.foreignpolicyobjectives. R Revisionsto_HPC_ԀcontrolthresholdsenableU.S.industrytoremaincompetitiveintheworld > marketandensurethatU.S.nationalsecurityinterestsaremaintainedbykeepingsensitive * computersunderexportcontrols.Thef  g f  current_CTP_Ԁlevelof190,000_MTOPS_Ԁf  g reflectsf  g Ԁadvancesin   computertechnology,massmarketconditions,andincreasedforeignavailability.   InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommercedidnotapproveanylicensesforexportofcomputers   f  g listedunderf  g ԀExportControlClassificationNumber(_ECCN_)4A003.Sevencases,valuedat  t $397,680,werereturnedwithoutaction!mainlybecausealicensewasnotrequired.Therewere  ` nodenialsforexportsof_HPCs_ԀinFY2003. L   5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedtheU.S.Government v$  hastheabilitytoeffectivelyenforcethesecontrols.Aslongas_HPC_Ԁcontrolsareimposedonthe b  mostadvancedmodels,whicharegenerallymanufacturedbyafewcompaniesandnotinlarge N  supply,therearenoparticularenforcementconcerns.However,iftechnologyoutpacesthe :  controllevels,itmaybecomedifficulttoenforcecontrolsonlowerlevelitemsthatare &  manufacturedforthemassmarket.   C.ConsultationwithIndustry   TheDepartmentofCommerce,throughitsInformationSystemsTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee p (_ISTAC_)andcomputerrelatedindustryassociations,holdsongoingdiscussionswiththeprivate \ sectoron_HPC_Ԁcontrols.Industryhasrepeatedlyurgedthatimprovementsinperformanceandthe H widespreadabilitytoclusteruncontrolled,lowlevelcomputerstoachievehighperformance 4 computingbetakenintoaccountinadjustingexportcontrolpolicy.TheU.S.Governmenttakes r  thesefactorsintoaccountwhenreviewingcomputercontrols. ^  f  InanOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentofCommercesolicited 6 commentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols. "  CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartments_TACs_,whichadviseBIS,aswellas ! fromthePresidentsExportCouncilSubcommitteeonExportAdministration.Commentsalso ! weresolicitedfromthepublicviatheBIS_webpage_.ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember " 21,2003,andeightcommentswerereceived. #  SunMicrosystemssubmittedcomments,someofwhichpertaintohighperformancecomputer %X" controls.Sunrecommendedthatthe scopeofTierIIIcontrolsshouldbenarrowedsubstantially &D # inordertorecognizetherealitiesofthenetworkedworldandtodiscontinuethedangerousand '0!$ counterproductivepretensionthatcontrollingcommercialcomputingpowerwillbeeitherviable n("% oreffectiveinthecomingyears.SunfurthercommentedthatTierIIIcountriesshouldbethose Z)#&  identifiedintheCIAssemiannual_WMD_ԀreporttoCongressunderSection721ofthe F*#' IntelligenceAuthorizationActforFY1997ratherthantheextensivelistofcountriescurrently 2+$( includedinComputerTierIII.SunisconcernedabouttheproposedregulationpublishedbyBIS ,%) intheFederalRegisteronOctober24,2003,toimposeacapof150,000_MTOPS_Ԁontransfersto R countriesandnationalsoutsidetheformerComputerTierIgroupandacapof75,000_MTOPS_Ԁon > ComputerTierIII,asSuncontendsthatsuchactionwouldbasicallyreinstatetheformerTierII * typecontrolsontechnology.SunfeelstheU.S.Governmentshouldshiftitsfocusfrom   performancemetricstoacceleratingtheadvantagetheU.S.militaryalreadyhasinexploiting   thesetechnologies.   Whilenoneofitscommentsspecificallyaddressedhighperformancecomputercontrols,the  t IndustryCoalitiononTechnologyTransfer(_ICOTT_)providedgeneralcommentsaboutall  ` foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols,statingthatthesecontrolsareunilateralandlargely L  ineffective._ICOTT_Ԁrecommendedthatunilateralcontrolsshouldonlybeusedwhenthe 8  symbolismoftheactofimposingcontrolsoutweighstheinjurytoAmericanworkersand v$  businesses.Inaddition,_ICOTT_Ԁsuggestedthatifunilateralcontrolsaretobeimposedwhilethe b  UnitedStatesnegotiateswithitstradingpartnerstoseekmultilateralsupport,thoseunilateral N  controlsshouldbeoflimitedduration.Adetailedreviewofallcommentsreceivedcanbefound :  inAppendixI.g  &   D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries   TheUnitedStatesactivelyconsultswithallies,its_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementpartners,andother  potentialsuppliernationstoensurethattheyunderstandthebasisforU.S.controls.TheUnited p StatesisworkingparticularlycloselywithJapaninthisregard. \  E.AlternativeMeans  4 TheUnitedStateswillcontinuetousediplomaticeffortstodiscourageothernationsfrom ^  acquiring_HPCs_Ԁforf  g useinf  g the_WMD_ԀdevelopmentandotherusesthatthreatenU.S.interests. J TheUnitedStatesalsoworkscloselywithothersuppliercountries,mostofwhomaremembers 6 ofthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangement,toincreasetheeffectivenessofmultilateralcontrols.However, "  theseeffortscanonlysupplement,notreplace,theeffectivenessofactualexportcontrols. !  F.ForeignAvailability  " Thekeytoeffective_HPC_Ԁexportcontrolsistosetcontrollevelsjustabovethelevelofcomputer $l! capabilitythatenduserswithsecurityandproliferationriskscanobtainfromnonU.S.sources %X" duetowidespreadavailability.Theabilityoftheseenduserstoachievehighperformance &D # computingcapabilitybyclusteringtogetherlowerlevelcomponentsisafactorindeterminingthe '0!$ appropriatecontrollevel._HPC_Ԁcontrollevelsareintendedtomaintainrealisticexportcontrol n("% levelsinthisdynamicmarket.Accordingtoprivatesectorforecasts,multiprocessorsystems Z)#& maysoonbeavailableonaworldwidebasisfromforeignmanufacturers,including F*#' configurationsthatexceedcurrentU.S.computercontrolthresholds.f  g Inaddition,theabilityto 2+$( clustercomputerstogetherusingofftheshelfcomponentstoachievehighperformance ,%) computingpowerhasbecomewidespread.g ԀTheU.S.Governmentsongoingconsultationswith R its_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementpartnersreflecttheU.S.Governmentseffortstoobtaininternational > cooperationincontrollingforeignavailability,asevidencedbytheJanuary14,2003,publication * ofanamendmenttotheEAR.     XXt  CHAPTER10 z(  Encryption  N (Section742.15)#XtXSf#   b f ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  N Encryptionitemscanbeusedtomaintainthesecrecyofinformation,andtherebymaybeusedby x&  personsabroadtoharmU.S.nationalsecurity,foreignpolicy,andlawenforcementinterests. d  TheU.S.Governmenthasacriticalinterestinensuringthatimportantandsensitiveinformation P  ofthepublicandprivatesectorisprotected. <  SincethetransferofdualuseencryptionitemsfromtheUnitedStatesMunitionsListtothe  CommerceControlList(CCL)onDecember6,1996,exportcontrolsonencryptionhave  evolved,consistentwithelectroniccommerce,nationalsecurity,andlawenforcementconcerns.  