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S\  `&Times New RomanS7`(X7k)1dxd'dxd "pdCEIMQUY]aAutoList6i)1)a)<:zTop of For7c(X7  ?%2A`Arial?  S\  `&Times New RomanS7`(X7k)2dxd0KS.SampleK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong jYk88:2  8dl6TypewriterK<6X9`(Courier NewKS\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      kkkk'dxd&0 d d2 0CommentB  -./01234 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.<:Default ParaYYYY)!dxdxd<6X9`("Courier 10cpiXx6X@8;X@+_ 0CG TimesBoldScalableXXz_ p^7X) `(CG TimesScalableblec P7P P u($USUS.,    1    _ԀSection6(b)(2)requirestheSecretarytoconsiderthecriteriasetforthinSection  6(b)(1)whenextendingcontrolsineffectpriortoJuly12,1985.Inaddition,thereportmust  includetheelementssetforthinSections6(f)(2)(A)(purposeofthecontrols);6(f)(2)(C)  (consultationwithindustryandothercountries);6(f)(2)(D)(alternativemeansattempted);and t 6(f)(2)(E)(foreignavailability).jYk$(.(3($ !USUS.,      0  (#$  0    u($USUS.,    2    _ԀSection6(b)(1)requirestheSecretarytomakedeterminationsregardingthecriteriaset  forththereinwhenimposing,extending,orexpandingcontrols.Thereportmustalsocontainthe  additionalinformationrequiredinSection6(f)(2)(A),(C)(E)(assetforthinfootnote1,supra.) 'USUS.,  _  XXChapter3RegionalStability  AY ) xd2EsxA  u($USUS.,    3    _ԀLimitationsexistwhenassessingtheeconomicimpactofcertaincontrolsbecauseofthe  unavailabilityofdataorbecauseoftheprevalenceofotherfactors,e.g.,currencyvalues,foreign  economicactivity,orforeignpoliticalregimes,whichmayrestrictimportsofU.S.productsmore  stringentlythantheUnitedStatesrestrictsexports.TABLE Add2d(jEGMSY_ekqAutoList14A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A. \ u($USUS.,    4    _ԀWhentheUnitedStatesimplementscontrolswithouttheimpositionofcorresponding  restrictionsbyothercountries,itisdifficulttoguardagainst_reexports_Ԁfromthirdcountriesto  thetargetcountry,tosecurethirdcountrycooperationinenforcementefforts,andtodetect  violationsabroadandinitiateproperenforcementaction.Therelativeeaseordifficultyof t identifyingthemovementofcontrolledgoodsortechnicaldataisalsoafactor.Controlson ` itemsthataresmall,inexpensive,easytotransportorconceal,orthathavemanyproducersand L  endusers,arehardertoenforce. H 'USUS.,  _  XXChapter2#XtXI#XXtCrimeControl/HumanRights#XtXؖ#  AY ) xd2EsxA "htCEIMQUY]aAutoList7i)1)a)Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5  u($USUS.,    13    _ԀXtXXXAlicensealsoisrequiredtoexportthistechnologyforantiterrorism(AT)reasons.#XtXXXtk# "hCEIMQUY]aAutoList8i)1)a)TABLE B  'USUS.,  __XX  Chapter2#XtXM#XXtCrimeControl/HumanRights#XtXئ#XXt  lAY ) xd2EsxA#XtX#  TABLE A "hCEIMQUY]aAutoList9i)1)a)TABLE C "hEGKOSW[_cAutoList10)1)a)Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 "hEGKOSW[_cAutoList11)1)a) ( 'USUS.,  _XXԀChapter4AntiTerrorismControls#XtX@# "hEGKOSW[_cAutoList12)1)a) "hEGKOSW[_cAutoList13)1)a)TABLE DTable_CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5  u($USUS.,    7    _ԀXtXXXTheDepartmentofCommercerequiresalicenseunderSection6(a)oftheActforall  computersgoingtoIran,NorthKorea,Sudan,orSyriawitha_CTP_Ԁof6_MTOPS_Ԁorabove.Note  alsothatcontrolsapplytoexportsofalllevelsofcomputerstoCubaandLibya.#XtXXXtj#TABLE B V u($USUS.,    8    _ԀXtXXXProvisionspertainingtoforeignavailabilitydonotapplytoexportcontrolsineffect  beforeJuly12,1985,undersections6(_i_)(InternationalObligations),6(j)(CountriesSupporting  InternationalTerrorism),and6(n)(CrimeControlInstruments).SeetheExportAdministration  AmendmentsActof1985,PublicLaw9964,section108(g)(2),Stat.120,13435.Moreover, t * sections6(_i_),6(j),and6(n)requirethatcontrolsbeimplementedundercertainconditions R withoutconsiderationofforeignavailability.#XtXXXtk#Table_ATable_BTable_E  'USUS.,  _XXԀChapter5EmbargoedCountriesandPersons#XtX@#Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5i)jY <6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial  'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter11SignificantItems:HotSectionTechnology#XtX=# 'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter6ToxicChemicals,ChemicalPrecursorsandAssociatedEquipment,TechnologyandSoftware#XtX=# h P)  _AY ) xdExA  XtXXXXXt   `    2004ReportonForeignPolicyBasedExportControls#؁##XtXؠ# P)  _AY ) xdExA  XX@ 2004ReportonForeignPolicyBasedExportControls ' 'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter12NuclearNonproliferation#XtX=#  'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter7BiologicalAgentsandAssociatedEquipmentandTechnology#XtX=# u($USUS.,    10    _ԀChapter7ofthisreportaddressesU.S.biologicalcontrols.  u($USUS.,    11    _ԀTheConventionontheProhibitionoftheDevelopment,Production,Stockpilingand  UseofChemicalWeaponsandontheirDestruction(the ChemicalWeaponsConventionor  _CWC_)wasratifiedbytheUnitedStatesonApril25,1997,andenteredintoforceonApril29,  1997.  u($USUS.,    17    _ԀTheanalysis,requiredbylaw,differsfornuclear_nonproliferation_Ԁcontrols.Itis  governedbytheNuclear_Nonproliferation_ԀActof1978(_NNPA_).Therefore,theheadingsunder  thissectiondifferfromtherestofthereport. E 'USUS.,  _XX  AppendixISummaryofPublicCommentsonForeignPolicyBasedExportControls #XtX=#  \AY ) xdEsxA   u($USUS.,    16    _ԀXtXXXAsofDecember2003,thecountriesinCountryGroupD:3includedAfghanistan,  Armenia,Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Belarus,Bulgaria,Burma,China(PRC),Cuba,Egypt,Georgia,  India,Iran,Iraq,Israel,Jordan,Kazakhstan,NorthKorea,Kuwait,_Kyrgyzstan_,Lebanon,Libya,  Macau,Moldova,Mongolia,Oman,Pakistan,Qatar,Russia,SaudiArabia,Syria,Taiwan, t Tajikistan,Turkmenistan,Ukraine,theUnitedArabEmirates,Uzbekistan,Vietnam,andYemen.#XtXXXtk#  u($USUS.,    12    _ԀAsofDecember2003,thecountriesintheCommerceCountryChartCBcolumn3  includedAfghanistan,Armenia,Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Belarus,Bulgaria,Burma,China(PRC),  Egypt,Georgia,India,Israel,Jordan,Kazakhstan,NorthKorea,Kuwait,_Kyrgyzstan_,Lebanon,  Macau,Moldova,Mongolia,Oman,Pakistan,Qatar,Russia,St.Kitts&Nevis,SaudiArabia, t Syria,Taiwan,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan,Ukraine,theUnitedArabEmirates,Uzbekistan, ` Vietnam,andYemen. # 'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter8MissileTechnologyControls#XtX=#  'USUS.,  _XXXX_XX  AppendixIIMultilateralExportControlRegimes  AY ) xdEsxA  u($USUS.,    15    _ԀXtXXXTheConventionontheProhibitionoftheDevelopment,ProductionandStockpilingof  Bacteriological(Biological)andToxinWeaponsandonTheirDestruction(_BWC_)wassignedin  1972andratifiedbytheUnitedStatesin1975.#XtXXXtk# u($USUS.,    14    _ԀChapter6ofthisreportaddressesU.S.chemicalcontrols. " 'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter9HighPerformanceComputers#XtX=#(hH  Z 6Times New Roman Regular / 'USUS.,  _XX򀀀Chapter10Encryption#XtX=#Table_A k 'USUS.,  _  XX#XtXI#XXtAppendixIIIComputerTierCountryChart#XtX؋#XXt  AY ) xdEsxATable_A(99Z 6Times New Roman Regular  u($USUS.,    18    _ԀExportsof_HPC_ԀitemsclassifiedontheCommerceControlListunderExportControl  ClassificationNumber(_ECCN_)4A003canbeexportedtoCanadawithnolicenserequired  (_NLR_)ratherthanunderthelicenseexceptionforhighperformancecomputers(_CTP_).The  recordkeepingrequirementsdonotapplyfor_HPC_ԀexportstoCanada.Retransferand_reexport_ t restrictionsstillapply.  