TheU.S.Governmentsencryptionpolicyrestsonthreeprinciples:(1)areviewofencryption  productsinadvanceofsale;(2)astreamlinedexportreportingsystem;and(3)alicenseprocess r thatpreservestheU.S.Governmentsabilitytoreviewthesaleofstrongencryptionproductsto ^ foreigngovernments,militaryorganizations,andnationsofconcern. J TheDepartmentofCommercepublishedaruleintheFederalRegisteronJune17,2003,to t" updatetheexistingU.S.exportcontrolsondualuseencryptionitemssubjecttotheExport ` AdministrationRegulations(EAR).Thepurposeoftherulewastwofold:(1)toimplementthe L December2002changestothe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangements ListofDualuseGoodsand 8 Technologies;and(2)tofurtherclarifyU.S.encryptionexportpolicyandensurethatitis $  consistentwiththewidespreaduseofencryptionproductsbyindividuals,businesses,and ! governments. ! TheJune17,2003,ruleclarifiedthreepoints:(1)whenencryptioncommoditiesandsoftware # maybegivende_minimis_treatment;(2)whenshortrangewirelessdevicesincorporating $n  encryptionmaybegiven massmarketorretailtreatment;and(3)thatspeciallydesigned %Z! medicalequipmentandsoftwarearenotcontrolledasencryptionor informationsecurityitems &F " undertheEAR.Therulealsoexpandedtheauthorizationsaccordingtowhichtravelersdeparting '2!# theUnitedStatesmaytakeencryptionfortheirpersonaluse,andprovidedadditionalguidanceon p("$ whenexportersarerequiredtosubmitencryptionreviewrequestsfornewproductsthatwillbe \) #% soldorotherwiseexportedforotherthan personaluseoverseas.Finally,theruleimplemented H*#&  changestothe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangements ListofDualuseGoodsandTechnologies,finalized 4+$' inDecember2002,thateliminatenationalsecuritybasedcontrolsoncertaintypesof R  personalizedsmartcardsandequipmentcontrollingaccesstocopyrightprotecteddata. >  TheU.S.GovernmentsupdatedencryptionpolicycontinuestoallowAmericanstousestrong   encryptionproductstoprotecttheirprivacy,intellectualproperty,andothervaluableinformation   athomeandabroad.However,theJune17,2003,ruledidnotchangethelicenserequirementsor   longstandinglicensingpoliciesonencryptionexportstodesignatedstatesponsorsofterrorismor   sanctionedpersons.  t   AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct L    A.ThePurposeoftheControl  v$  EncryptionexportcontrolsprotectU.S.nationalsecurity,foreignpolicy,andlawenforcement N  interests.Encryptionproductscan,forexample,beusedtoconcealthecommunicationsof :  terrorists,drugsmugglers,andothersintentonharmingU.S.interests.Cryptographicproducts &  andsoftwarealsohavemilitaryandintelligenceapplicationsthat,inthehandsofhostilenations,  couldposeathreattoU.S.nationalsecurity.ThesecontrolsareconsistentwithExecutiveOrder  (E.O.)13026issuedonNovember15,1996,andthePresidentialMemorandumofthesamedate.   B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  p  1.  LikelihoodofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose .TheSecretaryhas H determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose,inlight 4 ofotherfactors,includingtheavailabilityofencryptionitemsfromothercountriesandthatthe r  foreignpolicypurposecannotbeachievedthroughnegotiationsorotheralternativemeans. ^  CommensuratewiththegrowthofelectroniccommerceandtheInternet,thenumberofcountries J withthetechnologytoproducehighlysophisticated,dualuseencryptionproductscontinuesto 6 grow.However,sincemuchoftheworldscommercialcryptographyissuppliedbyacoregroup "  ofinformationtechnology(IT)industryleadersusingstandardalgorithmsandprotocols, ! encryptionexportcontrolscanbeeffectiveinachievingtheirintendedforeignpolicypurpose. ! ConsistentwithE.O.13026ofNovember15,1996,andthePresidentialMemorandumofthe " samedate,theSecretaryhasdeterminedthattheupdatedU.S.encryptionexportcontrolsachieve #  theintendedpurposeofimplementingtechnicalreviewproceduresforcommercialencryption $l! itemsandrestrictingtheexportofencryptionitemsinsituationsthatwouldbecontrarytoU.S. %X" nationalsecurityorforeignpolicyinterests. &D #  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthese n("% controlsarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesandwillnothaveanysignificant Z)#& adverseforeignpolicyconsequenceswiththeextensionofthesecontrols.Thecontrolsare F*#' consistentwiththeU.S.foreignpolicygoalofpreventingU.S.exports(andsubsequent 2+$( _reexports_)thatmightcontributetodestabilizingmilitarycapabilitiesortointernationalterrorists ,%) orcriminalsaimedattheUnitedStates.UpdatedU.S.encryptionexportcontrolsimplement R multilateralagreementsandprotectU.S.citizensoverseas,aswellascriticalinfrastructureassets > athome. *  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthecontinued   implementationofU.S.encryptionexportcontrolsisgenerallyacceptedintheworldwide   community,andthatanyadversereactiontothesecontrolsisnotlikelytorenderthecontrols   ineffective,noraretheycounterproductivetotheforeignpolicyinterestsoftheUnitedStates.  t Otheralliedcountries,particularlythosecapableofproducinghighlysophisticatedencryption  ` products,recognizetheneedtocontrolexportsofsuchproductsfornationalsecurityandlaw L  enforcementreasons.TheU.S.Governmentanditskeytradingandsecuritypartnersrecognize 8  thedesirabilityofsecuringcriticalinfrastructures,developingnewtechnologiesandstandards, v$  preventing_cybercrime_,andpromotingelectroniccommerce,whilerestrictinggoodsthatcould b  compromisecommonsecurityandforeignpolicyinterests.Asaresult,membersofthe N  _Wassenaar_ԀArrangementandotherinternationalfora,suchastheEuropeanUnion,continueto :  workwiththeU.S.GovernmentonencryptionexportcontrolsandgenerallyshareU.S.security &  concernsandeconomicinterestsrelativetotradeinencryption.   4.  EconomicImpactonU.S.Industry. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadverse  effectofthesecontrolsontheU.S.economy,includingonthecompetitivepositionoftheUnited  Statesintheinternationaleconomy,doesnotexceedthebenefittoU.S.foreignpolicyobjectives. p TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthecontinuedimplementationofupdatedencryption \ regulationswillallowU.S.industrytomaintainitsleadershippositionintheglobalmarketfor H encryptionandotherITproducts,whileensuringthatessentialprotectionsforU.S.national 4 securityandforeignpolicyinterests,aswellasthepublicsafety,areupheld. r  ThroughoutFY2003,theBureauofIndustryandSecurity(BIS)processedasubstantialnumber J ofpreexportencryptionreviewrequestsforavarietyofproductswithencryptionfeatures. 