'USUS.,  _XX  AppendixIVSelectedRulesPublishedin2003#XtX=#  AY ) xd9EsxA[TABLE A(C Z(Times New Roman (zEGMSY_ekqAutoList15A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.  u($USUS.,    9    _XtXXXԀThegeneralpolicyofdenialstatedintheEARissupercededbyapolicyofdenial  pursuanttotheIranIraqArms_Nonproliferation_ԀActof1992.Seeinfraat52,discussion  regardingtheIranIraqArms_Nonproliferation_ԀAct.  #XtXXXte#(k9 Z(Times New Roman !USUS.,  _ AY ) xdExA    2004REPORTONFOREIGNPOLICYBASEDEXPORTCONTROLS    U.S.DepartmentofCommerce  BureauofIndustryandSecurity w AY ) xdEN xA O    Ӏ f  0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#TableofContents0ph(#h(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#PageNumberR  x(#x(#  Chapter10 ` 0 ` (#` (#Introduction0h (# (#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#1* z  (# (# Chapter20 ` 0 ` (#` (#CrimeControl/HumanRights0p (# (#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#9R  (# (# Chapter30 ` 0 ` (#` (#RegionalStability0 (# (#0(#(#0p(#(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#19*  (# (#    `     h      p   Chapter40 ` 0 ` (#` (#AntiTerrorismControls0 (# (#0p(#(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#26 (# (# Chapter50 ` 0 ` (#` (#EmbargoedCountriesandPersons0p (# (#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#40 (# (# Chapter60 ` 0 ` (#` (#ToxicChemicals,ChemicalPrecursorsandAssociatedb (# (# 0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#Equipment,TechnologyandSoftware0 (# (#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#59N (# (# Chapter70 ` 0 ` (#` (#BiologicalAgentsandAssociatedEquipmentandTechnology0 (# (#68&v (# (# Chapter80 ` 0 ` (#` (#MissileTechnologyControls0 (# (#0p(#(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#74N (# (# Chapter90 ` 0 ` (#` (#HighPerformanceComputers0p (# (#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#80& (# (# Chapter100 ` 0 ` (#` (#Encryption0h (# (#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#85 (# (# Chapter110 ` 0 ` (#` (#SignificantItems;HotSectionTechnology0 (# (#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#91   (# (# Chapter120 ` 0 ` (#` (#Nuclear_Nonproliferation_0 (# (#0p(#(#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#94^"" (# (# AppendixI ` 0 SummaryofPublicCommentsonForeignPolicyExportControls0 (# (#976$$ (# (# AppendixII0 ` 0 ` (#` (#MultilateralExportControlRegimesin20030  (# (#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#101&^!& (# (# AppendixIII0 ` 0 ` (#` (#ComputerTierCountryChart0p (# (#0p(#p(#0 (#(#0x (# (#0 x(#x(#102'6#( (# (# AppendixIV0 ` 0 ` (#` (#SelectedRulesPublishedbytheDepartmentofCommercein20030 (# (#103)%* (# (#   *%+ 9?%%d d9(S    XXCHAPTER1 # Introduction#XtX#  K  Exportcontrolsmaintainedforforeignpolicypurposesrequireannualextensionaccordingtothe 7  provisionsofSection6oftheExportAdministrationActof1979,asamended(theAct).Section # 6(f)oftheActrequiresthePresidenttosubmitareporttoCongresstoextendthecontrols.Such   authorityhasbeendelegatedtotheSecretaryofCommerce.Sections6(b)and6(f)oftheAct   requirethereporttoincludecertainconsiderationss v#  1      ׀anddeterminationsx, v#  2      ׀withrespecttothe   criteriaestablishedinthatsection.Thisreportcomplieswithalloftherequirementssetoutin   theActforextending,amending,orimposingforeignpolicycontrols. t  TheDepartmentofCommerceisactingundertheauthorityconferredbyExecutiveOrder L 13222ofAugust17,2001(ExecutiveOrder),asextendedbytheNoticeofAugust7,2003. 8 Therein,thePresident,byreasonoftheexpirationoftheAct,invokedhisauthority,including o$ authorityundertheInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct(_IEEPA_),tocontinuein [ effectthesystemofcontrolsthathadbeenmaintainedundertheAct.Underapolicyof G conformingactionsundertheExecutiveOrdertothoseundertheAct,theDepartmentof 3 Commerce,insofarasappropriate,isfollowingtheprovisionsofSection6oftheActwithregard  toextendingforeignpolicycontrols.   Withthisreport,allforeignpolicyexportcontrolsdiscussedhereinareherebyextendedforthe  periodfromJanuary21,2004,toJanuary20,2005.TheBureauofIndustryandSecurity(BIS)  (formerlyknownastheBureauofExportAdministration)oftheDepartmentofCommerceis p takingthisactionattherecommendationoftheSecretaryofState.Asfurtherauthorizedbythe \ Act,foreignpolicyexportcontrolsremainineffectforreplacementpartsandforpartscontained  H  ingoodssubjecttosuchcontrols.Thecontrolsadministeredinaccordancewithprocedures !4 establishedpursuanttoSection309(c)oftheNuclear_Nonproliferation_ԀActof1978similarly K remainineffect. 7  Eachchapterofthisreportdescribesaparticularcategoryofforeignpolicycontrolsand   delineatesmodificationsthathavetakenplaceoverthepastyear.Althoughthisreportcoversthe   2003calendaryear,mostofthestatisticaldatapresentedinthereportarebasedonfiscalyear   2003exportlicensingstatistics,unlessotherwisenoted.BISgeneratesthisdatafromthe   computerautomatedsystemitusestoprocessandtrackexportlicenseactivity.Duetothe  t tabulatingproceduresusedbythesysteminaccountingforoccasionallicenseapplicationsthat  ` listmorethanonecountryordestination,thesystemhascertainlimitationsasameansof L  gatheringdata.Inaddition,BISbasesthedatainthisreportonvaluescontainedinissuedexport 8  licenses.Suchvaluesmaynotrepresentthevaluesofactualshipmentsmadeagainstthose o$  licenses,becauseinsomecasesanexportermayshiponlyaportionofthevalueofanapproved [  licenseormaynotshipatall. G  Certaingoods,technology,andsoftwaredescribedinthisreportalsomayrequirealicensefor   nationalsecuritypurposesforexporttocertaindestinationsinaccordancewithSection5ofthe   Act.   XXtPartI:Highlightsinthe2004Report#XtX"#    RegionalStability   OnApril3,2003,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedanamendmenttothef  Export l AdministrationRegulations(EAR)f  Ԁthatexpandsthescopeofcontrolsonexplosivesdetection X equipment,nowclassifiedunderExportControlClassificationNumber(_ECCN_)2A983.The D Departmentalsoimposednewlicenserequirementsfortheexportand_reexport_Ԁofrelated {0 softwareandtechnology,undernewlycreated_ECCNs_Ԁ2D983and2E983.g f  Withthisamendment, g theDepartmentofCommerceimposednewlicenserequirementsforRSreasonsforexplosives S detectionequipment,software,andtechnologytof  g f  g ԀalldestinationsexceptmembersoftheNorth ?  AtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO),Australia,Japan,andNewZealandf  g f  . +!  AntiTerrorismControlsonDesignatedTerrorists  # OnJune6,2003,theDepartmentofCommerceamendedtheEARbyimposingsanctionson #  transactionsinvolvingSpeciallyDesignatedGlobalTerrorists(_SDGTs_),SpeciallyDesignated $! Terrorists(_SDTs_),andForeignTerroristOrganizations(_FTOs_)._SDGTs_,_SDTs_Ԁand_FTOs_,as %x" wellascertainotherdesignatedpersons,aresubjecttolicensingrequirementsmaintainedbythe &d # DepartmentoftheTreasuryandareidentifiedonalistofdesignatedpersonsmaintainedin 'P!