6 Specifically,BISprocessedreviewrequestsconcerningcommoditiesandsoftwarefordesktop "  andlaptopcomputers,wirelesshandhelddevices,ebusinessapplications,networksecurity,and ! telecommunicationsplatforms.Exceptforhighendnetworkingproducts,sourcecodeitems,and ! productsforwhichthecryptographyhasbeencustomizedortailoredtocustomerspecification, " commercialencryptionproductsmaybeexportedand_reexported_Ԁtoanydestinationoutside #  CountryGroupE:1afteraonetimetechnicalreviewhasbeenconductedpursuanttoeitherthe $l! LicenseException_ENC_Ԁ(15_C.F.R._Ԁ740.17)orthe massmarketencryption(15_C.F.R._Ԁ %X" 742.15(b)(2))provisionsoftheEAR. &D # InFY2003,BISreceivedover1,400technicalreviewrequestsfor2,400controlledencryption n("% products,components,toolkits,andsourcecodeitems.Theseencryptionreviewscomprised34 Z)#& percentofBISstotaloutputofcommodityclassificationsinFY2003.Ofthe1,759encryption F*#'  productsreviewedduringthefiscalyear,82percent(or1,444encryptionreviews)wereclassified 2+$( as retail(964)or massmarket(480)encryptionitems,makingthemeligibleforexportand R _reexport_Ԁwithoutalicensetogovernmentandnongovernmentendusersinmostcountries. >  Additionally,duringFY2003BISapproved373licenseapplicationsfor nonretailencryption   items(suchashighendroutersandothernetworkinfrastructureequipment)andtechnology   (excludingsocalled deemedexportsthatareeligibleunderLicenseException_ENC_Ԁtomost   foreignnationalemployees).These373licenses,valuedat$71.1million,weredestinedtonon   sanctionedendusersoutsideCountryGroupE:1forwhichlicenseswererequired.  t ForotherencryptionlicenseapplicationscompletedundertheEARinFY2003,theDepartment L  ofCommercerejectedtwoapplicationsforencryptioncommodities(classifiedunder_ECCN_ 8  5A002)valuedat$173,352andreturnedwithoutaction(_RWA_)89applicationsforencryption v$  items(classifiedunder_ECCN_Ԁ5A002,5D002and5E002)valuedat$19.8million.Manyofthe b  latterapplicationsdidnotrequirealicense,asthetransactionwasauthorizedunderLicense N  Exception_ENC_. :   5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedtheUnitedStateshas  theabilitytoeffectivelyenforcethesecontrols.Detectionofsomeencryptiontransactionsis  difficultsinceencryptioncomponentsareoftenincorporatedintootherproductsandencryption  softwarecanbetransferredovertheInternet.However,theimportanceandvalueascribedto  commercialencryptionproductsdoesleadtotraceabletransfersanddistributions.Overthe p courseofimplementingU.S.encryptionexportcontrolsundertheEAR,theDepartmentof \ Commercehasdeterminedthatitiseasiertoenforcecontrolsonproprietaryencryption H technologyandcommercialencryptioncommoditiesandsoftwarethanitwouldbetorestrictfree 4 distributionsof opensourceencryptionsoftwareunderalicenserequirement. r  GXtXXXt    G  C.ConsultationwithIndustryG  92Ԍ J ЌXtXXXt  TheU.S.GovernmentcontinuallyconsultswithU.S.industryregardingencryptionpolicy.The "  objectiveoftheseconsultationsistodevelopupdatedpolicysolutionstoassistlawenforcement, ! protectU.S.nationalsecurity,ensurecontinuedU.S.technologicalleadership,andpromotethe ! privacyandsecurityofU.S.firmsandcitizensengagedinelectroniccommerceinanincreasingly " networkedworld.Suchconsultationshaveprovensuccessful,asevidencedbytheincreasing #  numberofencryptionitemssubmittedfortechnicalreview,constructiveindustryinputon $l! mattersofregulationsandpolicy,andcontinuedindustrycommitmenttoassistlawenforcement %X" tobetterunderstandcurrentandfutureencryptiontechnologies. &D # InreviewingandexaminingU.S.encryptionpolicyduringFY2003,theDepartmentof n("% CommerceworkedcloselywiththeBISTechnicalAdvisoryCommittees(_TACs_),suchasthe Z)#& RegulationsandProceduresTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee(_RPTAC_)andtheInformation F*#' SystemsTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee(_ISTAC_),andindustrygroupssuchastheAlliancefor 2+$( NetworkSecurity(ANS)andtheexportingcommunity.Leadinguptothepublicationofupdated ,%) encryptionregulationsonJune17,2003,U.S.industryprovidedvaluableinputonitsbusiness R modelsandpracticesformakingencryptionclassificationdecisions,creating massmarket > products,andseekingde_minimis_determinations. * f  InanOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentofCommercesolicited   commentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols.   CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartments_TACs_ԀwhichadviseBIS,aswellas   fromthePresidentsExportCouncilSubcommitteeonExportAdministration.Commentswere  t alsosolicitedfromthepublicviatheBIS_webpage_.ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember  ` 21,2003,andeightcommentswerereceived. L  Whilenoneofitscommentsspecificallyaddressedencryptioncontrols,theIndustryCoalitionon v$  TechnologyTransfer(_ICOTT_)providedgeneralcommentsaboutallforeignpolicybasedexport b  controls,statingthatthesecontrolsareunilateralandlargelyineffective._ICOTT_Ԁrecommended N  thatunilateralcontrolsshouldonlybeusedwhenthesymbolismoftheactofimposingcontrols :  outweighstheinjurytoAmericanworkersandbusinesses.Inaddition,_ICOTT_Ԁsuggestedthatif &  unilateralcontrolsaretobeimposedwhiletheUnitedStatesnegotiateswithitstradingpartners  toseekmultilateralsupport,thoseunilateralcontrolsshouldbeoflimitedduration.Adetailed  reviewofallcommentsreceivedcanbefoundinAppendixI.  GXtXXXt    G  D.ConsultationwithOtherCountriesG 92ԬԌ p ЌXtXXXt  TheU.S.Governmenthastakentheleadinglobaleffortstopreventinternationalcriminals, H terrorists,anddesignatedstatesponsorsofterrorismfromacquiringsophisticatedencryption 4 products,andurgedothersuppliernationstoadoptexportcontrolscomparabletothoseofthe r  UnitedStates.Asaresult,themajorindustrialpartnersoftheU.S.Governmentmaintainexport ^  controlsonencryptionequipmentandtechnology.U.S.encryptionpolicyreflectsactive J consultationwithothernations,suchasmembersofthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementandthe 6 EuropeanUnion.Inthismanner,theU.S.Governmentandtheotherparticipantsinthe "  _Wassenaar_ԀArrangementhaveestablishedmultilateralcontrolsfordualuseencryptionitems. ! InDecember1998,_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementmembersagreedtomoveencryptionitemsfromthe " SensitiveListtotheBasicListofdualusegoodsandtechnologies.Inaddition,aCryptography #  NotereplacedtheGeneralSoftwareNote(_GSN_)asthebasisforevaluating massmarket $l! encryptionitemscoveredbythe_Wassenaar_Ԁcontrollist.InDecember2000,_Wassenaar_Ԁmember %X" countriesagreedtoremovethe64bitkeylengthrestrictionfromtheCryptographyNote. &D # Accordingly,all massmarketencryptionproducts,regardlessofkeylength,aredecontrolled '0!$ underthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementandlicensingrequirementsforotherencryptionitemshave n("% beeneased.InDecember2002(andsubsequentlyimplementedbytheUnitedStatesintheJune Z)#& 17,2003,encryptionrule),certainlimitedtypesof personalizedsmartcardsand copy F*#' protectionitemswereremovedfromnationalsecuritybasedcontrolsunderthe_Wassenaar_ 2+$( Arrangementcontrollist. ,%) ЇGXtXXXt    G  E.AlternativeMeansG  92Ԍ R ЌXtXXXt  TheU.S.Governmenthasundertakenarangeofdiplomaticefforts,bothbilateral(withthe * GovernmentofIsrael,forexample)andmultilateral(inthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangement),to   encourageothernationstoadoptappropriaterestrictionsontheexportofencryptionproducts.   Throughcooperationwithlawenforcementofficialsinfriendlycountries,theU.S.Government   alsohassoughttokeepencryptionproductsoutofthehandsofterroristsandcriminals.These   alternativeeffortscanonlysupplement,butnotreplace,theeffectivenessofactualexport  t controls.  `  F.ForeignAvailability  8  TheUnitedStatesrecognizestheongoingadoptionandwidespreaduseofencryptionoverseas, b  andthecontinueddevelopmentofforeignmadeencryptionhardwareandsoftware.TheU.S. N  GovernmentcontinuestomonitorglobalITmarketplaceandencryptionpolicydevelopments,so :  thatupdatedU.S.regulationswillenableAmericancompaniestomaintaintechnological &  leadershipinamannerthatsafeguardsU.S.nationalsecurityandpublicsafetyinterests.The  U.S.Governmentdoesconsultwithothergovernmentstosecurecooperationincontrollingthe  foreignavailabilityofencryptionitems.However,theU.S.Governmentsforeignpolicy  concernsoverridetheimpactofforeignavailability.    XXt   CHAPTER11 z( SignificantItems;HotSectionTechnology  P (Section742.14) #XtX##  d W ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  P CertaintechnologytransferredfromtheUnitedStatesMunitionsListtotheCommerceControl z(  List(CCL)issubjectto enhancedcontrol.ThistechnologyisdesignatedontheCCLbythe f  acronym SI,whichstandsfor SignificantItems.ThetechnologycontrolledforSIreasonsis R   hotsectiontechnologyforthedevelopment,production,oroverhaulofcommercialaircraft >  engines,componentsandsystems.Itemscontrolledfor significantitemsreasonsareincluded *  inExportControlClassificationNumber(_ECCN_)9E003ontheCCL.  Thelicensingpolicyfor hotsectiontechnologyisasfollows:  ! '` XX! 6 "(gxx$ ""3"  3W2g3  0 '   TheUnitedStatesrequiresalicenseforexportsand_reexports_Ԁtoalldestinations,except t Canada,for hotsectiontechnology,whichisalsocontrolledfornationalsecurityreasons.3W݌`'(#'(# Ќ   5(8x6 "! !0 ' TheU.S.Governmentreviewsalllicenseapplicationsforf  g hotsectiontechnologyona 8 casebycasebasistodeterminewhetherf  g f  theproposedf  g Ԁexportor_reexport_Ԁisconsistentwith v$ U.S.nationalsecurityandforeignpolicyinterests.b'(#'(# % X'` X%  AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct  : u A.ThePurposeoftheControl  ! ThiscontrolprovidesamechanismfortheUnitedStatestomonitortheexportofthistechnology " topreventitsuseing f  g amannerf  g ԀthatwouldadverselyeffectU.S._nonproliferation_Ԁgoalsorthe # militarybalancewithinaregion. $p   B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  &H "  1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. TheSecretaryhas r( "$ determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose,inlight b)#% ofotherfactors,includingforeignavailabilityfromothercountriesandthattheforeignpolicy N*#& purposehasbeenpartiallyachievedthroughnegotiationsonexportcontrolswiththe :+$' participatingstatesofthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangement. &,%( Ї 2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthese R controlsarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesandwillnothaveanysignificant > adverseforeignpolicyconsequenceswiththeextensionofthesecontrols.Thecontrolis * consistentwithU.S.foreignpolicygoalstopromotepeaceandstabilityandtopreventU.S.   exportsthatwouldcontributetoinappropriatemilitarycapabilitiesabroad.    3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadversereactionto   thesecontrolsisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectivenorwillanyadversereactionby  t othercountriesbecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests. Hf  g otsectiontechnology  ` forcommercialjetenginesf  g f  g issubjecttog Ԁdualusef  g f  exportcontrolsbyotheralliedcountriesf  g .These L  countriesalsorecognizethedesirabilityofrestrictinggoodsthatcouldcompromiseshared 8  securityandforeignpolicyinterests. v$   4.  EconomicImpact. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadverseeffectofthesecontrols N  ontheeconomyoftheUnitedStates,includingonthecompetitivepositionoftheUnitedStates >  intheinternationaleconomy,doesnotexceedthebenefittoU.S.foreignpolicyobjectives.In *  FY2003,f  g theDepartmentofCommercef  g Ԁapproved128licensesfortechnologyf  g f  controlledunderf  g   _ECCN_Ԁ9E003.Ofthe128licensesapproved,mostlicensesinvolved hotsectiontechnology.  Thetotaldollarvalueoftheapprovalswas$10.3million.Oneapplication,involvingthetransfer  ofengine hotsectiontechnologytoaforeignnationalemployedintheUnitedStates,was  denied.Additionally,18applicationswerereturnedwithoutaction. t  5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthattheUnitedStates L hastheabilitytoeffectivelyenforcethesecontrols.TheU.S.Governmentdoesnotexperience < anyunusualproblemsinenforcingthesecontrols.Manufacturersandintermediarycompanies z( arefamiliarwithU.S.controlsontheseproductsandtechnology.Theseitemsalsoaresubjectto f multilateralcontrolsf  g f  .Therefore,cooperationfromforeigngovernmentenforcementagenciesis R usefulinpreventingandpunishingviolators. >  C.ConsultationwithIndustry  ! Asneeded,theDepartmentofCommerceconsultswiththeTransportationTechnicalAdvisory " Committee,althoughtherearenomajorchangesenvisionedtocontrolsontheCCL. #  f  InaOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentofCommercesolicited %`" commentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols. &L # CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartmentsTechnicalAdvisoryCommittees '8!$ (_TACs_),whichadviseBIS,aswellasfromthePresidentsExportCouncilSubcommitteeon v($"% ExportAdministration.CommentsalsoweresolicitedfromthepublicviatheBIS_webpage_. b)#& ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember21,2003,andeightcommentswerereceived. N*#'  &,%)  D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  R TheUnitedStateshastakentheleadininternationaleffortstostemtheproliferationofsensitive * items,urgingothersuppliernationstoadoptandapplyexportcontrolscomparabletothoseofthe   UnitedStates.ThemajorindustrialpartnersoftheUnitedStatesmaintainexportcontrolsonthis   equipmentandtechnologyandcontrolthemasdualusecommodities.Pursuanttotheir   agreementtoestablisharegimeforthecontrolofconventionalarmsandsensitivedualusegoods   andtechnologies,theparticipantsinthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementhaveagreedtocontrolthese  t itemsandtoensurethattransfersofsuchitemsarecarriedoutresponsiblyandinfurtheranceof  ` internationalpeaceandsecurity. L   E.AlternativeMeans  v$  TheU.S.Governmenthasundertakenawiderangeofdiplomaticendeavors,bothbilateraland N  multilateral,toencouragethepropercontrolovertheseitems,andhasbeensuccessfulin :  reachingmultilateralagreement(inthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangement)tocontroltheseitems.The &  UnitedStateshasspecificallyencouragedeffortstopreventtheunauthorizeduseordiversionof  theseitemstoactivitiescontrarytoU.S.nationalsecurityandforeignpolicyconcerns.However,  theseeffortsdonotreplacethecontinuedneedforthecontrols.   F.ForeignAvailability  p AlthoughtheUnitedStateshasbeentheworldleaderinthistechnology,othercountriesproduce H  hotsectiontechnology.Mostcountriesthatareproducersof hotsectiontechnologyare 4 participantsinthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementandcontroltheseitemsasdualuseitemsin r  accordancewiththeirnationallicensingpolicies.ThecommitmentoftheU.S.Governmentand ^  its_Wassenaar_Ԁpartnerstomaintaincontrolsreflectsthecooperationamonggovernmentsto J controlforeignavailability.  6  XXtC  CHAPTER#XtX#XXtԀ12 z( #XtXr#XXtNuclear_Nonproliferation_Ԁ  P (Sections742.3and744.2) #XtX#  d < ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  P TheU.S.Governmentmaintainscontrolsonexportsofnuclearrelateditemsundertheauthority z(  oftheNuclear_Nonproliferation_ԀActof1978(_NNPA_)inordertofurtherthecountrysnuclear f  _nonproliferation_Ԁpolicy.Althoughthesecontrolsareprimarilybasedonthe_NNPA_,theyhave R  beenincludedinthisreportbecausetheyareusuallygroupedwiththeother_nonproliferation_ >  controlsreferencedelsewhere.Controlsbasedonnuclearendusesandendusersaremaintained *  undertheauthorityofSection6oftheExportAdministrationAct(theAct),aspartofthe  EnhancedProliferationControlInitiative(_EPCI_)._EPCI_Ԁcontrolsaredescribedindetailin  Chapters6,7,and8ofthisreport.  OnOctober22,2003,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedanamendmenttotheExport t AdministrationRegulations(EAR)thataddedKazakhstantoCountryGroupA,ColumnA:4,as ` aresultoftheadmissionofthatcountrytotheNuclearSuppliersGroup(_NSG_). L  LicensingRequirementsandLicensingPolicy  v$ TheDepartmentofCommercerequiresalicensefortheexportofthefollowingitems: J ! '` XX!  "(x85"3"  323  0 '   Commodities,relatedtechnology,orsoftwarethatcouldbeofsignificancefornuclear "  explosivepurposes(i.e.,theNuclearReferralListincludedintheCommerceControlList).3݌!'(#'(# Ќ   ' Anycommodity,relatedtechnology,orsoftwarethattheexporterknows,orhasreasonto "  ' know,willbeuseddirectlyorindirectlyinanyofthefollowingactivities: # % X'` XB%*,X, XX*  "(xx "  !0  Nuclearexplosiveactivitiesincludingthedesign,development,manufacture,ortestingof %X! nuclearweaponsornuclearexplosivedevices.&D "(#(#   !0  _Unsafeguarded_Ԁnuclearactivitiesincludingthedesign,development,ormanufactureof n("$ anynuclearreactor,criticalfacility,facilityforthefabricationofnuclearfuel,facilityfor Z)#% theconversionofnuclearmaterialfromonechemicalformtoanother,orseparatestorage F*#&  installationwherethereisnoobligationtoacceptInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency 2+$' safeguardsatthefacilityorinstallation,whenitcontainsanysourceofspecialfissionable R material,orwhereanysuchobligationisnotmet.>(#(#    !0  Safeguardedand_unsafeguarded_Ԁnuclearactivities,includingthedesign,construction,   fabrication,oroperationofthefollowingfacilities,orcomponentsforsuchfacilities:(_i_)   facilitiesforthechemicalprocessingofirradiatedspecialnuclearorsourcematerials;(ii)   facilitiesfortheproductionofheavywater;(iii)facilitiesfortheseparationofisotopesof   sourceandspecialnuclearmaterial;or(iv)facilitiesforthefabricationofnuclearreactor  t fuelcontainingplutonium. `(#(#   "(xx ""3"  323  0    TheDepartmentofCommercemayinformtheexporterthatalicenseisrequiredforanyitem 8  subjecttotheExportAdministrationRegulationswhenthereisanunacceptableriskofusein v$  ordiversiontoanyoftheactivitiesdescribedabove.3D݌b (#(# Ќ  Factorsconsideredinreviewingapplicationsforlicensesinclude: :    "(Dxx ""3"  32D3  0    Thestatedend-useoftheitem.3݌(#(# Ќ  "3"  32D3  0    Thesignificancefornuclearpurposesoftheparticularcomponentanditsavailability  elsewhere.3݌(#(# Ќ    "(xx ""3"  3A23  0    Thetypesofnuclear_nonproliferation_Ԁassurancesorguaranteesgiveninaparticularcase.3An݌\(#(# Ќ    "(txx ""3"  32t3  0    The_nonproliferation_Ԁcredentialsoftherecipientcountry.3 ݌4(#(# Ќ  @  AnalysisofControlasRequiredbyLaw_ v#  17      _  ^  Section17(d)oftheExportAdministrationActandSection309(c)ofthe_NNPA_Ԁareinterpreted 6 toprovidethat:(1)nuclear_nonproliferation_Ԁcontrolsdonotexpireannuallyanddeterminations "  toextendthemarethusnotrequired;and(2)thecriteriaandotherfactorssetforthinSections ! 6(b)through6(f)oftheActarenotapplicabletothesecontrols. ! TheCongressis,therefore,notifiedthatthesecontrolscontinueineffect.Thesecontrolsfurther #  thenuclear_nonproliferation_ԀpolicyoftheUnitedStatesandhavemadeitmoredifficultfor $l! nationstoacquiresensitivenucleartechnologyorequipment. %X"   &D # ThesecontrolssupportU.S.internationalnuclear_nonproliferation_Ԁobligations.TheU.S. R  Governmentmaintainsongoingdiscussionswithothercountriestocoordinateexportcontrolsfor > nuclear_nonproliferation_Ԁpurposesandisamemberofthemultilateral_NSG_.The_NSG_, * composedof40members,setsforthexportcontrolguidelinesapplicabletoalistofnuclear   relateddualuseitems(seeAppendixIIforacompletelistofregimemembers.)TheUnited   Statesalsoisamemberofthe_Zangger_ԀCommittee,amultilateralgroupformedintheearly   1970stoestablishguidelinesfortheexportcontrolprovisionsoftheNuclear_Nonproliferation_   Treaty.  