$ AppendixAto31_CFR_ԀChapterV.ThecontrolsmaintainedbytheDepartmentoftheTreasury, (<"% includingthosewithrespectto_SDGTs_,_SDTs_Ԁand_FTOs_,arenotdiscussedinthisreport. s)(#&  7,%)  Iraq  K OnMay22,2003,theUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(_UNSC_)issuedResolution1483that 3 liftedthecomprehensive_UNSC_ԀtradesanctionsonIraq,whileretainingrestrictionsonthesaleor  supplytoIraqofarmsandrelated_matriel_.Resolution1483alsoreiteratedcertainprovisionsof   related_UNSC_ԀResolutions707ofAugust15,1991,and687ofApril3,1991.Inparticular,those   provisionsrequirethatIraqeliminateitsnuclearweaponsprogramandrestrictitsnuclear   activitiestotheuseofisotopesformedical,industrial,oragriculturalpurposes.Suchprovisions   furthermandatetheeliminationofIraqschemicalandbiologicalweaponsprogramsaswellas  p itsballisticmissileprogram.TheDepartmentofCommerceispresentlyintheprocessof  \ amendingtheEARtoreflectIraqssignificantlychangedstatus.Atpresent,theDepartmentof H  theTreasurycontinuestorequirealicensefortheexporttoIraqofmostitemsontheCommerce 4  ControlList,otherthanitemscontrolledforantiterrorismreasonsonly. k   Syria  C  OnDecember12,2003,thePresidentsignedtheSyriaAccountabilityandLebaneseSovereignty +  RestorationAct(SAA)(Pub.L.108175).TheDepartmentofCommercehasresponsibilityfor   implementingSection5oftheSAA,insofarasitaffectstheEAR.   Rwanda   The_UNSC_ԀimposedanarmsembargoonRwandaonMay17,1994.In1995,the_UNSC_ x suspendedtheapplicationofthearmsembargototheGovernmentofRwandaifitemswere d shippedthroughspecifiedpointsofentry,andlaterterminated(effectiveSeptember1,1996)the P applicationoftheserestrictionsonsalesorsuppliestotheGovernmentofRwanda.Thesaleor < supplyofsucharmsandarmsrelated_materil_ԀtonongovernmentalforcesinRwandaremains s( prohibited. _ OnJuly30,2003,theDepartmentofStateimplementedthepartialliftingofthearmsembargo 7 forthoseitemssubjecttotheInternationalTrafficinArmsRegulations(_ITAR_)destinedforthe # GovernmentofRwanda.TheDepartmentofCommercewillbeimplementingacomparable   partialliftingofthearmsembargobyamendingtheEAR.    PersonsNamedPursuanttoExecutiveOrder13304  " PursuanttoExecutiveOrder13304,theDepartmentofCommercemaintainscontrolsonexports #p  topersonswhothreateninternationalstabilizationeffortsintheWesternBalkans,including $\! _Slobodan_Ԁ_Milosevic_,certainfamilymembersandcloseassociates,andpersonsunderopen %H" indictmentbytheInternationalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslavia.TheU.S.Government &4 # modifiedtheserestrictionsin2003andtheDepartmentofCommercewillpublishchangestothe k' !$ EARtoreflectthesemodifications. W( "%  Angola  /*#' ThePresidentdeclaredanationalemergencyrelatingto_UNITA_ԀbyExecutiveOrder12865on +$( September26,1993,incoordinationwithinternationalsanctionsadoptedbythe_UNSC_.The ,%) U.S.sanctionswerefurthertightenedbyExecutiveOrder13069ofDecember12,1997,and K ExecutiveOrder13098ofAugust18,1998.TheUnitedStatestooktheseactionsinaccordance 7 withUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolutions1127ofAugust28,1997,Resolution1173of # June12,1998,andResolution1176ofJune26,1998.   ExecutiveOrder13298ofMay6,2003,liftedallsanctionsimposedon_UNITA_Ԁintheseearlier   ExecutiveOrders.WiththesuccessfulimplementationoftheLusakaProtocolandthe   demilitarizationof_UNITA_,thePresidentdeterminedthatthecircumstancesthatledtothe  t declarationofanationalemergencyonSeptember26,1993,nolongerexist.Theliftingof  ` sanctionswasconsistentwithUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1448,whichliftedthe L  measuresimposedpursuanttopriorSecurityCouncilresolutionsrelatedto_UNITA_.The 8  DepartmentofCommercewillpublishanamendmenttotheEAR,whichwillremovereferences o$  tothesanctionsadministeredbytheDepartmentoftheTreasury. [   ChemicalandBiologicalControls  3  OnJune10,2003,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedarulereflectingdecisionsreachedby   theAustraliaGroup(AG)in_intersessional_ԀagreementandattheJune2002AGPlenary.Atthe  urgingoftheUnitedStates,thecontrolthresholdsin_ECCN_Ԁ2B352for_fermenters_Ԁandcrossflow  filtrationequipmentwereloweredtocaptureadditionalequipmentthatcouldbeusedinthe  productionofchemicalweapons.Theruleaddedeightbiologicaltoxinstothelistofcontrolled  itemsontheCCL.Additionally,editorialcorrectionsweremadetosomechemicalrelated l entriestoclarifythescopeofAGcontrols. X  MissileTechnologyControls  {0 Afterseveralyearsofdebate,agreementwasreachedintheMissileTechnologyControlRegime c (_MTCR_)todefinemissilerangeandpayload,keydeterminantsofthelevelofcontrolapplicable O torocketandunmannedaerialvehiclesystems.Insummary,payloadisnowdefinedasthat ; portionofarocketsystemorunmannedaerialvehiclethatisnotusedtomaintainflight;rangeis ' definedasthemaximumdistancethatarocketsystemorunmannedaerialvehicleiscapableof   travelinginstableflightasmeasuredbytheprojectionofitstrajectoryoverthesurfaceofthe   Earth.Clarifyingamendmentstothescopeandjurisdictionofcontrolsonglobalnavigation ! satellitereceivingequipmentwerealsoacceptedby_MTCR_Ԁmembers.OnSeptember22,2003, " theDepartmentofCommercepublishedaruleincorporatingtheserevisionsintheEAR. #x   HighPerformanceComputers  %P" OnJanuary14,2003,theDepartmentofCommerceamendedtheEARtoimplementrevisions &8 # thatwereagreeduponintheFebruary2002meetingofthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementonExport o'$!$ ControlsforConventionalArmsandDualUseGoodsandTechnologies(_Wassenaar_ [("% Arrangement).Thisruleremovedlicenserequirementsforexportsand_reexports_Ԁofgeneral G)"& purposemicroprocessorstomostdestinationstoconformwithchangesintheListofDualUse 3*#' GoodsandTechnologiesmaintainedandagreedtobygovernmentsparticipatinginthe +$( _Wassenaar_ԀArrangement.Thisruleretainedlicenserequirementsforexportsand_reexports_Ԁto  ,%) designatedterroristsupportingcountries.Inaddition,thisruleestablishedanewlicense K requirementfortheexportor_reexport_Ԁofgeneralpurposemicroprocessorsif,atthetimeofthe 7 exportor_reexport_,theexporteror_reexporter_Ԁknows,hasreasontoknow,orisinformedbyBIS # thattheitemwillbeorisintendedtobeusedforamilitaryenduseinacountrythatisofconcern   fornationalsecurityreasonsorbyamilitaryenduserinsuchacountry.    EncryptionItems    OnJune17,2003,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedaruletoimplementchangestothe  p _Wassenaar_ԀArrangementListofdualuseitems(finalizedinDecember2002)andclarifyU.S.  \ exportcontrolsoncertainlimitedusesofencryption.Thisupdateclarifieswhenencryption H  commoditiesandsoftwaremaybegivende_minimis_Ԁtreatment,whenshortrangewireless 4  devicesincorporatingencryptionmaybegivenmassmarketorretailtreatment,andthatspecially k  designedmedicalequipmentandsoftwarearenotcontrolledasencryptionor information W  securityitemsundertheEAR.Therulealsoexpandstheauthorizationsaccordingtowhich C  mosttravelersdepartingtheUnitedStatesmaytakeencryptionfortheirpersonaluse.Finally, /  thisruleimplementsthe2002_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementagreementtoeliminatenationalsecurity   basedcontrolsoncertaintypesof personalizedsmartcardsandequipmentcontrollingaccessto  copyrightprotecteddata.   Nuclear_Nonproliferation_   OnOctober22,2003,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedaruleinresponsetoanagreement h amongtheNuclearSuppliersGroup(_NSG_)membercountriestoestablishexportlicensing T proceduresforthetransferofitemsidentifiedontheAnnextothe Nuclear-RelatedDual-Use @ Equipment,Materials,andRelatedTechnologyList,whichispublishedbytheInternational w, AtomicEnergyAgency.  f   c  XXtPartII:FormatofAnalysisUsedinChapters212ofThisReport#XtXW#  ; Chapters212ofthisreportdescribethevariousexportcontrolprogramsmaintainedbythe ;  DepartmentofCommerceforforeignpolicyreasons.Eachoftheseprogramsisextendedfor '! anotheryear.Theanalysisrequiredforsuchanextensionispresentedineachchapterinthe " formatdescribedbelow. "  ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  $! Thissectiondefinestheexportcontrolsmaintainedforaparticularforeignpolicypurposethat %t" areimposedorextendedfortheyear2004.Eachofthefollowingchaptersdescribesthe &` # licensingrequirementsandpolicyapplicabletoaparticularcontrol. 'L!$  AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct  o)$#& Section6(f)(2)oftheActrequiresthattheSecretaryofCommercedescribethepurposeofthe W* $' controlsandconsiderordeterminewhethertoimposeorextendforeignpolicycontrolsbasedon C+$( specifiedcriteria,includingconsultationefforts,economicimpact,alternativemeans,andforeign /,%) availability.Foreachcontrolprogram,theDepartmentofCommercesconclusionsarebasedon K thefollowingrequiredcriteria: 7  A.ThePurposeoftheControl    Thissectionprovidestheforeignpolicypurposeandrationaleforeachparticularcontrol.    B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce   t ThissectiondescribestheSecretarysdeterminationsorconsiderationswithrespecttothe L  followingcriteria: 8   *,X` XX*1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. Whethersuchcontrolsare [  likelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurposeinlightofotherfactors,includingthe K  availabilityfromothercountriesofthegoodsortechnologysubjecttocontrol,andwhetherthe 7  foreignpolicypurposecanbeachievedthroughnegotiationsorotheralternativemeans. #   2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. Whetherthecontrolsarecompatiblewiththe  foreignpolicyobjectivesoftheUnitedStatesandwithoverallU.S.policytowardthecountryor  theproscribedendusesubjecttothecontrols.   3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. Whetherthereactionofothercountriestotheextensionof d suchexportcontrolsbytheUnitedStatesislikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectiveinachieving T theintendedforeignpolicypurposeortobecounterproductivetootherU.S.foreignpolicy @ interests. w,  4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry. Whethertheeffectofthecontrolsonthe O exportperformanceoftheUnitedStates,itscompetitivepositionintheinternationaleconomy, ? theinternationalreputationoftheUnitedStatesasareliablesupplierofgoodsandtechnology,or +  theeconomicwell-beingofindividualU.S.companiesexceedsthebenefittoU.S.foreignpolicy ! objectives.z v#  3       "   "  5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. WhethertheUnitedStateshastheabilitytoenforcethe K controls.Someenforcementproblemsarecommontoallforeignpolicycontrols._ v#  4      _ԀOther ;  enforcementproblemsareassociatedwithonlyoneorafewcontrols.Eachcontrolhasbeen ' assessedtodetermineifithaspresented,orisexpectedtopresent,anuncharacteristic   enforcementproblem.    C.ConsultationwithIndustry    Thissectiondiscussestheresultsofconsultationswithindustryleadingtotheextensionor  d impositionofcontrols.InaOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentof P  CommercesolicitedcommentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybased <  exportcontrols.CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartmentsTechnicalAdvisory s(  Committees(_TACs_)thatadviseBIS,aswellasfromthePresidentsExportCouncil _  SubcommitteeonExportAdministration.Commentsalsoweresolicitedfromthepublicviathe K  BIS_webpage_.ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember21,2003.Eightcommentswere 7  receivedfromthefollowingcompaniesandorganizations:AnalogDevices,Inc.;Federal #  ExpressCorporation;IndustryCoalitiononTechnologyTransfer(_ICOTT_);JupiterAluminum  Corp.;NationalChamberofIndustries&Commerce,_U.P._ԀIndia;SandiaNationalLaboratories  CooperativeMonitoringCenter;theSensorsandInstrumentationTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee  (_SITAC_);andSunMicrosystems.Adetailedreviewofthecommentsreceivedisavailablein  AppendixI. t  D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  L ThissectionreflectsconsultationsonthecontrolswithcountriesthatcooperatewiththeUnited o$ Statesonmultilateralcontrolsandwithothercountriesasappropriate. [  E.AlternativeMeans  3 Thissectionspecifiesthenatureandresultsofanyalternativemeansattemptedtoaccomplishthe  ! foreignpolicypurpose,orthereasonsforextendingthecontrolswithoutattemptinganysuch ! alternativemeans. "  #   F.ForeignAvailability  K Thissectionconsiderstheavailabilityfromothercountriesofgoodsortechnologycomparableto # thosesubjecttotheproposedexportcontrol.Italsodescribesthenatureandresultsoftheefforts   madepursuanttoSection6(h)oftheActtosecurethecooperationofforeigngovernmentsin   controllingtheforeignavailabilityofsuchcomparablegoodsortechnology.Inaccordancewith   theAct,foreignavailabilityconsiderationsdonotapplytoexportcontrolsineffectpriortoJune   12,1985,tocontrolsmaintainedforhumanrightsandantiterrorismreasons,ortocontrolsin  t supportoftheinternationalobligationsoftheUnitedStates.   `     XXt(CHAPTER2#XtXfu# s(     XXtCrimeControl/HumanRights s ( (Sections742.7,742.11,742.17)#XtXu#_V v#  5      _  < uExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  s( AsrequiredbySection6(n)oftheExportAdministrationActof1979,asamended,theUnited K  Statescontrolstheexportsofcrimecontrolanddetectionitemstoreflectitsconcernsaboutthe 7  observanceofhumanrightsinvariouscountriesoftheworld.TheU.S.Governmentrequiresa #  licensetoexportmostcrimecontrolanddetectioninstruments,equipment,relatedtechnology,   andsoftwaretoalldestinations,g ԀexceptAustralia,Japan,NewZealand,andmembersofthe   NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO).Alicenseisrequiredtoexportcertainf  g Ԁcrime  controlitemsf  g f  g Ԁincludingrestrainttypedevices(suchashandcuffs)anddischargetypearms(such  as_tasers_)g f  g Ԁtof  ԀalldestinationsexceptCanada.Speciallydesignedimplementsoftortureand t thumbscrews,whicharepartofthecrimecontrolcategory,requirealicenseforexporttoany ` destination.Inaddition,theU.S.Governmentmaintainsexportlicenserequirementsforcertain L crimecontrolitemsinfurtheranceoftheInterAmericanConventionAgainsttheIllicit 8 ManufacturingofandTraffickinginFirearms,Ammunition,Explosives,andotherRelated o$ Material. [  LicensingPolicy 3 CrimeControl/ImplementsofTorture    f  TheU.S.Governmenthasag f  g f  g Ԁgeneralf  g f  g Ԁpolicyofdenialforapplicationstoexportf  g Ԁcrimecontrol  itemsf  Ԁtoacountryinwhichthegovernmentengagesinaconsistentpatternofgrossviolationsof   internationallyrecognizedhumanrights.Forothercountries,theU.S.Governmentwillconsider ! applicationsforcrimecontrolitemsfavorably,onacasebycasebasis,unlessthereiscivil "l disorderinthecountryorregionconcerned,orthereisevidencethatthegovernmentmayhave #X violatedhumanrightsandthatthejudicioususeofexportcontrolswouldbehelpfulin $D  minimizingregionalinstability,deterringthedevelopmentofaconsistentpatternofsuch {%0! violations,orindemonstratingU.S.oppositiontosuchviolations. g& "   S'!