t TheDepartmentsofCommerceandEnergy,inconsultationwiththeDepartmentsofState, L  Defense,andtheNuclearRegulatoryCommission,regularlyreviewandrevisethislistof 8  U.S.dualuseitemscontrolledfornuclear_nonproliferation_Ԁreasons.ReferredtoastheNuclear v$  ReferralList(_NRL_),thislistconformswithourinternationalcommitmentsunderthe_NSG_.  b   AP@*XXt  APPENDIXI#XtX #XXt 9 #XtX #XXtSummaryofPublicComments q  onForeignPolicyBasedExportControls #XtXG #  $  TheDepartmentofCommercesBureauofIndustryandSecurity(BIS)requestedpublic q commentsonexistingforeignpolicybasedexportcontrolsmaintainedunderSection6ofthe ]  ExportAdministrationAct(_EAA_)throughaFederalRegisternoticepublishedOctober21, I  2003.CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartmentsTechnicalAdvisory 5  Committees(_TACs_),whichadviseBIS,aswellasfromthePresidentsExportCouncil !  SubcommitteeonExportAdministration.Commentsalsoweresolicitedfromthepublicviathe    BIS_webpage_.BISrequestedcommentsonhowexistingforeignpolicycontrolshaveaffected   exportersandtheoverallpublic.Thenoticeinvitedpubliccommentsaboutissuessuchasthe  effectivenessofcontrolswhenforeignavailabilityexists;whetherthegoalsofthecontrolscanbe p achievedthroughothermeanssuchasnegotiations;thecompatibilityofthecontrolswiththe \ overallU.S.policytowardacountryinquestion;theeffectofcontrolsonU.S.economic H performance;andtheabilitytoenforcethecontrols. 4 BISreceivedeightresponsesfromthefollowingorganizations:AnalogDevices,Inc.;Federal m  ExpressCorporation;IndustryCoalitiononTechnologyTransfer(_ICOTT_);JupiterAluminum Y Corp.;NationalChamberofIndustries&Commerce,_U.P._ԀIndia;SandiaNationalLaboratories; E theSensorsandInstrumentationTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee(_SITAC_);andSun 1 Microsystems.BIShasmadeallcommentsreceivedavailableforreviewintheBISFreedomof  InformationActReadingRoomavailableontheBIS_webpage_.BISalsomakesthecomments   availableforpublicreviewuponrequest.ThisAppendixsummarizesthecommentsreceived.   IndustryComments  !l OnNovember24,2003,AnalogDevices,Inc.,(_ADI_)submittedthefollowingcommentsrelating #D toitsitemscontrolledinCategories3,4,and5oftheCommerceControlList(CCL)fornational $0  securityreasons: Itisextremelydifficultfor_ADI_Ԁtoknowiftheirequipmentwillmakea }%! significantcontributiontothemilitarypotentialofthecustomercountrybecausethecontrol i& " parametersareofnecessitysubjectiveandnotwelldefined._ADI_Ԁfurthercommentedthatthe U' # subjectivenatureofreviews,andtheinteragencyconsultationprocess,haveledtodelaysoftwo A(!$ tothreeyearsinreceivingalicense,whichisdetrimentaltobothtolongtermplanningand -)"% customerrelations._ADI_Ԁestimatesthatinaparticularmarketsegment,theylose$15$20million *#&  ayeartoforeigncompetitionthatcanobtainapprovalsfasterfromtheirowngovernments._ADI_ +$' foreseesageneralriskofU.S.industrylosingitscompetitiveandtechnologicaledgebynotbeing a abletoaccessexportmarkets. M  OnNovember19,2003,FederalExpressCorporationsubmittedcommentsproposingthe %  eliminationofPart736.2(b)(8)(GeneralProhibitionEight)oftheEAR,whichrequiresalicense   orlicenseexceptionforexportsor_reexports_Ԁthroughortransitthroughanumberofcountries.   FederalExpressstatesthisregulationwasputinplaceduringtheColdWarandmostofthe   countriesthatfallunderthejurisdictionofthisregulationnowhaveveryfriendlyrelationswith  t theUnitedStates.Someareevenmembersofmultilateralexportcontrolregimes.Anumberof  ` statessubjecttoU.S.unilateralembargoes,however,arenotonthislist.Thisrequirementplaces L  alargeburdenonFederalExpressgiventhenatureofitsbusiness. 8  Second,FederalExpressrecommends smartsanctionsthattargetonlyspecificactivitiesof q  concernratherthanthebroadembargosthatarecurrentlyinplaceforanumberofcountries. ]  ThiswouldleveltheplayingfieldforU.S.companieswiththeirworldwidecompetition.Lastly, I  FederalExpresscitesconfusionbetweenBISregulationsandthoseoftheDepartmentofthe 5  TreasurysOfficeofForeignAssetsControl(_OFAC_).TherequirementsintheIranprovisionsof ! theEARconflictwiththoseof_OFAC_sregulations.OfparticularconcernaretheEAR   regulatoryprovisionsforSudan,whicharesilentwithregardtotheU.S.embargo.  OnNovember17,2003,theIndustryCoalitiononTechnologyTransfer(_ICOTT_)wroteto p expressconcernoverforeignpolicybasedexportcontrolswhich_ICOTT_Ԁdescribedasunilateral \ and,therefore,largelyineffective._ICOTT_Ԁrecommendedthatunilateralcontrolsshouldonlybe H usedwhenthesymbolismoftheactofimposingcontrolsoutweighstheinjurytoAmerican 4 workersandbusinesses.IfunilateralcontrolsaretobeimposedwhiletheU.S.Government   negotiateswithitstradingpartnerstoseekmultilateralsupport,thoseunilateralcontrolsshould m  beoflimitedduration. Y OnNovember21,2003,JupiterAluminumexpressedconcernovertheabilityofChinesescrap 1  aluminumpurchaserstoacquireUnitedStatesscrapandexportittoChina.Jupiterassertsthat ! ChinasabilitytoacquireU.S.scrapstemsfromunfairtradepracticeincludingcurrency  " manipulationandfakeshippingdocuments.ThelargescalepurchaseofU.S.scrapbythe " ChineseisdrivingupthecostsofdoingbusinessintheUnitedStatesandinthefuture,the #  UnitedStatesmaynothaveascrapindustry.JupiterwouldliketheU.S.Governmenttouse $l! existingexportregulationstostoptheexportofscraptoChina. %X" OnOctober24,2003,theNationalChamberofIndustriesandCommerce,_U.P._Ԁ(_NCIC_) '0!$ expressedconcernaboutthecontinuedU.S.requirementforanexportlicenseforEAR99items }("% toIndia._NCIC_ԀassertsthatnewsreportsindicatethattheU.S.Governmentisnolongerasking i)#& IndiatosigntheNuclear_Nonproliferation_ԀTreatytopromotebettertraderelations.Therefore, U*#' theexportlicenserequirementforEAR99items,eventolistednuclearentities,shouldbe A+$( removedsinceEAR99itemsdonotdirectlycontributetoanuclearormissileprogram._NCIC_ -,%) notesthatifitisnotpossibletowaivetheEAR99licensingrequirementcompletely,thenseveral a possibilitiestostreamlineexportingshouldbeexamined,includingbulklicences,licence M exceptionsforshipmentvalue,orexpeditedprocessingoflicenseapplications. 