# f  TheU.S.Governmenthasaf  policyofdenialforanylicenseapplicationg Ԁtoexportspecially K  designedimplementsoftortureandthumbscrewsf  g .Noapplicationsfortheexportoftheseitems 7 weresubmittedin2003. #  China    Followingthe1989militaryassaultondemonstratorsbythePeoplesRepublicofChina(PRC)   inTiananmenSquare,theU.S.GovernmentimposedconstraintsontheexporttothePRCof   certainitemsontheCommerceControlList(CCL).Section902(a)(4)oftheForeignRelations  p AuthorizationActforFY19901991,PublicLaw101246,suspendstheissuanceoflicenses  \ underSection6(n)oftheActfortheexportofanycrimecontrolordetectioninstrumentsor H  equipmenttothePRC.ThePresidentmayterminatethesuspensionbyreportingtoCongress 4  thatChinahasmadeprogressonpoliticalreformorthatitisinthenationalinterestoftheUnited k  Statestoterminatethesuspension.In2003,thePresidentdidnotexercisehisauthorityto W  terminatethissuspension. C   Indonesia    TheU.S.Governmentdeniesapplicationstoexportf  certaincrimecontrolitemstoIndonesia,  subjecttonarrowexceptions,consistentwithSection582oftheForeignOperations,Export  FinancingandRelatedPrograms1995Appropriationsand1994SupplementalAppropriations  Act(PublicLaw103306). |  Rwanda  T InconformitywithU.N.Resolution918andtheU.N.ParticipationAct,theU.S.Government < maintainsanembargoonthesaleorsupplyofarmsandrelatedmaterieltocertainentitiesin s( Rwanda.Asaresult,applicationstoexportitemscontrolledforcrimecontrolanddetection _ reasonsontheCCLtosuchentitiesaresubjecttoageneralpolicyofdenial. K  OrganizationofAmericanStatesMemberCountries  # TheDepartmentofCommercepublishedf  af  Ԁruleg ԀinApril1999f  g Ԁreflectingtheprovisionsofthe   OrganizationofAmericanStates(OAS)ModelRegulationsfortheControloftheInternational   MovementofFirearmsg .TheDepartmentofCommercedesignedtheseregulationstoharmonize ! importandexportcontrolsoverthelegalinternationalmovementoffirearmsamongOAS " memberstatesandtoestablishprocedurestopreventtheillegaltraffickingoffirearmsamong #p  thesecountries. $\! Undertheseprovisions,theDepartmentofCommerceg maintainsf  g Ԁforeignpolicycontrolson &4 # exportsofCommercecontrolledfirearms,includingshotgunswithabarrellengthof18inchesor k' !$ overandparts,buckshotshells,shotgunshellsandparts,andopticalsightingdevicestoallOAS W( "% membercountriesg ,includingCanada.Itemssubjecttothesecontrolsareidentifiedby FC C)"& Column1inthe LicenseRequirementssectionofthecorrespondingExportControl /*#' ClassificationNumbers(_ECCNs_).InsupportoftheOASModelRegulations,theU.S. +$( Governmentf  requiresf  ԀanImportCertificate(IC)g forg ԀtheexporttoallOASmembercountriesof ,%) thoseitemsaffectedbytheregulations.Ingeneral,theDepartmentofCommerceapproves K licenseapplicationsfortheexportoffirearmstoOASmembercountriesiftheapplicationis 7 supportedbyanIC.TheDepartmentofCommercedeniesapplicationsthatinvolveenduses # linkedtodrugtrafficking,terrorism,internationalorganizedcrimef  ,andothercriminalactivities.   Asdiscussedlaterinthischapter,duringFY2003approximately55percentofallapproved   crimecontrollicenseapplicationswereforitemsalsocontrolledforFCreasonstoOASmember   countries.    OtherLicensingConsiderations   ` TheDepartmentofStateannuallycompilestheCountryReportsonHumanRightsPractices. H  TheDepartmentofStatepreparesthesereportsinaccordancewithSections116(d)and502B(b) 4  oftheForeignAssistanceActof1961,asamended,forsubmissiontoCongress.Thefactual k  informationpresentedinthesereportsisasignificantelementinlicensingrecommendations W  madebytheDepartmentofState.InaccordancewiththeForeignAssistanceAct,thereisa C  policyofdenialforlicenseapplicationstoexportcrimecontrolitemstoanycountrywhose /  governmentengagesinaconsistentpatternofgrossviolationsofhumanrights.   TheInternationalReligiousFreedomActof1998(_IRFA_)callsforthePresidenttotake  diplomaticorotherappropriateactionwithrespecttoanycountrythatengagesinortolerates  violationsofreligiousfreedom._IRFA_Ԁalsoprovidesfortheimpositionofeconomicmeasuresor  commensurateactionswhenacountryhasengagedinsystematic,ongoing,egregiousviolations l ofreligiousfreedomaccompaniedbyflagrantdenialsoftherightstolife,liberty,orthesecurity X ofpersons,suchastorture,enforcedandarbitrarydisappearances,orarbitraryprolonged D detention.Forsuchcountries,_IRFA_ԀprovidesthattheDepartmentofCommerce,with {0 DepartmentofStateconcurrence,shallincludeontheCCLforreasonsofcrimecontrolf  Ԁor g detectiong ,andrequireexportlicensesfor,itemsthatarebeingusedf  g ,f  g Ԁorareintendedforusef  g ,f  g  S directlyandinsignificantmeasure,tocarryoutparticularlysevereviolationsofreligious ? freedom.f  g InOctober2001,f  g ԀtheSecretaryofStateg ,actingundertheauthorityofthePresident, + redesignatedfivecountries!Burmaf  g ,China,Iran,Iraq,andSudan!anddesignatedonenew   country!NorthKorea!as countriesg Ԁofparticularf  g concernundertheActg Ԁforf  Ԁhavingengagedg Ԁinf  g  ! org toleratedf  g Ԁparticularlysevereviolationsf  Ԁofreligiousfreedomg .Thesedesignationswere ! reiteratedinthemostrecentDepartmentofStateInternationalReligiousFreedomReporttothe " CongressonOctober7,2002.TheDepartmentofCommercehasnotaddedadditionalitemsto #|  theCCLpursuantto_IRFA_,butitreviewslicenseapplicationsforcrimecontrolitemstothese $h! destinationsg byapplyingthemostrestrictivelicensingpolicyapplicabletosuchcountries.g  %T"  m-./01234(03   AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct  w',!$  A.ThePurposeoftheControl  O)#& ThesecontrolsseektoensurethatU.S.-origincrimecontrolequipmentisnotexportedto '+$( countrieswhosegovernmentsfailtorespectinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights,orwhere ,%) civildisorderisprevalent.Denialofexportlicenseapplicationstosuchcountrieshelpsto K preventf  humanrightsviolationsandclearlysignalsU.S.concernsabouthumanrightsinthese 7 countries.Thef  g licenserequirementsformostdestinationsg Ԁallowg Ԁforclosef  g Ԁmonitoringofexports # ofcertaincrimecontrolitemsthatcouldbemisusedtocommithumanrightsviolations.   Controlsonimplementsoftorturesimilarlyhelptoensurethatsuchitemsarenotexportedfrom   theUnitedStates.TheDepartmentofCommercehasneitherreceivedapplicationsforexportof    speciallydesignedimplementsoftorturenorwoulditf  approveg Ԁtheexportofsuchitems.In  t addition,theDepartmentofCommerceapprovednolicenseapplicationfortheexportof  ` _thumbcuffs_. L   B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce  o$   1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose .TheSecretaryhas G  determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose,inlight 7  ofotherfactors,includingthefactthattheforeignpolicypurposecannotbeachievedthrough #  negotiationsorotheralternativemeans.Thelackofcomplementarycontrolsbyotherproducer  nationslimitstheeffectivenessofthesecontrolsinpreventinghumanrightsviolations.The  controlsrestricthumanrightsviolatorsaccesstoU.S.-origingoodsandprovideimportant  symbolicevidenceofU.S.supportfortheprinciplesofhumanrights.Theimpositionof  stringentlicensingrequirementsforcrimecontrolitemsenablestheU.S.Governmenttomore t closelymonitoritemsthatcouldbeusedinhumanrightsviolations. `  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthese 8 controlsarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesandwillnothaveanysignificant s( adverseforeignpolicyconsequenceswiththeextensionofthiscontrolprogram.Thiscontrol _ programisfullyconsistentwithU.S.policyinsupportofinternationallyrecognizedhuman K rights,asexpressedbysuccessiveAdministrationsandCongress. 7  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadversereactionto ! thesecontrolsisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectivenorwillanyadversereactionby ! othercountriesbecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests.Thesecontrolsareunique, " serveadistinctforeignpolicypurpose,andariseoutofdeeplyheldconvictionsoftheU.S. #  Governmentandpeople.Othercountriescurrentlydonothaveequivalentregulations,butmany $x! haverestrictionsonexportsoflethalproductstoareasofcivilunrest.OnJanuary27,2003,the %d" EuropeanUnionissuedatraderegulationproposalconcerningtradeincertainequipmentand &P # productsthatcouldbeusedforcapitalpunishment,tortureorothercruel,inhumanordegrading '4&#  2  && > 0A978 0&!D " 0Saps D:D  # D0 LB4D " #  LЀ$0 9/!D 3 9 0A979 0&! " 0Policehelmetsandshields PF   T@80T@P80 XN@ "  T@80 T@ X$7,399,599 9/! 3 9 򀀀0A982 0&!D " 0Restraintdevices,e.g.,leg D  irons,shackles,handcuffs QG{0  l@229l@Q229 YOAD " l@229 l@ Y$7,135,507 9/!D 3 9 0A983 0&!" 0Speciallydesigned  implementsoftorture D: # D0   LB4" #  L$0  Ѐ 9/! 3 9 0A984 0&!g!" 0Shotgunsandbuckshot g" shotgung shells QGS# ؁@571؁@Q571 g$  YOAS%" ؁@571 ؁@ Y$19,155,315 9/!g&3 9 0A985 0&!'" 0Dischargetypearms(stun ( guns,shockbatons,etc.) QGt) e@173e@Q173 *  YOAt+" e@173 e@ Y$12,859,656 ,  9/!t-3 9 0A987 0&!?." 0Opticalsightingdevices QG?/ @514@Q514 YOA?0" @514 @ Y$39,305,608 MC!?13 # M 0E982 C94t2" #  CTechnologyforitemsunder t3 0A982/0A985 OE`4  @2@O2 WM?t5"  @2 @ W$2 MC!t63 # M 0E984 C94+ 7" #  CTechnologyforitemsunder + 8 0A984 D:!9 # D0 LB4+ :" #  L$0 + ;  9/!!<3 9 1A984 0&!"L=" 0Chemicalagentsincluding "L> teargascontaining1%orless #8? ofCSorCN PFo$$@  =@29=@P29 "LA  XN@o$$C"  =@29 =@ X$1,209,514 "LD  9/!o$$F3 9 1A985 0&!%G" 0Fingerprintingpowders,dyes %H andinks QG& I @_@125@_@Q125 %J  YOA& K" @_@125 @_@ Y$14,321,706 %L Ѐ 9/!& M3 9 3A980 0&![("N" 0Voiceprintidentificationand [("O analysisequipment OEG)"P  ?1?O1 [("Q  WM?G)"R"  ?1 ? W$8,700 [("S  9/!G)"T3 9 3A981 0&! d" 0Polygraphs,fingerprint  d analyzers,camerasand  P  equipment QG <  f@177 f@Q177  d  YOA <"  f@177  f@ Y$7,913,562  d  9/! < 3 9 3D980 0&!s  " 0Softwareforitemsunder s   3A980and3A981 PF_    (@12(@P12 XN@s "  (@12 (@ X$3,372,498 9/!s 3 9 3E980 0&!(" 0Technologyforitemsunder ( 3A980and3A981 D: # D0 (  LB4" #  L$0 (  9/!3 9 4A003* 0&!K" 0Digitalcomputersfor K computerizedfingerprint 7  equipmentonly D:#l  # D0 K  LB4#l " #  L$0 K  9/!#l 3 9 4A980 0&! !" 0Computersforfingerprint  " equipment PF #  &@11&@P11  $  XN@ %"  &@11 &@ X$5,368,925  &  9/! '3 9 4D001* 0&!X(" 0Softwareforitemsunder X) 4A003only D:D* # D0 X+  LB4D," #  L$0 X-  9/!D.3 9 4D980 0&!{/" 0Softwareforitemsunder {0 4A980 PFg1  5@215@P21 {2  XN@g3"  5@21 5@ X$1,815,493 {4  9/!g53 9 4E001* 0&!06" 0Technologyforitemsunder 07 4A003and4D001only D:8 # D0 09  LB4:" #  L$0 0;  9/!<3 9 4E980 0&!S=" 0Technologyforitemsunder S> 4A980 OE??  ?1?O1 S@  WM??A"  ?1 ? W$1 SB  9/!?C3 9 6A002c* 0&! D" 0Policemodelinfraredviewers  E only PF!F  &@11&@P11 XN@ G"  &@11 &@ X$895,695 9/! H3 9 6E001* 0&!+#tI" 0Technologyfordevelopment +#tJ ofitemsunder6A002conly D:$`K # D0 +#tL  LB4$`M" #  L$0 +#tN  9/!$`O3 9 6E002* 0&!%P" 0Technologyforproductionof %Q itemsunder6A002conly D:&R # D0 %S  LB4&T" #  L$0 %U  9/!&V3 9 9A980 0&!(LW" 0Mobilecrimescience (LX laboratories OE(8 Y  ?1?O1 (LZ  WM?(8 ["  ?1 ? W$1,250 (L\  @&/!(8 ]3 @ TOTAL 7&&!o*!^"& 7 [&Jo*!_&  0P@[1,958 c&RDo*!`"P  0 @& c$120,763,0311'%o*!a3  & 1 +"a  XXtNOTES: (1)Togivethereaderthebroadestperspectiveoftheitemscovered,#XtX؆#XXtԀTable1listsallcrimecontrol_ECCNs_ K includingthoseforwhichnolicenseapplicationsweresubmitted.(2)Those_ECCNs_Ԁmarkedwithanasterisk(*)list  itemsthatarecontrolledforcrimecontrolreasonsandforotherreasons,butthecorrespondingstatisticsrepresent  onlythecrimecontrolitemswithinthe_ECCN_.#XtX# N InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommercedenied29applicationsforcrimecontrolitemsvalued I  atabout$10.7million.Thelargestnumberofdenialsinvolvedshotguns(twelvecases),butby 5  value,dischargearmsweregreatest(duetodenialofonelicenseofhighvalue).Table2lists !  onlythosecrimecontrol_ECCNs_Ԁforwhichapplicationsweredenied.      Table2:CRIMECONTROLAPPLICATIONSDENIED(FY2003)     *td d'dd 'A dd A rdd rdd (#(#,'dd , dd ,dd ,dd +  *&&r r  * _ECCN_ 7&&&!! "&& 7 Description 7&&&!! "&& 7 Applications !  Denied 7&&&!  "&& 7   $Value >4&! 2  && > 0A979 0&!B " 0Policehelmets,shields OEB   ?1?O1 WM?B "  ?1 ? W$225 9/!B 3 9 0A982 0&! " 0Restraintdevices,e.g.,leg   irons,shackles,handcuffs OE  @2@O2    WM?"  @2 @ W$16,000    9/!3 9 0A984 0&!y." 0Shotgunsandshotgunshells PFy.  (@12(@P12 XN@y."  (@12 (@ X$348,618 9/!y. 3 9 0A985 0&!!" 0Dischargetypearms(e.g.,stun " guns,shockbatons) OE#  @5@O5 $  WM?%"  @5 @ W$10,044,817 & Ѐ 9/!'3 9 0A987 0&!e(" 0Opticalsightingdevicesfor e) firearms OEQ*   @8 @O8 e+ Ѐ WM?Q,"   @8  @ W$266,000 e-  9/!Q.3 9 1A985 0&!/" 0Fingerprintingpowders,dyes, 0 andinks OEr1  ?1?O1 WM?2"  ?1 ? W$15,236 @&/!33 @ TOTAL 7&&!= 4"& 7 U&D= 5&  0=@U29 ]&L>= 6"  0 =@& ]$10,690,8961'%= 73  & 1InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommerceapproved830exportlicenseapplicationf  g sf  g Ԁworth$41.9 E"8 millionforitemsaffectedbytheforeignpolicycontrolsonfirearmsandammunitioninstitutedin 1#9 1999insupportoftheOASModelRegulations.LicensestoCanadaaccountformore $: applicationsthananyothercountry,with474applicationsinFY2003.Approximately55  %; percentofallapprovedcrimecontrollicenseapplicationswereforitemsalsocontrolledfor %< FirearmsConventionreasonstoOASmembercountries.Thetablebelowliststhenumberand & = valueofexportlicensesthattheDepartmentofCommerceissuedforfirearms,ammunition, '!> sights,andrelateditemsaffectedbytheseforeignpolicycontrolsg appliedtoOAScountriesg inFY (n"? 2003. )Z#@  }+2%B @ TABLE3:APPLICATIONSFORFIREARMS,AMMUNITION, K @A A ANDSIGHTSTOOASCOUNTRIESAPPROVEDINFY2003  7 *td d'dd ' dd dd dd (#(#,dd ,dd ,dd ,dd +  3&&"   3_ECCN_ @&&/!s ("&& @ItemsControlled @&&/!s ("&& @Applications s ( Approved @&&/!_ "&& @  $Value s (   >4&_  2  && >OӀ0A984 0&!    0Shotgunsand    buckshotshotgun    shells H> l  p|@455p|@H  455 PFA   p|@455 p|@ Ps  $15,810,850     9/! 0 9  0A986 0&!7  0sOthershotgunshells H>7 d@165d@H  165 PFA7  d@165 d@ P   $12,730,517 7   9/!# 0 9  0A987 0&!X   0 Opticalsighting X  devicesforfirearms H>D  @j@210@j@H  210 X   PFAD   @j@210 @j@ P  Ӏ$13,317,452 X   @&/!D 0 @@  TOTAL 7&&! & 7 R&A &  0P@Rv  830 Z&ID  P  0 @& ZӀ?"$41,858,819(   & ( 5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedtheUnitedStateshasthe " abilitytoeffectivelyenforcethesecontrols.Crimecontrolitemsandimplementsoftortureare # easilyrecognizableanddonotpresentspecialenforcementproblemsrelatedtodetecting $ violationsorverifyinguse.However,enforcementcooperationwithothercountriesgenerallyis % difficultincasesinvolvingunilaterallycontrolleditems,suchasthese,andoftendependsonthe l& typeandquantityofgoodsinquestion.Inaddition,enforcementofcontrolson_reexports_Ԁis X' challengingandrestsinlargepartonthewillingnessoftherecipienttoabidebythetermsofthe D( exportlicense.TheU.S.Governmentconductspostshipmentverificationstoverifythatthe {0) listedenduserhasreceivedtheexportsandtoconfirmthattheenduserisusingthecontrolled g* itemsinawayconsistentwiththelicenseconditions. S+  C.ConsultationwithIndustry  +!