9 OnNovember21,2003,SandiaNationalLaboratoriesCooperativeMonitoringCenterwroteto   expressconcernthathuman,animalandplantpathogensshippedwithintheUnitedStatesrequire   priorapprovaloftherelevantfederalagency.However,exportingthesamepathogenstoanother   countryisregulatedbyBISandmayormaynotrequirealicence.Thisgapcouldcontributeto  t theproliferationofbiologicalweapons.Thelabhasprovidedalistof25pathogensit  ` recommendsbeaddedtotheCCLtopreventproliferation. L  OnOctober21,2003,BISsSensorsandInstrumentationTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee $  (_SITAC_)submittedseveralcomments.First,theyemphasizedtheircommentsfromprioryears, q  whichtheyfelthavenotbeenaddressed,namelythatCategory6commoditiesrelatedto ]  commercialnightvisionandthermalimagingequipment(specifically6A002,6A003,6E001, I  and6E002),whicharecontrolledforRegionalStability(RS)Column1,shouldinsteadbe 5  controlledinRSColumn2asafirststeptowardreviewingRScontrols.AlthoughRS1includes ! allcountriesexceptCanada,theimpositionofRS2controlswouldallowitemsclassifiedunder   these_ECCNs_ԀtobeexportedtoCanada,mostEuropeanUnionmemberstates,Japan,andseveral  othercountrieswithoutalicense.  DuetothedevelopmentofforeigncompetitionintheUnitedKingdom,France,Israel,andJapan \ inrecentyears,the_SITAC_Ԁstatedthat thenegativeeffectonU.S.companiesfarexceedsthe H perceivedbenefittotheforeignpolicyobjective._SITAC_Ԁnotedtheimportanceofthermal 4 imagingforfirefighting,lawenforcement,andsecurityorganizationsworldwideandstatedthat   theU.S.callforbuildingalargeinternationalcoalitiontocombatterrorismisunderminedwhen m  alliesaccesstoavailableU.S.technologyisrestricted._SITAC_Ԁfurtherstatedthattreatingall Y regionswiththeexceptionofCanadaasbeingpotentiallyunstable dilutesthefocusonregions E wherestabilitymaytrulybeinquestion.Second,theyemphasizedthatforeigncompetitionto 1  theU.S.focalplanearray(_FPA_)equipmentindustryhasbecomequitevigorous,suggestingthat ! U.S.regionalstabilitycontrolsareharmingU.S.industrywithoutsignificantregionalstability  " benefits.Finally,theyrenewedtheircallformovingsix_ECCN_ԀitemsfromRS1toRS2controls " sincethiswould leveltheplayingfieldwithforeigncompetitionwithoutharmtoU.S. #  interests. $l! ThefinalpubliccommentreceivedwasfromSunMicrosystems.SunMicrosystemscommented &D # onSection744ProliferationControls,knownspecificallyasthe _EPCI_(theEnhanced '0!$ ProliferationControlInitiative)provisions,andcontrolsonhighperformancecomputers(_HPCs_). }("% Thecompanybelievesthat_EPCI_Ԁcatchallrequirementscausesubstantialunnecessarycosts i)#& associatedwithexportcomplianceforglobalinformationtechnology(IT)companies.The U*#' burdentoITcompaniesliesin policies,procedures,andautomatedsystems[that]mustbe A+$( constructedtoscreenthousandsoftransactionsinvolvinguncontrolledoruncontrollable -,%) products,andtechniques[that]mustbedevisedtostoptransactionsforwhichanexporterhas a reasontoknowthattheultimateendusewillinvolveweaponsofmassdestruction. M Inaddition,ITcompaniesspend substantialmoneyandtimeonscreeningshipmentsof %  de_minimis_,irrelevantanduncontrollableitems,orattemptingtoenforcecompliancewithsucha   system,[which]detractsfromtheabilityofbothcompaniesandenforcementauthoritiesto   enforcewhatreallymatters.SunMicrosystemscallsfora complete,authoritativelistof   entitiespresentingproliferationconcerns,includingthoseenduserstowhomexportswere  t previouslysubjecttoenhancedcontrols(i.e.,exportprohibitionorlicensing).Thecompany  ` alsosuggestedthecreationofnewpracticespursuanttowhichtheDepartmentofCommerce: L   (1)processesvoluntarycompanyrequeststoscreenindividualendusersforaparticular 8  transactioninnomorethan14days,and(2)permitsvoluntaryonetimeenduserreviewsand $  certificationssothatcompaniescanexporttoagivenenduser,freeof_EPCI_Ԁliability,untilthe q  exporterisnotifiedotherwise.InadditiontheU.S.Governmentmustpublishalldenialson ]  sometypeofanentitylisttopreventthoseentitiesfromseekingthesametransactionwith I  anothervendor. 5  Withregardto_HPCs_,the scopeofTierIIIcontrolsshouldbenarrowedsubstantiallyinorderto   recognizetherealitiesofthenetworkedworldandtodiscontinuethedangerousand  counterproductivepretensionthatcontrollingcommercialcomputingpowerwillbeeitherviable  oreffectiveinthecomingyears.TierIIIcountriesshouldbethose identifiedintheCIAs p semiannual_WMD_ԀreporttoCongressunderSection721oftheIntelligenceAuthorizationActfor \ FY1997ratherthantheextensivelistofcountriescurrentlyincludedinComputerTierIII.Sun H isconcernedabouttheproposedregulationoncomputertransfersinceitwillessentiallyreimpose 4 TierIItypecontrols.SunfeelstheU.S.Governmentshouldshiftitsfocusfromperformance   metricstoacceleratingtheadvantagetheU.S.militaryalreadyhasinexploitingthese m  technologies.  Y   XXt APPENDIXII a MultilateralExportControlRegimesin2003 #XtXH# u *d d'' m m (#(#,'",",S", "+  XXXXt9XX ;&&*(( ;#XX9J#_XX@@_WASSENAAR_ @&&/!@"&& @@@!AG @&&/!@"&& @@@0_MTCR_ @&&/!@"&& @@@B_NSG_#XX_"  P Y PXGermany @Y/!k?"Y @Germany @Y/!k@"Y @Germany @Y/!kA"Y @Germany XYG,kB"  P Y PXGreece @Y/!9C"Y @Greece @Y/!9D"Y @Greece @Y/!9E"Y @Greece XYG,9F"  P Y PXHungary @Y/!hG"Y @Hungary @Y/!hH"Y @Hungary @Y/!hI"Y @Hungary XYG,hJ"  P Y PX @Y/!6K"Y @Iceland @Y/!6L"Y @Iceland @Y/!6M"Y @ XYG,6N"  P Y PXIreland @Y/!O"Y @Ireland @Y/!P"Y @Ireland @Y/!Q"Y @Ireland XYG,R"  P Y PXItaly @Y/!qS"Y @Italy @Y/!qT"Y @Italy @Y/!qU"Y @Italy XYG,qV"  P Y PXJapan @Y/!?W"Y @Japan @Y/!?X"Y @Japan @Y/!?Y"Y @Japan XYG,?Z"  P Y X @Y/!n ["Y @ @Y/!n \"Y @ @Y/!n ]"Y @Kazakhstan XYG,n ^"   Y X @Y/!<_"Y @ @Y/!<`"Y @ @Y/!<a"Y @Latvia XYG,<b"   Y PXLuxembourg @Y/! c"Y @Luxembourg @Y/! d"Y @Luxembourg @Y/! e"Y @Luxembourg XYG, f"  P Y PXNetherlands @Y/!wg"Y @Netherlands @Y/!wh"Y @Netherlands @Y/!wi"Y @Netherlands XYG,wj"  P Y PXNewZealand @Y/!Ek"Y @NewZealand @Y/!El"Y @NewZealand @Y/!Em"Y @NewZealand XYG,En"  P Y PXNorway @Y/!to"Y @Norway @Y/!tp"Y @Norway @Y/!tq"Y @Norway XYG,tr"  P Y PXPoland @Y/!Bs"Y @Poland @Y/!Bt"Y @Poland @Y/!Bu"Y @Poland XYG,Bv"  P Y PXPortugal @Y/! w"Y @Portugal @Y/! x"Y @Portugal @Y/! y"Y @Portugal XYG, z"  P Y PXRomania @Y/! }{"Y @Romania @Y/! }|"Y @ @Y/! }}"Y @Romania XYG, }~"  P Y PXRussia @Y/!!K"Y @ @Y/!!K"Y @Russia @Y/!!K"Y @Russia XYG,!K"  P Y PXSlovakRepublic @Y/!z""Y @SlovakRepublic @Y/!z""Y @ @Y/!z""Y @SlovakRepublic XYG,z""  P Y X @Y/!H#"Y @ @Y/!H#"Y @ @Y/!H#"Y @Slovenia XYG,H#"   Y PX @Y/!$"Y @ @Y/!$"Y @SouthAfrica @Y/!$"Y @SouthAfrica XYG,$"  P Y PXRep.ofKorea(SouthKorea) @Y/!$"Y @Rep.ofKorea(SouthKorea) @Y/!$"Y @Rep.ofKorea(SouthKorea) @Y/!$"Y @Rep.ofKorea(SouthKorea) XYG,$"  P Y PXSpain @Y/!%Q"Y @Spain @Y/!%Q"Y @Spain @Y/!%Q"Y @Spain XYG,%Q"  P Y PXSweden @Y/!& "Y @Sweden @Y/!& "Y @Sweden @Y/!& "Y @Sweden XYG,& "  P Y PXSwitzerland @Y/!N' "Y @Switzerland @Y/!N' "Y @Switzerland @Y/!N' "Y @Switzerland XYG,N' "  P Y PXTurkey @Y/!