- f  InaOctober21,2003,FederalRegisternotice,theDepartmentofCommercesolicited #/ commentsfromindustryontheeffectivenessofU.S.foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols. #0 CommentsweresolicitedfromallsixoftheDepartmentsTechnicalAdvisoryCommittees $1 (_TACs_),whichadvisetheBureauofIndustryandSecurity(BIS),aswellasfromthePresidents %|2 ExportCouncilSubcommitteeonExportAdministration.Commentsalsoweresolicitedfrom &h 3 thepublicviatheBISwebsite.ThecommentperiodclosedonNovember21,2003,andeight 'T!4 commentswerereceived.Whilenoneofthecommentsspecificallyaddressedcrimecontrols,the (@"5 IndustryCoalitiononTechnologyTransfer(_ICOTT_)providedgeneralcommentsaboutall w),#6 foreignpolicybasedexportcontrols,statingthatthesecontrolsareunilateralandlargely c*$7 ineffective._ICOTT_Ԁrecommendedthatunilateralcontrolsshouldonlybeusedwhenthe O+%8 symbolismoftheactofimposingcontrolsoutweighstheinjurytoAmericanworkersand ;,%9 businesses.Inaddition,_ICOTT_Ԁsuggestedthatifunilateralcontrolsaretobeimposedwhilethe K UnitedStatesnegotiateswithitstradingpartnerstoseekmultilateralsupport,thoseunilateral 7 controlsshouldbeoflimitedduration.Adetailedreviewofallcommentsreceivedcanbefound # inAppendixI.g    f  Inaddition,tf  g heDepartmentofCommercehasconsultedextensivelywithexportersofcrime   controlitemsandwithhumanrightsgroupsconcernedaboutthepotentialformisuseofsuch   itemsinvariouspartsoftheworld.Itdoessomostfrequentlybyalmostdailyconsultationwith  t exportersaboutspecificitemsproposedforexporttospecificendusersandenduses.The  ` DepartmentsofStateandCommercehaveconsultedwithAmnestyInternationaltodiscussa L  widerangeofissuesrelatingtocrimecontrolitems.TheU.S.Governmenthasmadecertain 8  changesinthelicensingpolicyandcontrolledcommoditiesinresponsetotheconcernsofhuman o$  rightsgroups. [   D.ConsultationwithOtherCountries  3  Mostothercountriesthatsupplycrimecontrolanddetectionitemshavenotimposedsimilar   exportcontrols.TheUnitedKingdomandCanadamaintaincontrolsoncertaincrimecontrol  commoditiesthataresimilartoU.S.controls.CertainEuropeanUnionmemberstatesprohibit  orimposeanauthorizationrequirementontheexportofdualuseitemsnotcoveredbythe  multilateralexportcontrolregimesforreasonsofpublicsecurityorhumanrightsconsiderations. p TheU.S.Governmentconsultsregularlywithothermembercountriesinthe_Wassenaar_ \ Arrangement,theNuclearSuppliersGroup,theMissileTechnologyControlRegime,andthe H AustraliaGroupregardingU.S.exportcontrols.OnJanuary27,2003,theEuropeanUnion 4 issuedatraderegulationproposalconcerningtradeincertainequipmentandproductsthatcould k  beusedforcapitalpunishment,torture,orothercruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentor W  punishment. C  E.AlternativeMeans    Section6(n)oftheActrequiresf  g theDepartmentofCommercetomaintainf  g exportcontrolson ! crimecontrolanddetectionequipment.Alternativemeansdonotsatisfythisstatutoryrequire " ment.TheU.S.Governmentdoes,however,usediplomaticefforts,sanctions,andothermeans #  toconveyitsconcernsaboutthehumanrightssituationinvariouscountries. $l!  ,%)  F.ForeignAvailability  K TheforeignavailabilityprovisiondoesnotapplytoSection6(n)oftheAct._W v#  6      _ԀCongresshas # recognizedtheusefulnessf  g andsymbolicvaluef  g ofthesecontrolsinsupportingU.S.Government   policyonhumanrightsissues,foreignavailabilitynotwithstanding.     XXt  yCHAPTER3 ( RegionalStability  P (Section742.6)#XtX#  d ExportControlProgramDescriptionandLicensingPolicy  P Rf  g egionalstability(RS)f  g controlsensurethatexportsand_reexports_Ԁofcontrolleditemsdonot (  contributedirectlyorindirectlytoacountrysmilitarycapabilitiesinamannerthatwouldalteror u  destabilizearegionsmilitarybalancecontrarytotheforeignpolicyinterestsoftheUnited a  Statesg .Thiscontroltraditionallycoversitemsspeciallydesignedormodifiedformilitary M  purposesandcertaindualusecommoditiesthatcanbeusedtomanufacturemilitaryequipment. 9  OnApril3,2003,theDepartmentofCommercepublishedanamendmenttothef  Export  AdministrationRegulations(EAR)f  Ԁthatexpandsthescopeofcontrolsonexplosivedetection  equipment.Theamendmentmovedexplosivedetectionequipmentfrom_ECCN_Ԁ2A993to_ECCN_  2A983.TheDepartmentalsoimposednewlicenserequirementsfortheexportand_reexport_Ԁof t relatedsoftwareandtechnology,undernewlycreated_ECCNs_Ԁ2D983and2E983.g f  g ԀWiththis ` amendment,theDepartmentofCommercehasimposedalicenserequirementforRSreasonsfor L theexportofexplosivedetectionequipment,softwareandtechnologytof  g f  g Ԁalldestinationsexcept 8 membersoftheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO),Australia,Japan,andNewZealandf  g f  . $ Theamendmentisdesignedtoenhancethesecurityandsafetyofairlinetravelandphysical q structures,includinggovernmentbuildings.TheDepartmentofStatesDirectorateforDefense ] TradeControlsisencouragingmanufacturersofsuchequipmenttoseekconfirmationoftheir I individualitemtransferstoDepartmentofCommerceexportlicensingjurisdictionbyusingthe 5  CommodityJurisdiction(22_CFR_Ԁ120.4)process.f  g  !!  LicensingPolicy  " f  Section742.6oftf  hef  EARf  g Ԁrequiresf  g Ԁalicensef  g ԀforRSreasonstoexportcertainimageintensifier $p  tubes,infraredfocalplanearrays,certainsoftwareandtechnologyforinertialnavigationsystems, %\! gyroscopesandaccelerometers,toalldestinationsexceptCanadaf  g .Alllicenseapplicationsfor &H " theseitemsarereviewedonacasebycasebasistodeterminewhethertheexportcould '4!# contribute,directlyorindirectly,toacountrysmilitarycapabilitiesinamannerthatwould ( "$ destabilizeoralteraregionsmilitarybalancecontrarytoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests. m) #%   E+$' Section742.6oftf  heEARf  g Ԁrequiresalicenseforf  RSreasonsf  g Ԁtoexportexplosivedetection a  equipmentandrelatedsoftwareandtechnology,militaryrelatedf  g Ԁitems(e.g.,certainvehiclesand M traineraircraft),andcertaincommoditiesusedtomanufacturemilitaryequipmenttoall 9 destinationsexceptmembernationsoff  Ԁg NATOf  g ,Australia,Japan,andNewZealand.TheU.S. %  Governmentwillgenerallyconsiderapplicationsforsuchlicensesfavorably,onacasebycase   basis,unlesstheexportwouldsignificantlyg affectf  g Ԁregionalstability.     AnalysisofControlasRequiredbySection6(f)oftheAct   ` ' A.ThePurposeoftheControl  8  ThiscontrolprovidesamechanismfortheU.S.Governmenttomonitortheexportoftheseitems q  torestricttheiruseininstancesthatwouldadverselyaffectregionalstabilityorthemilitary ]  balancewithinaregionandtoprotectthenationalsecurityf  g andforeignpolicyinterestsg ofthe I  UnitedStates.Thepurposeoftheexf  g f  g paf  nsionofcontrolsonexplosivedetectionequipmentg Ԁg and 5  impositionofcontrolsonrelatedsoftwareandtechnologyf  g Ԁf  g istoenhancethesecurityandsafetyof ! airlinetravelworldwideandphysicalstructuresincludinggovernmentbuildings.    B.Considerationsand/orDeterminationsoftheSecretaryofCommerce    1.  