(!"Y @Turkey @Y/!(!"Y @Turkey @Y/!(!"Y @Turkey XYG,(!"  P Y XUkraine @Y/!(""Y @ @Y/!(""Y @Ukraine @Y/!(""Y @Ukraine XYG,(""   Y PXUnitedKingdom @Y/!)W#"Y @UnitedKingdom @Y/!)W#"Y @UnitedKingdom @Y/!)W#"Y @UnitedKingdom X&G,)W#"  P Y XUnitedStates @&/!*%$"& @UnitedStates @&/!*%$"& @UnitedStates @&/!*%$"& @UnitedStates<20*%$"   * & <#XX9L##XtXXXJ#XXXXt  _XX AG :AustraliaGroup; _MTCR_ :MissileTechnologyControlRegime; _NSG_ :NuclearSuppliersGroup#_##XtX;# \  <+$    XXtAPPENDIXIII#XtX#  a  XXtComputerTierCountryChartin2003#XtX#  u *d+d'"'"S"S " (#(#,dT",}dd +  7&&&u u  ,7XXtCOMPUTER  x TIER @&&/! :"&& @COUNTRIES#XtXػ# D:, x" d,  && @,DXXt1 '  'Antigua&Barbuda,_#XX_#_XXԀArgentina,Australia,Austria,Bahamas,Bangladesh,#XX_F#_XX#_#_ԀBarbados,#XX_#_XX#_#_Belgium,   Belize,Benin,Bhutan,Bolivia,Botswana,#_#_#XX_K#_XXԀBrazil,Brunei,BurkinaFaso,Burma,Burundi,#XX_W#_XX#_#_  P  Cameroon,#_ #_#XX_Lj#_XXԀCanada_ v#  18      _,CapeVerde,CentralAfricanRepublic,Chad,Chile,Colombia,Congo, u   CostaRica,CotedIvoire,Cyprus,#XX_#_XX#_i#_ԀCzechRepublic,Denmark,Dominica,Dominican 9  Republic,Ecuador,ElSalvador,EquatorialGuinea,Eritrea,Estonia,Ethiopia,Fiji,#_)#_#XX_#_XXԀFinland,   France,Gabon,Gambia(The),#XX_C#_XX#_#_Germany,Ghana,#_#_#XX_#_XXGreece,Grenada,Guatemala,Guinea, `  GuineaBissau,Guyana,Haiti,#XX_#_XX#_T#_HolySee,Honduras,HongKong,#_p#_#XX_.#_XXԀHungary,Iceland,Indonesia,#XX_#_XX#_Ў#_ $  Ireland,Italy,Jamaica,#_#_#XX_q#_XXԀJapan,Kenya,Kiribati,Korea(Republicof),Latvia,Lesotho,Liberia, I  #XX_d#_XX#_"#_Liechtenstein,Lithuania,#_D#_#XX_#_XXԀLuxembourg,Madagascar,Malawi,Malaysia,Maldives,Mali,Malta,    MarshallIslands,Mauritius,#XX_#_XX#_#_ԀMexico,Micronesia(FederatedStatesof),#_ג#_#XX_#_XXԀMonaco,Mozambique, p  Namibia,Nauru,Nepal,#XX_#_XX#_C#_ԀNetherlands,NewZealand,Nicaragua,Niger,Nigeria,#_H#_#XX_#_XXNorway, 4  Palau,PapuaNewGuinea,Panama,Paraguay,Peru,Philippines,#XX_#_XX#_#_ԀPoland,Portugal,Romania, Y  Rwanda,St.Kitts&Nevis,St.Lucia,St.VincentandGrenadines,#_ߕ#_#XX_#_XXԀSanMarino,SaoTome&  Principe,Senegal,Seychelles,SierraLeone,Singapore,SlovakRepublic,Slovenia,Solomon  Islands,Somalia,SouthAfrica,#XX_Ԗ#_XX#_#_ԀSpain,SriLanka,Surinam,Swaziland,#_#_#XX_З#_XXԀSweden,Switzerland, D Taiwan,Tanzania,Thailand,#XX_#_XX#_z#_ԀTogo,Tonga,Trinidad&Tobago,#XX_C#_XX#_#_ԀTurkey,Tuvalu,Uganda,#_)#_#XX_#_XX i UnitedKingdom(The)andallterritoriesthereof,Uruguay,Venezuela,WesternSahara, - WesternSamoa,Zaire,Zambia,andZimbabwe.#XX_Ś#_XX#_# ZP# d, @   @3,@Z3 E;6E  @3 @ EAfghanistan,Albania,Algeria,Andorra,Angola,Armenia,Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Belarus, E Bosnia&Herzegovina,Bulgaria,Cambodia,China(PeoplesRepublicof),Comoros,Croatia,   Djibouti,Egypt,Georgia,India,Israel,Jordan,Kazakhstan,Kuwait,_Kyrgyzstan_,Laos, l Lebanon,Macau,Macedonia(TheFormerYugoslaviaRepublicof),Mauritania,Moldova, 0 Mongolia,Montenegro,Morocco,Oman,Pakistan,Qatar,Russia,SaudiArabia,Serbia, U Tajikistan,Tunisia,Turkmenistan,Ukraine,UnitedArabEmirates,Uzbekistan,Vanuatu,   Vietnam,andYemen. B&1#|! d,   h<B4 .&1 "& .ЀCuba,Iran,Iraq,Libya,NorthKorea,Sudan,andSyria.3)'1 # d< h  & 3#XtXر#   1!#   d XXt  APPENDIXIV u #XtX#XXt#XtX#XXtSelectedRulesPublishedbytheDepartmentofCommercein2003 #XtXT#  L *YtdddT"}dd }(#(#,dd ,rdd ,*dd +  ) 8 8 )Publication   Date 6,! "k 6FederalRegister    Citation 6,!  "k 6Rule UK&  "  k @`@37634@`@UXXXXt_XX1/14/03#XX_C##XtXXX!#XXt 7-+i  @`@37634 @`@ 7_#XX_#_XX68FR1796#XX_M##XtXXX#XXt  i  #XtXؼ#XXtRevisionofExportControlsforGeneralPurposeMicroprocessors i  (FinalRule) j #XtX# A7-  f@37684f@AXXXXt_XX3/5/03#XX_*##XtXXX #XXt 7-+$  f@37684 f@ 7_#XX_#_XX68FR10586#XX_3#&u%XXԀ $  0  #&?%%&u##XtX%&?#XXt (]    (#XtX #XXtImplementationofthe2002_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementListofDual $  UseItems:RevisionstoCategories2,3,4,5,6,7,8,and9ofthe I  CommerceControlList,GeneralSoftwareNote,andReporting    Requirements#XtXw# A7p  j@37712j@AXXXXt_XX4/2/03 l #XX_A##XtXXX"#XXt 7-+) j@37712 j@ 7_#XX_#_XX68FR16144#XX_\##XtXXX#XXt  ) #XtX̬#XXtRevisionstotheExportAdministrationRegulationsRelatedtothe ) MissileTechnologyControlRegime(_MTCR_)#XtX,# A7  j@37713 j@AXXXXt_XX4/3/03#XX_m##XtXXXN#XXt 7-+E  j@37713  j@ 7_#XX_خ#_XX68FR16208#XX_v##XtXXX1#XXt  E #XtX#XXtExportsand_Reexports_ԀofExplosivesDetectionEquipmentand E RelatedSoftwareandTechnology;ImpositionandExpansionof   ForeignPolicyControls#XtXF# A7l  r@37777 r@AXXXXt_XX6/6/03 l #XX_##XtXXX#XXt 7-+%   r@37777  r@ 7_#XX_=#_XX68FR34192#XX_۲##XtXXX#XXt  %! #XtXK#XXtImpositionandExpansionofControlsonDesignatedTerrorists %"   #XtXث# J@# r@37781r@JXXt6/10/03#XtXؕ# I?4i$ r@37781 r@ IXXt68FR34526#XtX'# i% XXXXt_XXImplementationoftheUnderstandingsReachedattheJune2002 i& AustraliaGroup(AG)PlenaryMeetingandtheAG_Intersessional_ -' DecisiononCrossFlowFiltrationEquipment!Chemicaland ( BiologicalWeaponsControlsintheExportAdministration T) Regulations#XX_##XtXXX#XXt A7 y* s@37788s@A#XtX؅#XXt6/17/03#XtX# I?4 p+ s@37788 s@ IXXt68FR35783#XtXؚ#  p, XXt_ExportAdministrationRegulations:EncryptionClarificationsand  p- Revisions.#_$# A7 !4.  u@37801 u@A#XtX#XXt6/30/03#XtX*# I?4"/  u@37801  u@ IXXt68FR38599#XtXؼ# "0 XXXXt_XXExportsand_Reexports_ԀtotheFederalRepublicofYugoslavia ! #XX_F##XtXXX'#XXt A7 "1  @37881 @A#XtX#XXt9/18/03#XtXؕ# I?4E$2  @37881  @ IXXt68FR54655#XtX'# E$3 XXXXt_XXRevisionstotheExportAdministrationRegulationsBasedonthe E$4 2002MissileTechnologyControlRegimePlenaryAgreements#XX_#&u%XX  %5   #&?%%&u##XtX%&?#XXt A7 %l6 `@37915`@A#XtX#XXt10/22/03#XtX؉# I?4%' 7 `@37915 `@ IXXt68FR60288#XtX# %' 8 XXXXt_XXAdditionofKazakhstantotheNuclearSuppliersGroup(_NSG_), %' 9 andotherrevisions.#XX_##XtXXX#XXt A7 '!: @37917@A#XtXؐ#XXt10/24/03#XtX# I?4A)"; @37917 @ IXXt68FR60891#XtXئ# A)"< XXXXt_XXComputerTechnologyandSoftware,andMicroprocessor A)"= TechnologyEligibleforExportor_Reexport_ԀUnderLicense *#> Exception#XX_0##XtXXX#XXt A7 *h$? `@37955`@A#XtXT#XXt S m-./01234(0x "12/01/03 S#XtX# I?4d `@37955 `@ IXXt68FR67030#XtX!# 'd 'XXtRevisionsandClarificationstotheExportAdministration d  Regulations--ChemicalandBiologicalWeaponsControls: D( AustraliaGroup;ChemicalWeaponsConvention;Correction#XtXؕ# J@  `@37955`@JXXt12/01/03#XtX# ` D  I?4$  `@37955 `@ IS ` D SXXt68FR67147#XtX#    S 'w [  ' SXXtImpactofImplementationoftheChemicalWeaponsConvention ` D  onCommercialActivitiesInvolving"Schedule1"Chemicals $   throughCalendarYear2003#XtX؇# SXXt"   "#XtXؘ#