ProbabilityofAchievingtheIntendedForeignPolicyPurpose. f  TheSecretaryhas \ determinedthatthesecontrolsarelikelytoachievetheintendedforeignpolicypurpose,inlight L ofotherfactors,includingtheavailabilityoftheseRScontrolleditemsfromothercountriesand 8 thatmostoftheitemssubjecttothesecontrolsarealsocontrolled,asaresultofinternational $ negotiations,bytheUnitedStatespartnersinthe_Wassenaar_ԀArrangementandtheMissile q TechnologyControlRegime(_MTCR_).Regionalstabilitycontrols,includingthenewand ] expandedf  g Ԁcontrolsonexplosivedetectiong g equipment,software,andtechnologyf  g f  ԀcontributetoU.S. I nationalsecurityandforeignpolicyobjectivesbyenablingtheUnitedStatestorestricttheuseor 5  availabilityofcertainf  g f  g sensitivef  g f  g U.S.origingoodsandtechnologiesthatwouldadverselyaffect !! regionalstabilityorthemilitarybalanceincertainareas.  "  2.  CompatibilitywithForeignPolicyObjectives .f  g TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatthese #  controlsarecompatiblewithU.S.foreignpolicyobjectivesandwillnothaveanysignificant $t! adverseforeignpolicyconsequenceswiththeextensionofthesecontrols.Rf  g egionalstability %`" controls,includingtheg f  g expandedf  Ԁandnewcontrolsonexplosivedetectiong f  equipment,software, &L # andtechnologyf  g f  g ԀareconsistentwithU.S.foreignpolicygoalstopromotepeaceandstabilityand '8!$ preventU.S.exportsthatmightcontributetoweaponsproduction,f  g Ԁdestabilizingf  Ԁmilitary ($"% capabilities,orterroristacts. q)#&  3.  ReactionofOtherCountries .TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadversereactionto I+$( thesecontrolsisnotlikelytorenderthecontrolsineffectivenorwillanyadversereactionby 9,%) othercountriesbecounterproductivetoU.S.foreignpolicyinterests.Anumberofother a countrieslimitexportsofitemsandtechnologieswithmilitaryapplicationstoareasofconcern, M recognizingthatsuchf  g f  g itemsf  g Ԁandtechnologiescouldadverselyaffectregionalstabilityandmilitary 9 balances.Forexample,theUnitedStatesandothermembercountriesofthe_Wassenaar_ %  Arrangementeachhavetheirownnationalcontrolsontheexportofcertainnightvisiondevices.   Allmembersofthe_MTCR_Ԁmaintaincontrolsonsoftwareandtechnologyrelatedtomissile   guidanceandcontroldevices.AlthoughothercountriesmayobjecttonewunilateralRS   controls,alliesandpartnersoftheUnitedStatessupportU.S.effortsagainstg regionalconflictand  t f  terrorismandappreciatetheneedtokeepcertainequipmentandtechnologiesfromf  g thosewho  ` couldmisusetheitemstodestabilizecountriesorregionsf  g . L   4.  EconomicImpactonUnitedStatesIndustry .TheSecretaryhasdeterminedthatanyadverse $  effectofthesecontrolsontheeconomyoftheUnitedStates,includingonthecompetitive u  positionoftheUnitedStatesintheinternationaleconomy,doesnotexceedthebenefittoU.S. a  foreignpolicyobjectives.Itemscontrolledforregionalstabilityf  g reasonsf  generallyrequiref   M  g licensef  g sf  g ԀforexporttoalldestinationsexceptNATOcountries,Australia,Japan,g ԀandNew 9  Zealand,includingtheexpandedandnewcontrolsonexplosivedetectionequipmentandrelated % softwareandtechnology.CertainRScontrolledf  g Ԁitems,includingthosecontrolledconcurrently  formissiletechnologyreasonsandcamerascontrolledunder_ECCN_Ԁ6A003,however,require  f  g licensesforexportg ԀtoalldestinationsexceptCanada.  InFY2003,theDepartmentofCommerceapproved2,883licenseapplicationsforf  itemsf  g  ` controlledforRSreasons,f  g Ԁwithatotalvalueof$1,101million.Sixteenapplicationsforthese L items(allwerecamerasin6A003)weredenied,withatotalvalueof$496,210.Inaddition,the 8 DepartmentofCommercereturnedwithoutaction(_RWA_)176applicationsg ,valuedat$21.5 $ million.Mostofthe_RWA_swereduetog commodityjurisdictionquestionsinvolvingthe q DepartmentofStateorf  g Ԁbecausef  Ԁinsufficientenduserorenduseinformationg Ԁwasprovidedf  g .The ] majorityof_RWA_Ԁcases,130ofthe176,wereforimagingcamerasg classifiedunderg f  g Ԁ_ECCN_ I 6A003. 5  Thelicensingvolumeforitemscontrolledforregionalstabilitywassignificantlylargerthanin  " FY2002,inwhichtheDepartmentofCommerceapproved1,662licenseapplicationsforf  itemsf  g  " controlledforRSreasons,f  g Ԁwithatotalvalueof$441million.Thisincreaseisduetoseveral #  factors.First,thecommercialmarketfornightvision/thermalimagingcamerascontrolledin $p! _ECCN_Ԁ6A003isgrowingrapidly.Second,BISimposednewregionalstabilitycontrolson %\" explosivedetectionequipmentandrelatedtechnology(_ECCN_Ԁ2A983,2D983and2E983). &H # Lastly,regionalstabilitycontrolswereappliedtoadditional_ECCNs_Ԁasaresultofthe space '4!$ qualifiedruleagreementsinlate2002. ( "% Thetablethatfollowsliststhetotalnumberandvalueby_ECCN_Ԁofexportlicensesthatthe Y*#' DepartmentofCommerceissuedforregionalstabilityitemsduringFY2003: E+$(  1,%) @  RegionalStabilityApplicationsApproved(FiscalYear2003)  a *{|fd ddd dd dd dd (#(#,dd ,[dd ,dd ,rdd +  *&&99 *_ECCN_ 7&&&!<"&& 7Description 7&&&!<"&& 7Numberof < Applications 7&&&! ("&& 7DollarValue >4&<"  && >1B018.a 9/!  9Equipmentfortheproductionofmilitary    explosivesandsolidpropellants D:!   # D0 C94  " #  C$0 9/!  " 92A983 9/!u   9Explosivesdetectionequipment PF!u   =@29=@P29 OE@u "  =@29 =@ O$4,432,618 9/!u " 92B018 9/! 9EquipmentontheInternationalMunitions  List D:!  # D0 LB4" #  LЀ$0 9/! 92D983 9/!a  9Softwareforequipmentin2A983 OE!a   @2@O2 ND?a "  @2 @ N$0 9/!a " 92E983 9/!  9Technologyforequipmentin2A983 OE!   ?1?O1 ND? "  ?1 ? N$0 9/! " 96A002.a.1 a ,.a.2,.a.3,. M c,.e 9/!9  9Opticaldetectorsanddirectviewimaging a! equipmentincorporatingimageintensifier M" tubesorfocalplanearrays PF!9#  A@35A@P35 OE@a$"  A@35 A@ O$3,588,251 9/!a%" 96A003.b. X& 3,.b.4 9/!D' 9Imagingcamerasincorporatingimage X( intensifiersorfocalplanearrays XN!D) 8@2588P8@X2,588 WMHX*"P 8@2588 8@ W$642,177,201 9/!X+" 96A008.j.1 9/!%, 9Spacequalified_LIDAR_Ԁequipment J@!%- # PJ0 I?:%."P #  I$0 9/!%/" 96A998.b 9/!D0 9Spacequalified_LIDAR_Ԁequipmentfor D1 meteorologicalobservation J@!02 # PJ0 I?:D3"P #  I$0 9/!D4" 96D001 9/!5 9Softwarefordevelopment/productionof 6 6A002,6A003,or6A008 J@!7 # PJ0 I?:8"P #  I$0 9/!9" 96D991 9/!} : 9Softwarefordevelopment/production/use } ; of6A998.b J@!i!< # PJ0 I?:} ="P #  I$0 \R!} >" N@6E001N@\6E001 [QC"? N@6E001 N@ [Technologyforthedevelopmentof "@ equipment,materials,orsoftware #tA controlledby6A,6B,6C,or6D OE!$`B  @3@O3 ND?"C"  @3 @ N$2 \R!"D" @6E002@\6E002 [QCA&E @6E002 @ [Technologyfortheproductionof A&F equipmentormaterialscontrolledby6A, -' G 6B,or6C OE!(!H  @2@O2 ND?A&I"  @2 @ N$201,000 9/!A&J" 96E991 9/!)8#K 9Technologyforproduction,development )8#L oruseofitemsin6A998.b OE!*$$M  @2@O2 ND?)8#N"  @2 @ N$0 9/!)8#O" 97D001 9/!1 d 9Softwareforthedevelopmentor 1 d  productionofequipmentin7Aor7B OE! P  @5@O5 ND?1 d"  @5 @ N$3 \R!1 d" Q@7E001Q@\7E001 [QC  Q@7E001 Q@ [Technologyforthedevelopmentofitems   in7A,7B,or7D PF!   (@12(@P12 OE@  "  (@12 (@ O$322,553 \R!  " @7E002@\7E002 [QC <  @7E002 @ [Technologyfortheproductionofitemsin  <  7Aor7B OE!(   @5@O5 ND? <"  @5 @ N$2,506 \R! <" ѵaU7E101ѵaU\7E101 u  [QCa ѵaU7E101 ѵaU [Technologyfortheuseofitemsin7A,7B, u or7D PF!a  5@215@P21 OE@u"  5@21 5@ O$9,102 9/!u" 99A018.a,.   b 9/!  9Militarytraineraircraftandvehicles   designedormodifiedformilitaryuse QG!  n@244n@Q244 PFA " n@244 n@ P$456,616,153 c&R! " 89C9E01889Cc9E018 b&QCM  89C9E018 89C& bTechnologyforthedevelopmentofitems M  in9A018.a,.b e&T!9l &  "@9P"@e9 d&SEM "P  "@9 "@& d$85,051 @&/!M "& @TOTAL @&/!!& @ h&W!"& @2883P@h2,883 g&VH#"P @2883 @& g$1,101,000,3091'%$"  & 10  XXtNOTE: Thenumberofsubcategoriesundercertain_ECCNs_Ԁthatarenotcontrolledforregionalstabilityreasons % isinsignificantandisnotreflectedinthisdata.#XtXql#&(#(#  5.  EffectiveEnforcementofControl. TheSecretaryhasdeterminedtha